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The ubiquity of technology enables unprecedented contact between people, yet it neglects
essential face-to-face communion; e-mail, text-messaging and even social media strip away
the metadata of our interpersonal communications; the emotional cues and clues that are a
necessary part of everyday social interaction. At the same time, the relentless densification of 
urban populations enforces proximity among strangers, with routine encounters increasingly
bereft of emotional nourishment. The affective numbing that ensues shares many
characteristics of post-traumatic stress disorder. The current study explores how exposure to 
theatre may help to maintain the emotional health of individuals alienated by the stresses of
21
st
century urban living; moreover, it examines how performance is able to facilitate 
emotional and social healing in post-conflict communities. An examination of the scientific
literature reveals the evolution of emotion as part of a neurobiological mechanism facilitating
social cognition. Tracing the progress of philosophical attitudes towards affect, one finds a 
pervasive wariness that is consistently reflected in the development of the performing arts
from classical times to the present. Placing performance within the context of social ritual, 
the study is able to conclude that theatre is largely a manifestation of human biology, 
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―Shut-up you fucking white bitch! Piece of shit!‖ 
―Oh, no …‖ 
―I said shut-up! Fuck you white bitch! Lie down!‖ 
 
Rationale 
On the evening of July 27
th
 2004, Vicki Bawcombe, my wife, and I fell prey to criminals in a 
vehicle hijacking and abduction incident that was characterised by excessive violence and 
sexual degradation. (Kemp, 2004) The incident has had a profound and lasting effect on how 
we view ourselves in the context of our society and its values; how we position ourselves in 
relation to crime, poverty, greed, abuse, violence and the attendant ills with which our society 
is afflicted. In the aftermath of that episode repeated reference was made by others to our 
miraculous survival, attributing it variously to our good luck, our presence of mind, and even 
our training as actors. My initial response was to acknowledge the insights proffered whilst 
inwardly dismissing them as facile; I was convinced that these opinions were fuelled by a 
common misconception that actors are adept at donning masks to conceal their true feelings 
and are thus able to maintain control of a situation. I had to reject the view that we had 
somehow managed to bluff ourselves out of a life-threatening situation. On subsequent 
reflection, however, I have been tempted to concede that there may well be some substance to 
the observations.  
During the psychological debriefing sessions that followed the event, Vicki and I were struck 
by how similar our subjective experiences were. We were both acutely sensitive to the subtle 
shifts of power that played out that night and shared the perception that our relationship to 
our tormentors was not one of ‗us‘ versus ‗them‘. Instead, we had found ourselves in a 
communal situation involving four players with potentially conflicting objectives. However, 
there appeared to be a defining objective that each one of the four of us shared by virtue of 
our common humanity; the mutual imperative to get out alive. Despite persistent attempts on 
the part of the strangers to define our relationship as adversarial, we perhaps instinctively 












acceptable ‗win-win-win-win‘ outcome was undoubtedly nonverbal, relying on the reading of 
and responding to emotional clues and cues. 
This is, of course, the essential language of theatre; our immersion in the world of theatre and 
our training as actors did perhaps contribute in some way to our survival. I have come to 
realise over time that our lives may well have been spared by a shift in dynamics from that of 
confrontation between reciprocally objectified adversaries to that of cooperation between 
mutually dependent individuals. This experience of an awakening insight into each other‘s 
subjective experience is what is usually referred to as empathy.  
I have been a working actor, writer and director in the media of stage, television and film 
since the mid 1980s. In 2004, shortly before the hi-jacking experience, I had begun working 
in an academic environment training student actors. Subsequent to this traumatic experience, 
in my work with fellow actors and students I became more fascinated by the subtle emotional 
dimensions of performance and the capacity for audiences to be moved by a theatrical 
experience. Intrigued by the very nature of empathy, my reading led me to the field of 
neuroscience where current research is providing fresh insights into the role emotion plays in 
defining human experience. There I began encountering research that appears to validate 
many of the principles by which actors have been working for generations; research that 
appears to offer fresh insights into the teachings of Stanislavsky and the work of practitioners 
such as Myerhold, Brecht and Grotowski.  
I have been motivated to examine these new insights in the context of social cognition as 
defined by the transaction between audience and performer and the interface between theatre 














The central research question of this study is: to what extent can exposure to theatre maintain 
the emotional health of individuals within society and how is performance able to facilitate 
healing in traumatised communities? Drawing on my experience of close to three decades in 
various aspects of theatre practice as an actor, writer, designer, director and teacher, I have 
been compelled to consult the literature in various fields of scholarship to validate my 
observations and to gain further insight into the role of emotion in both performance and 
everyday social interaction. 
In the first chapter I answer the secondary question as to the precise nature of emotions. I turn 
to the scientific literature and, from the perspective of evolutionary biology, develop an 
insight into the neuroscience of affect.  In common with many other species, human beings 
relate to and interact with their environment by responding to information provided by their 
senses, however the processing of the sensory data occurs mostly beyond the purview of our 
consciousness (Damasio, 2005). Recent neuroscientific studies indicate that humans and their 
mammalian relatives collect and process information about their environment in a far more 
dynamic and complex manner than accepted wisdom would suggest, and moreover, they 
show that emotion is a fundamental component of the underlying mechanisms (Bartels and 
Zeki, 2000; Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004).  
Of particular interest is the phenomenon of seemingly intuitive interactions between 
independent agents within a social environment (Goleman, 2007). Current research provides 
evidence of dedicated brain circuitry in humans that is incomplete in the absence of social 
interaction (Keysers and Gazzola, 2006). Moreover, specific areas of the brain have been 
identified whose sole function appears to be the perception of intentions and the anticipation 
of the actions of others (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). According to Keysers and Gazzola, 
the central neural mechanisms concerned invoke pre-cognitive emotional feedback systems; 
an observation which suggests that social communion and interpersonal relationships are 
predicated on a capacity for affect. In this vein I argue that an ability to perceive feelings and 
to experience emotion is central to the optimal functioning of both the human organism and 
the social structures within which it exists. I conclude this section with the assertion that a 
facility for inter-subjective experience, or empathy, is vital to the efficient functioning of 












Throughout the argument I refer to successive developments in scientific knowledge and 
technological innovation, noting how they have enabled challenges to be brought against the 
hegemonic thinking of their particular epoch; I am guided in particular by Damasio‘s 
confrontation of Descartes‘ dictum cogito ergo sum, which had placed rational thought at the 
centre of existence.  
My second chapter adopts a historical perspective to address the question: how has theatre 
practice responded to shifting philosophical and political attitudes towards emotion?   
Classical Greek and Roman scholars were aware of the role emotion plays in rhetoric, 
acknowledging that the most persuasive speeches attend to both logic and feeling (Benedetti, 
2007). However, by the advent of the twentieth century, theatre-makers were still grappling 
with the mind-body dichotomy bequeathed them by Descartes, the subsequent elevation of 
reason through the Enlightenment and Diderot‘s definitive proclamation that emotions are 
antithetical to effective performance (Gordon, 2006). I examine the contributions of 
Stanislavsky, his contemporaries and their various descendents during the first half of that 
century, taking care to locate them within their respective intellectual mileux and political 
contexts, while evaluating key aspects of their work through the lens of the current 
neuroscientific literature.  
One of the most significant findings of cognitive neuroscience is that both thought and 
feeling are essentially embodied phenomena (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999); a verdict that 
ultimately validates Stanislavsky‘s monistic intuition that emotion is rooted in the body and 
is linked to physical action (Moore, 1965). This position is further endorsed by the work of 
research psychologist and neuroscientist Susanna Bloch who, with her colleagues, has 
categorised primary emotional states by their distinct, objectively quantifiable, physiological 
manifestations (Santibañez and Bloch, 1986; Bloch, Orthous and Santibañez, 1987). Bloch 
has gone on to conduct extensive work with actors, devising a method of inducing such 
states through the intentional physical manipulation of postural attitudes and breathing 
patterns (Bloch, Lemeignan and Aguilera, 1991; Bloch, 1993; 2006). I conclude with the 
conjecture that the brain curcuitry of social cognition is able to co-opt this faculty to induce 
a vicarious experience of the emotional state of another: empathy. 
The third chapter of this study continues to trace the development of theatre and 












question: with the mind firmly located in the body, how does theatre accommodate the 
cosmological implications and how does neuroscience account for transcendent, spiritual 
and profound aesthetic experience? 
The prophetic vision of Antonin Artaud had placed the body at the centre of performance, 
and Polish director Jerzy Grotowski‘s work attempted to give practical expression to this 
elusive notion. Although I reference a number of theatre-makers in this section, it is 
Grotowski‘s trail out of traditional theatre and into ritual that provides direction for my 
research. An examination of the scientific, philosophical and mystical literature allows me to 
present Grotowski‘s journey as one driven by a desire to embrace the paradoxes presented by 
monism, those contradictions that had previously been solved by splitting mind from body. I 
argue that the revolutionary physicists of the time endowed Grotowski with the necessary 
intellectual fortitude: quantum-theory is able to accommodate apparent contradictions 
through the adopting the notion of complementarity and transcending the strictures of binary 
logic (Greiner, 2000).  
The literature reveals that an affinity for metaphysical monism drew Grotowski to an 
exploration of eastern religious teachings, a pursuit wherein he discarded dogma in favour of 
the underlying spirituality: ‗Secular Holiness‘ (Lavy, 2005). In order to locate the material 
roots of the mystical Nirvana, I consult the scientific literature and discover similar neural 
correlates for transcendent states induced through meditation, through the use of psychoactive 
drugs and by means of traditional ritual practices (Bowker and Bowker, 1998; Newberg et al. 
2001, 2003; Biello, 2007; Nelson, 2011). 
As Grotowski abandons the conception of theatre-as-presentation in favour of theatre-as-
ritual, I turn to the literature of cultural anthropology and consider the implications of Victor 
Turner‘s interstitial ‗liminal‘ state, where individual participants in ritual practice are acutely 
aware of and reciprocally affected by their co-presence in time and space (Turner, 1969). 
Turner‘s conception of social-drama (1986) allows me to position theatre alongside other 
post-industrial forms of social-ritual, both religious and secular, that serve to promote the 
embodiment of mythology in evoking the divine, in celebrating rites-of-passage or in healing 
social breaches. I conclude with the assertion that theatre lies at the nexus of biology and 












narrative and, through a process of embodiment of reason and affect, to contemplate the 
possibility of alternatives. 
My final chapter sets out to answer the question: how can theatre promote social healing?  
Drawing on the preceding research, I begin by examining the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission as an example of social-ritual. Consulting the literature on 
transitional justice, I place the Commission at that juncture where the legal and moral 
matrices are interlaced, arguing that its capacity to promote healing lies substantially within 
its performative dimensions. A perusal of the psychological literature offers insights into the 
nature of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, its destructive effects on the psyche of the 
individual and on the broader social fabric (Herman, 1994; Culbertson, 1995; Shay, 1994; 
2002; Field, 2006). I investigate the limitations of language in conveying the varied 
dimensions of experience and adopt Diana Taylor‘s notion of the performed repertoire as a 
viable repository of knowledge to supplement the archive (Taylor, 2003). I then recall briefly 
a number of theatrical manifestations of the TRC repertoire before examining in some detail 
Truth in Translation, a project that was initiated with the overt intention of fostering dialogue 
and promoting healing among diverse communities burdened with the legacy of conflict. 
I conclude this study with observations on the capacity for theatre and performance to 
promote social healing, together with some caveats revealed by insights gleaned through my 
research. I review my argument, highlighting implications that arise and noting ongoing 
research in the various fields I have explored. Finally, I provide suggestions as to possible 












A Neurological Basis for Empathy. 
 
―Suit the action to the word, the word to the action …  
to hold as 'twere the mirror up to nature: to show  
virtue her feature, scorn her own image …‖ 
Shakespeare: Hamlet, Act 3, scene 2, 17–24 
―Here‘s looking at you, kid.‖   
Rick Blaine in Casablanca (1942. [Film] Dir. Michael Curtiz) 
 
We sit on the floor face to face, each closely scrutinising the other‘s features. For the first 
time I note the faint freckles on her nose and how incredibly long her eyelashes are. We are 
being encouraged to mirror our partner‘s expressions and what begins as a grotesque face-
pulling exercise finally settles into a more subtle mutual interrogation. I replicate a twitch at 
the corner of the mouth and at once her brow knits, ever so slightly. By now we are engaged 
in a wordless dialogue and it becomes unclear which of us is the subject and who is the 
mirror; my fleeting sense of doubt immediately raises her eyebrow; I feel a slight smile and 
her eyes twinkle. On command she turns away from me and I grab the rolled-up newspaper, 
preparing to beat her over the head. It‘s all part of the exercise and I‘m simply following 
instructions, but I can‘t do it.  I am all at once overcome by a feeling of intense anguish and I 
break down sobbing.  
What happened during that acting class at Wits Drama School in the early 1980s unsettled 
me; I had no idea what had transpired, but I sensed that it was something profound and the 
incident has stayed with me ev r since. However, thanks to a chance discovery at a laboratory 
in the Italian city of Parma a decade or so later, and the subsequent scientific investigation it 
has sparked, I have begun developing some insights into my unanticipated experience. 
In this small metropolis better known at the time for its dried ham and hard cheese, Giacomo 
Rizzolatti was in a laboratory heading up a team of scientists monitoring neural activity in the 
brains of macaque monkeys as they performed a series of routine actions (Di Pellegrino et al, 
1992). The team was investigating a group of neurons in the inferior pre-motor cortex of the 
monkeys‘ brains, observing how they become active or ‗discharge‘ during certain goal-
directed hand movements, such as reaching for and grasping at food. Various accounts 
suggest a researcher either tried to snatch a peanut for himself or was legitimately trying to 
reset the experiment, when he unwittingly altered the course of neurological enquiry. The 












when, quite unexpectedly, the neurons being monitored discharged, or ‗fired‘ in the same 
manner as if the monkey had performed the action itself. Subsequent investigation confirmed 
that the group of neurons associated with the planning and execution of motor functions 
became involved as the subject merely observed another performing an action. What‘s more, 
the research established that the more specific, intentional and goal-oriented the observed 
action, the more strongly the neurons were activated. The scientists concluded that the pre-
motor neurons concerned were not only able to direct actions on the basis of internal coding, 
but also on the basis of decoding the meaning of observed actions. 
Monkey see, monkey do 
In this chapter, I examine the implications of the discovery of mirror-neurons on the study of 
emotion and human behaviour, with particular emphasis on social interaction. I begin by 
giving an overview of how recent technological advances have afforded increasingly detailed 
insights into the workings of the brain: the nature of consciousness and different ways of 
knowing (Anderson, 1993). I continue by exploring the inner world of conscious and non-
conscious bio-regulatory mechanisms and consider the interaction between cognitive and 
affective dimensions of experience in decision-making processes, as outlined in Damasio‘s 
somatic marker hypothesis (1996). I investigate how a working knowledge of our physical 
and social environments is assimilated by the brain via a coordination of input from various 
sensory mechanisms: those responsible for sight, sound, smell, touch, taste and a number of 
other lesser recognised modalities.  
We rely on our senses to provide accurate real-time data, but survival within a dynamic 
environment depends on accurate predictions of future consequences (Berthoz, 2000). For 
example, I investigate some of the complex neurophysiological mechanisms that allow a 
driver to anticipate the appearance of a child as a ball bounces into the road. I go on to 
discuss how the brain is able to simulate models of reality, drawing on different categories of 
knowledge and memory, in order to anticipate future events (Bergson, 2007). I conclude by 
illustrating how these mechanisms ensure survival within the social environment, where 
success is often dependent on the ability to discern the intentions of others, to predict their 
actions and to anticipate their needs. Throughout this study I locate theatre within the social 
arena; I argue that it is a mechanism through which these necessary skills may be exercised 












It is important to stress that the brain is a complex organ; it would be foolish to suggest that 
any aspect of neural function could be reduced to the contribution of an individual structure, 
much less a specific type of cell. Nevertheless, the discovery of mirror-neurons has been 
hailed as the most important finding in neuroscience in recent years; eminent neuroscientist 
Vilanayur S. Ramachandran claims its significance rivals the discovery of the double-helix 
structure of DNA in molecular biology (2000; 2006). He argues that mirror-neurons were 
involved in ‗the great leap forward‘ in human evolution - a sudden explosion of human 
mental abilities and culture a mere 40 000 years ago that saw the development of tools, art, 
clothes, religious belief and possibly even language. Ramachandran suggests that these 
sensorimotor neurons are involved in many hitherto unexplained socially cognitive 
characteristics of the human mind, including the ability to learn through imitation, the ability 
to assimilate language, the apparent facility for ‗mind reading‘ and the capacity for empathy.    
However others are more sceptical. Jacob and Jeannerod (2005) argue that the case for 
mirror-neurons is somewhat overstated and that at best they may facilitate imitative learning. 
They maintain that the motor theories spawned by the discovery of these specialised brain 
cells do not adequately support the degree of social cognition required in order to know 
another‘s mind. The so-called ‗Theory of Mind‘ is the ability to attribute states of mind to 
others that are different from one‘s own beliefs, desires and intentions (Carruthers, 1996). It 
is a concept familiar to the contemporary behavioural and social sciences although it has its 
philosophical roots in Descartes which, as I will argue, gives rise to a significant paradox.  
In their critique of mirror-neurons and the associated motor theory of social cognition, Jacob 
and Jeannerod appear to conflate two divergent approaches to Theory of Mind, namely 
simulation theory and theory-theory (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). Simulation theory 
characterises Theory of Mind as a particular kind of knowledge allowing one to anticipate 
another‘s mental state by putting oneself in the other‘s shoes, effectively ‗simulating‘ them. I 
submit that this school of thought is clearly supported by the discovery of mirror-neurons. 
However the two critics, while accepting the tenets of simulation theory, base much of their 
argument on the alternative paradigm that describes Theory of Mind as a detached theoretical 
process rather than an innate feature. 
Referring to Rizzolatti‘s original experiments, the detractors argue that whether executing or 












verbal intentional communication … [the] agent intends to grasp a fruit, not to impart some 
information to his conspecific‖ (Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005:21). In this way they conclude 
that the discharge of the mirror-neurons is not a socially cognitive process at all. However, I 
argue that the critics erroneously equate action intention with communicative intention. I 
submit that social cognition does not rely on the intention to communicate as much as it does 
on the capacity to perceive. For example, consider the evolutionary advantage of predicting 
the next move of an adversary despite their best conscious efforts not to signal their 
intentions. I maintain that we see this evolutionary legacy in action each time two opponents 
square off in a sparring-ring. Perhaps there‘s something to be said for outwitting the card 
sharp with the fabled ‗poker face‘.   
Neural wi-fi 
Of relevance to theatre practice, I note here that the influential Russian theatre-maker 
Konstantin Stanislavsky (1961) was aware that goal directed behaviour on-stage is more 
compelling than apparently unmotivated action. Scientific research has validated 
Stanislavsky‘s remarkable insight: the connection between the representation of observed 
actions on a neural level and the intention behind those actions was first established in a 
series of experiments in which a screen was placed between a watching monkey and the 
target-object of the agent being observed (Umiltà et al. 2001). The monkeys were tested 
under a range of circumstances during which they looked at an experimenter, who was either 
grasping an object in full view, or simply miming the action with no object actually present. 
The monkeys then witnessed the same action, but this time with the final critical component 
hidden by a screen: the hand-object contact.  
Umiltà and her colleagues confirmed that the mirror-neurons were unlikely to discharge 
during mimed action. However, the same brain-cells fired strongly when the monkey knew 
the object to be present behind the screen and could therefore mentally represent the action. It 
became clear that the intention behind a goal-directed action is critical to the involvement of 
the mirror-neurons in the brain of the observer. The researchers concluded that the specialised 
brain cells are in fact involved in action understanding. A separate study confirmed their 
observations, but it went further by demonstrating that the phenomenon is not solely 
dependent on the visual modality (Kohler et al. 2002). This study established that mirror-
neurons that activated during the observation of a noisy action, such as the ripping of paper, 












It would be scientifically unsound to draw inferences about humans simply by extrapolating 
the monkey findings, but due to ethical considerations invasive single-neuron studies have 
not been done in humans (Crick et al. 2004). However, increasingly sophisticated technology 
has enabled researchers to prove indirectly that a human mirror-neuron system does indeed 
exist. In fact, the case for mirror-neurons in humans has become increasingly difficult to 
refute as the quality of the accumulated data steadily improves with each technological 
innovation in the laboratory. 
As the existence of these specialised neurons in humans is central to my argument, I present a 
brief overview of the technology involved in verifying their presence. The earliest method of 
peering into the brain was electroencepholography (EEG), which records electrical activity 
along the scalp as it is produced by the firing of neurons (Niedermeyer and Lopes de Silva, 
2005). As far back as the 1950s EEG studies had detected activity in the motor cortex of a 
person observing an action performed by another individual. (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 
2004). More sophisticated innovations in the intervening decades have confirmed these 
observations with mounting reliability as the data is rendered in greater detail, thus ensuring 
refined accuracy. For instance, the technique of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) 
doesn‘t simply record data, but actively stimulates the nervous system (Fitzgerald, Fountain 
and Daskalakis, 2006). This effectively non-invasive technique ‗prods‘ the brain through the 
skull with electrical impulses, and then monitors responses. TMS studies have left no doubt 
that a mirror-neuron system does exist in humans but, more significantly, the investigations 
reveal that the human system possesses important properties not observed in monkeys 
(Patuzzo et al. 2003).  
It was already known that mirror-neurons in monkeys do not respond to mimed actions 
(Umiltà et al. 2001). However Simone Patuzzo and her colleagues found that intransitive 
actions, apparently meaningless movements, sparked some degree of mirror-neuron activity 
in humans. In addition, they found that the human mirror-neuron system is more finely tuned 
than that of monkeys: in humans, the systems are able to code for all the smaller movements 
making up a larger action and not just for the broad action itself. I suggest that this would 
account for the human ability to imitate in accurate detail the actions of others. But more 
importantly, as I will demonstrate, it suggests a more sophisticated capacity in humans for 
understanding the intentions of others through the observation of their actions. I submit that 












The most compelling evidence for the presence of mirror-neurons in humans has been 
provided by the latest innovations in the laboratory, enabling more complex observations of 
the brain through the creation of images rather than the measurement of electrical activity. 
The first of these, Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), is able to detect the behaviour of 
water molecules in the presence of a magnetic influence; a significant percentage of the 
human body is composed of H2O molecules which are electrically polarised and thus oscillate 
in response to an alternating electromagnetic field (Filler, 2009). Neurosurgeon and prolific 
inventor Aaron Filler explains that the density and composition of different tissues varies, 
causing the responsive behaviour of the water molecules to fluctuate. The varying degrees of 
magnetic ‗resonance‘ enable the scanner to detect contrasts and so to build up a visual image 
of the internal tissues.   
A subsequent innovation saw the development of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI), which has enabled the most significant brain imaging studies to date (Pekar, 2006). 
American biophysicist James Pekar explains that this type of scanner detects levels of activity 
in the tissues of the brain by monitoring the behaviour, not of water molecules, but of 
oxygen-carrying haemoglobin molecules in the blood: the vessels of the brain change in 
appearance according to fluctuating levels of blood oxygenation. Pekar describes how these 
studies take advantage of a phenomenon where increases in neuronal activity are 
accompanied by local increases in oxygenated blood supply; changes in blood flow and other 
related factors are mapped in orde  to shed light on regional changes in brain activity. The 
advent of the fMRI scan has enabled researchers to observe the functional brain in the 
process of performing its multifarious tasks. In this way scientists are able to develop an 
understanding of how the mirror-neurons interact with other specialised cerebral areas, 
including those known to be involved in the processing of language and speech (Gandour, J. 
et al. 2006), those dedicated to the recognition of places and faces (O‘Craven and Kanwisher, 
2000), and those associated with the processing of emotion (Ochsner et al., 2002). Once 
again, I assert that such observations have significant implications for the performing arts.  
Ways of knowing 
The dynamic nature of the data collected through fMRI scans provides a valuable insight into 
the relationship between brain structure and brain function and, in so doing it begins to 
explore the territory that lies between declarative and procedural knowledge. Experimental 












and that which is inferred through the observation of behaviour (Anderson, 1993). Of course 
these two ‗ways of knowing‘ often co-exist: the layout of a computer keyboard can be 
memorised and recited as declarative knowledge or it can be embodied as part of a typing 
skill or procedural knowledge. If I am asked to describe where the ‗Q‘ is located on the 
keyboard I have no idea how to verbalise my response, such declarative knowledge having 
atrophied through lack of use. But the little finger on my left hand will extend itself and 
twitch as if trying to show the way; a case in which I quite literally seem to have more 
knowledge in my pinkie than in my head. 
There is, however, yet another way of knowing that persistently defies objective verification, 
and that is the experience of consciousness itself (Bob, 2011). Certain aspects of 
consciousness can be explained in terms of the standard tools of the cognitive sciences, where 
a phenomenon is described through a reductive examination of computational or neural 
mechanisms (Chalmers, 1995). This line of thinking defines consciousness through a number 
of observable phenomena, Chalmers explains, each of which can be scientifically described. 
These include the ability to distinguish between the states of wakefulness and sleep; a 
capability for discerning and reacting to environmental stimuli; the facility for integrating 
information through a cognitive system; a capability to access internal states, to report mental 
states and the ability to focus attention and deliberately to control behaviour. These are of 
course all characteristic of consciousness, but they all fall short of explaining the vital 
component of subjective experience. 
To illustrate this point I present a dramatisation, and note where the analogy becomes tricky.  
It‘s the bedroom of a contemporary middle class South African suburban home. All is 
quiet, bar the sound of deep breathing as two forms under the duvet are illuminated by 
the cold moonlight streaming through a crack in the curtain. She stirs. 
 ―Darling? Are you awake?‖  
―Mmmm.‖ (The ability to report wakefulness. Check.)  
―Did you hear that?‖ 
―Huh?‖ 
―There it is again!‖ 












 to environmental stimuli. Check.) 
 ―What do you suppose it is?‖  
―I don‘t know, let me think. Did you leave a window open?‖ (The ability to integrate 
information through a cognitive system. Check.) A bedside light goes on. 
―I‘m scared.‖ (The ability to report a mental state. Check.) 
―I‘m going down there to see what‘s going on.‖ (Focusing attention. Check.) 
―Be careful. Oh, Hmm. (Gasps) Feels like my heart is in my throat!‖ (Accessing an 
 internal state. Check.) 
―Stay calm. Shhh. Breathe. Deep breaths.‖ 
―Ok. … Aaah …. Hmm. I‘m a bit better now.‖  
He leaves the room. A moment passes. Silence. She makes to follow him, then  
 decides against it. (Modifying behaviour. Check.) 
A peal of laughter rings out downstairs. She shrieks. He reappears, carrying the cat. 
―It got caught in your knitting. Knocked over a vase.‖ He chuckles. 
So far, so good; the above behaviour exhibits each of Chalmers‘ marks of consciousness. But 
then the situation takes a curious turn.  
―Don‘t mock me!‖ She begins to sob. 
―It‘s OK. I‘m not mocking you.‖ 
―You knew all along! You tried to scare me!‖ She screams at him. The cat leaps out  
of his arms, scratching him in its haste to escape.  
―Ouch! Stupid cat! Now look what‘s happened.‖  
―Oh, baby! You‘re bleeding!‖ She tries to comfort him. He shrugs her off. 
―It‘s OK. It‘s just a scratch.‖ 
―Let me clean it.‖ 
―I‘m fine!‖ 
―Now you‘re cross with me!‖ 
―Don‘t over-react.‖ 












―Of course you were.‖ 
There is a moment as they each take stock of the situation. 
―Why are you looking at me like that?‖ 
In the second part of the scenario the interchanges appear to have become more convoluted, 
less rational, as each of the participants responds to the situation quite firmly from their 
individual subjective perspective. Neither is sufficiently aware of the other‘s state of being 
and so each makes assumptions as to the other‘s motives, demonstrating a more elusive 
component of consciousness; the problem of experience. The American thinker Thomas 
Nagel is most famous for his essay What it’s Like to be a Bat (1974), in which he describes 
what philosophers call ‗qualia‘; the subjective quality of conscious experience. When we 
think and perceive, he explains, there is an observable flurry of mental activity as information 
is processed. However, there is also a subjective aspect to consciousness which is not readily 
measured. 
But no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious 
experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism 
… fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is 
something that it is like to be that organism something it is like for the organism [all 
emphasis in the original].  (ibid.:436) 
 
Co-pilots in a perceptual universe  
So consciousness would appear then to have two distinct components that seemingly co-exist, 
as if in parallel. A pioneer in the field of artificial intelligence, Alan Newell, chose to reserve 
the term ‗consciousness‘ to define subjective experience, while those phenomena readily 
defined by the standard tools of the cognitive sciences he referred to as ‗awareness‘ (Newell, 
1990). This suggests that human beings habitually hover between the two modes of 
consciousness; one can be responsive to a particular activity that holds one‘s full attention 
and readily recall the details, while having scant recollection of another in which one 
interacts with one‘s environment with limited awareness, as would an automaton. I have lost 
count of how many times I have driven along a familiar stretch of road, ending up somewhere 
other than at my intended destination! Force of habit seemingly asserts itself through 
inattention and I am hard pressed to proffer a suitable explanation for my tardiness.  
Francis Crick, who in 1962 shared the Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine for the 












creature to possess these two interacting modes of consciousness, ―one to provide a limited 
number of rapid, stereotyped unconscious responses and the other, parallel but slower, for 
more measured conscious responses to more complex situations‖ (2004:275). This advantage 
is explained by zoologist Kay Holekamp in relation to her research on the social behavior of 
spotted hyaenas (2007); she suggests that the evolution of intelligence in mammals is 
characterized by an ability to learn from experience and to modify behavior accordingly. 
Holekamp describes how all animals are born with a set of innate or instinctive behaviours of 
the kind that allow spiders to spin complex webs at first attempt or for small mammals to 
have a knee-jerk reaction and to flee from sudden noises. However, she notes that in a 
changing environment, some of these ‗fixed‘ reactions can become counter-productive, 
reducing the probability for survival and reproduction. Fortunately though, the capacity to 
learn enables an animal to respond and adapt to change in its own lifetime. I argue that in the 
higher mammals this ability to learn extends from purely personal experience to a vicarious 
third-person experience through the involvement of mirror-neurons. I propose to show that 
the learning resulting from observation and neural mirroring brings about significant changes 
to the brain‘s neural wiring (Hebb, 1949), and almost certainly contributes to 
Ramachandran‘s ‗great leap forward‘ in human evolution (2000, 2006).   
It is tempting to view the parallel states of consciousness in terms of the Cartesian paradigm 
that emphasizes the schism between mind and body, reason and emotion. But more recent 
evidence based on clinical studies of neurological patients suggests that the two modes of 
consciousness interact, with the subjective emotional experience being firmly within the loop 
of reason (Damasio, 2005). Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio asserts that emotion, evoked by 
subjective experience, assists the reasoning process rather than disrupting it, as had been 
assumed by Descartes. He believes that emotions are central to an integrated view of brain, 
body and mind, and stresses the importance of an evolutionary perspective where 
bioregulation ensures homeostasis, essential for continued survival particularly in more 
complex organisms. Damasio concludes that disorders of emotion can kill in both animals 
and humans (1998).  
A series of complex bioregulatory mechanisms enables an organism to respond with 
appropriate behaviour to changes, in both the external and internal environments, to ensure 












feel the urge to make myself a snack and decide to head off to the kitchen to prepare 
something tasty. When my partner asks what I‘m up to, I‘m hardly likely to respond with an 
explanation about the neurons in my hypothalamus detecting a decline in my blood-sugar 
levels thus triggering a series of events in my neural circuitry which ultimately resulted in the 
institution of a hunger-state whose only remedy at this point appears to be the consumption of 
a toasted cheese sandwich, ―do you want one?‖ That‘s because the entire process described 
here involves no explicit knowledge, no obvious display of options and their consequences 
and no conscious mechanism of inference: all I know is that I‘m hungry (De Kloet et al. 
2005). Damasio considers feelings and the experience of emotion to be the highest-order 
direct expression of bioregulation in a complex organism, concluding that body regulation, 
survival and mind are intimately interwoven within biological tissue. ―Curiously, it happens 
most strongly not far from the pineal gland, inside which Descartes once sought to imprison 
the nonphysical soul‖ (Damasio, 1998:123). 
Think again, with feeling: way-points in the brain 
The terms emotion and feeling are often used interchangeably but Damasio suggests separate 
expressions: emotion describes the pre-cognitive change of physical state in response to a 
stimulus, while for him the term feeling describes the mental state that arises from the 
experience of emotion. An emotional state can be objectively measured in terms of 
physiological changes within the body. Damasio explains that the subjective mental state of 
feeling includes a representation within the central nervous system of these visceral changes, 
together with alterations in cognitive processing caused by secondary signals resulting from 
the initial stimulus. 
It would appear that Damasio‘s research, in essence, explores the neurobiological foundations 
that underpin the philosophy of the pioneering nineteenth century psychologist William 
James who had speculated on the nature of emotion. 
Our natural ways of thinking about these standard emotions is that the mental 
perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this 
latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My thesis on the contrary is 
that the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact and that 
our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion [all emphasis in 
original] (James, 1884:189-190).  
 
James described the primacy of emotion over cognition, noting that it follows a sequence of 












nervous system - triggers the corresponding emotion, which in turn is registered as a feeling. 
The often quoted example he uses to illustrate his argument is that of a man running from a 
bear; does he run because he is scared or is he afraid because he is running? James challenged 
the assumption that the bear is the source of the fear and argued that the perception of the 
‗exciting fact‘ causes immediate changes in the body, such as a constriction of the blood 
vessels and a quickening of the pulse, which in turn leads to a psychological sensation called 
emotion.  
Emotion is therefore clearly tied to the reasoning process, but it has also been argued that 
emotion plays a role in memory, understanding and the capacity to learn, so necessary for the 
survival of complex organisms in a changing environment (Holekamp et al. 2007). I maintain 
that memory and the emotions are so closely coupled that it is difficult to develop insights 
into the one without a reasonable grasp of the other. It is the relationship between reasoning, 
decision making and learning that form the basis of Damasio‘s ‗somatic marker hypothesis‘ 
(1996).  
Damasio suggests that evolution has bequeathed a mechanism for streamlining complex 
decision-making where rapid responses are required in the interests of survival. Many of 
these reactions are innate and instinctive, but Damasio argues that other responses are learned 
through experience and embedded in our brains for future reference. As noted earlier, 
emotions tend to be associated with lived experience and originate as a visceral response and 
a change in somatic state; these states are monitored by the brain through somatosensory 
networks and as they give rise to secondary brain-to-brain impulses, they are manifested as 
feelings. A lived experience may include either advantageous or disadvantageous outcomes, 
resulting alternatively in pleasant or unpleasant feelings, both of which are recorded as 
somatic markers. Damasio suggests that these markers serve as reference points for informing 
future judgements; a bad outcome connected to a particular response-option, results in an 
unpleasant gut-feeling.  
It can be said that the purpose of reasoning is to arrive at a decision, which is to select an 
appropriate response to a given set of circumstances, either choosing a verbal option 
consisting of a set of words and the manner of their combination, or a non-verbal course of 
action and a strategy for its implementation (Mercier and Sperber, 2011). Of course a verbal 












are plucked from myriad possibilities and processed in the fleeting present moment, drawing 
on the past in order to predict and influence the future. The somatic marker hypothesis 
concerns itself with the neurobiological underpinnings of this ―…all-consuming, ceaseless 
process of creation [which] is what reasoning and deciding are about‖ (Damasio, 2005:165).  
Most relevant to the present study is that Damasio‘s research points to the essential role of 
emotion in the social environment. He refers to a number of clinical patients he‘d observed 
with damage to specific areas of the prefrontal region of their brains; their intellectual 
abilities were largely intact but he noted severe impediments in their personal and social 
decision making capabilities (Damasio et al., 1996). The patients experienced a range of 
difficulties, from planning their day and deciding on activities, to selecting suitable friends 
and partners; the choices they made were often neither personally favourable nor socially 
adequate. Damasio reasoned that while high-level abstract thought may tend towards a purely 
rational process, the closer the factors under consideration encroach upon the social and 
personal domain, the more likely a role emotion plays in arriving at a decision (Damasio, 
2005).  
Damasio is not without his detractors, notable among them being a scholar in medieval 
philosophy, Andrew Gluck (1999), who appears to be reluctant to rock Descartes‘ boat. He 
suggests that Damasio is misguided in relying on the tools of empirical science to arrive at 
metaphysical conclusions, accusing him of pursuing a logical fallacy that presupposes that 
which he sets out to prove (Gluck, 2007). Gluck argues that metaphysical assumptions are 
inherent in the scientific enterprise, and so helpfully suggests a compromise whereby a 
pluralistic approach is adopted; different disciplines are encouraged to use different 
metaphysical frameworks, as dictated by the limitations of their subject matter. In this vein he 
puts forward physical monism as the most suitable for the sciences, neutral monism for 
aesthetics and mind/body dualism for the social sciences. The logic of this proposition 
suggests to me that should three men set out to sea in a tub, one may be compelled to fall off 
the edge of the earth whilst his colleagues go on to survive a complete circumnavigation. 
Gluck insists that he takes this position because of the limitations of the scientific paradigm 
to deal with subjectivity and phenomena like consciousness; he‘s concerned that a partial 












I am aware that the cross-disciplinary nature of my own research courts paradoxes that must 
be acknowledged. I therefore concede that Gluck‘s argument may have something to 
contribute to discussions about consciousness and the reality of the self, and it addresses 
some questions as to where our subjective experience of reality fits within the scientific world 
view. But he offers no direct critique of Damasio‘s ideas; neither does he mount a cogent 
defence of Descartes. As a classical scholar Gluck offers a helpful perspective, demonstrating 
how our thinking about consciousness and the self is encapsulated in the conceptual 
understanding of each historical period, which in turn reflects the prevailing social and 
political ideology (2001). In other words, we choose our metaphysics because of our beliefs 
which  are largely dictated by our particular historical epoch. For the purposes of my current 
research, however, I feel obliged to maintain the perspective of evolutionary biology despite 
its attendant metaphysical baggage. In this stance I count myself fortunate to be living in the 
Age of Aquarius and not that of Copernicus.  
Navigation Tools: biological gyroscopes and sextants 
As I have been arguing, our external environment is extremely complex in its ideological, 
social, cultural and physical dimensions and we are fortunate to be able to negotiate this 
landscape through our parallel faculties for thinking and feeling. But before we can even 
begin to assess our predicament, it is revealing to consider how the dynamic data concerning 
our environment is collected and transported to the brain for processing, wherupon 
appropriate responses are generated to be implemented in real time. Our experience of the 
multifaceted milieu in which we are submerged is necessarily dictated by the input from our 
senses, the most commonly acknowleged being those of sight, sound, smell, taste and touch. 
But, there may be more: close your eyes for a moment and, without peeking, locate the end of 
your nose with the tip of an index finger. Now try it with the other hand. Is it a fluke, is it 
magic, or could it be a sixth sense? What you have demonstrated is indeed a generally 
unappreciated vestibulary sense by which we locate and orient ourselves in space with 
feedback from proprioceptors in our muscles and joints and the otolithic organs in our inner 
ear (Berthoz, 2000).  
It seems humans possess many more sensory modalities than meet the eye, as it were. In 
addition, the brain is able to adapt its own structure in response to environmental demands; 
neuroplasticity of the adult brain has been demonstrated in fMRI studies (Kolb and Whishaw, 












documented cases of blind individuals honing their capacity for echolocation, creating 
composite ‗images‘ of their environment through auditory feedback alone, as does Nagel‘s 
bat (Blach, 1997). Daniel Kish, who lost his sight in infancy, cites Diderot‘s 1749 account of 
a blind friend ―so sensitive to his surroundings that he could distinguish an open street from a 
cul-de-sac‖ (2009:32). Kish trains blind individuals in the use of echolocation to the extent 
that they are able to navigate their environment with remarkable competence; to play 
basketball and to ride a bicycle using no more to guide them than the sound of clicks 
produced by the tongue. He speculates that ‗flash-sonar‘ is able to create an image for blind 
individuals as vivid as the intermittent static impressions created for the sighted by a 
stroboscopic lamp, the commonly experienced nightclub ‗strobe‘.  
Kish believes it likely that humans unconsciously depended on a degree of echolocation in 
the days before artificial lighting, when they had to find their way round in the dark. There is 
evidence that echolocation is an innate human capacity with at least one study concluding 
that children who are blind ―naturally acquire echolocation skills during their developmental 
years through the spontaneous use of audition‖ (Blach, 1997:150). In light of this information 
it is clear that humans do possess more than five senses, but precisely how many make it onto 
the list of valid modalities is not quite as plain; we commonly refer to an individual possessed 
of a strong ‗sense of self‘, for example, just as we allude to the significance of a ‗sense of 
responsibility‘, not to mention the soc al capital to be garnered by demonstrating a ‗sense of 
humour‘. While this comment is intended flippantly, recent studies suggest that a facility for 
humour is indeed a relatively recent evolutionary development: ―[It] may have coevolved 
with another cognitive specialization of the great apes and humans: the ability to navigate 
through a shifting and complex social space‖ (Watson et al., 2007:314). 
Remembering the future 
Stanislavsky‘s conception of a dramatic gesture as defined by units, objectives and a super-
objective along a through-line of action (Sawoski, 2007), appears to have anticipated a more 
recent line of scientific inquiry: the examination of how our senses interact and how the brain 
co-ordinates their input, provides insight into the human capacity for social cognition. Alain 
Berthoz (2000), a French researcher into the physiology of perception and action, proposes 
we classify the senses according to their perceptual functions rather than defining them by the 
particular receptors they employ. In this way, he argues, a subject‘s goal becomes a defining 












path towards its objective. Perception and action are thus inextricably linked; each of the 
senses calls on those properties of each receptor that it may need, while the brain filters the 
messages received according to its own plans.  
Berthoz‘s understanding of the senses suggests an enquiry into how the brain is informed by 
the receptors: how it regulates their sensitivity and directs attention; the manner in which the 
brain combines messages from the receptors; and how it estimates their value according to an 
internal simulation of the expected consequences of an action. Berthoz is at pains to stress 
that the brain functions in the mode of a flight-simulator, rather than as a computer-
simulation: the whole action is orchestrated by internal models of physical reality, 
interactions between real neurons, rather than abstract mathematical operations. ―Biological 
models must be embodied in physical reality just as the brain is incarnated in the body‖ 
(Berthoz, 2000:22).  
Much of the behavioural data examined thus far suggests that a plan of motor-action is 
assembled in the brain ahead of an action, but more recent studies indicate that the plan is 
continually altered during execution (Paillard, 1996; Saunders and Knill, 2003). This is 
facilitated by sensory feedback loops which rely on a forward model, integrating sensory 
inflow and motor outflow, continually evaluating the consequence of the motor commands. 
―The ability of the motor system to estimate the future state of the limb might be an 
evolutionary substrate for mental operations that require an estimate of sequelae in the 
immediate future‖ (Desmurget and Grafton, 2000). 
If I am able to stretch my hand out to intercept a moving ball, it is because of neurons that are 
sensitive to the path of the ball rather than an inherent capacity to calculate the velocity and 
trajectory of the projectile before it hits the glass patio-door. Having averted the unintended 
consequences of a missed catch in the slips during a youthful backyard cricket match I am 
grateful to the neurons in my superior colliculus, a specialised brain structure involved in 
anticipation and motor prediction (Stein and Meredith, 1995). This is the same structure that 
allows a cat to pounce on a darting mouse: it is able to identify cues from a number of 
sensory receptors, to extract pertinent signals and to direct the execution and correction of 
movements carried out by a number of effectors in an elegant choreography of eyes, head, 












Continuing this line of argument, it is clear that the target becomes crucial in describing a 
biologically generated action. When contemplating a moving body, physicists would tend not 
to concern themselves with goals, and even less with intentions, most likely confining their 
interest to the characteristics of the propelling force. However, even a naïve observer will 
often describe the motion of a body with reference to its destination; our lived experience 
tells us that a movement is always going somewhere. This is because perception is both 
active and predictive: the cat pounces on the spot where the mouse will be at a future point in 
time when the rodent is to meet its destiny; the chameleon‘s tongue unfurls to intercept the 
unsuspecting fruit-fly at its future position within three-dimensional space or, more 
accurately, in four-dimensional time/space .  
So perception is actively engaged in the present while anticipating what has yet to occur 
based on our previously lived experience. From an evolutionary perspective, we owe our very 
survival to unconscious predictions that occur on a cellular level within our bodies as the past 
and future collide in an active present. Already in the late nineteenth century, the pioneering 
Scottish neurologist David Ferrier had submitted the view that we are able to predict the 
future through internal simulations that draw on our memories. 
 In calling up an idea, or when engaged in the attentive consideration of some idea or 
 ideas, we are in reality throwing into action, but in an inhibited or suppressed manner, 
 the movements with which the sensory factors of ideation are associated in organic 
 cohesion (Ferrier, 1876:285).  
 
Memory is expressed at all levels of cerebral functioning and is widely considered to be a 
basic property of the brain (Schacter, Norman and Koutstaal, 1998; Gabrieli, 1998). As noted 
earlier, knowledge is recognised as being either declarative or procedural, depending on the 
type of memory employed: declarative or explicit memory is devoted to storing facts and 
recalling events, whilst implicit, procedural memory includes that which serves the 
acquisition of skills and habits (Anderson, 1993). I submit that an understanding of the neural 
underpinnings of memory may help to clarify the role it plays in the relationship between 
perception and action. 
If goals and intentions are crucial in defining an action, I suspect that the fabled ‗sense of 
direction‘ that precludes many from simply stopping to ask the way, may well be an innate 
capacity. The type of memory primarily associated with negotiating the external environment 












topokinetic memory which allow us to locate a place and find our way back to it (Berthoz, 
2000). The vestibular apparatus in the middle-ear is intimately involved in constructing such 
memories to the extent that even a blindfolded individual would retain data of a journey as if 
on a geographic map. I recall being alerted to this faculty as my wife and I were forcibly 
being transported out of town after being abducted at gunpoint one night during a hi-jacking 
incident as described earlier (Kemp, 2004).  
Lying on the floor of our vehicle I was able, in my mind‘s eye, to follow the route by which 
we were leaving the Cape Town suburb of Observatory. By the time it became clear that we 
were travelling on a highway, I was quite certain we were on the N2 headed towards 
Somerset West rather than either the N1 bound for Paarl or the N7 West Coast road. Studies 
have shown that the brain can provide estimates of direction as well as of distance travelled 
solely from inertial information supplied by the vestibular organ receptors, the otoliths and 
semicircular canals located in the inner ear (Ivanenko et al. 1997). I remember feeling 
frustrated that we had been forced to lie face-down as this was somewhat disorienting, but I 
nevertheless was able to compensate and somehow translate the sensations into a ‗map‘ as if  
I were sitting upright and facing the direction in which we were travelling. Although all the 
information on which I was able to draw was ostensibly egocentric, there appears to have 
been a constant factor of external origin, against which I was comparing data; no doubt an 
internalisation of the effect of gravity (Berthoz, 2000).  
Earlier studies had suggested that humans are able to form composite topographical 
knowledge through the dual functioning of two processing modes (Sholl, 1992). In order to 
accurately position the body according to spatial relationships within its external 
environment, a model was proposed whereby a body-centred mapping of extra-corporeal 
space through feedback from the vestibular and sensorimotor systems interacts with a 
representational mode where the feedback from all the external senses is processed by 
consulting stored representations of the physical environment. ―Central space structures then 
emerge from the processing of a polymodal inflow of changing re-afferent information, 
generated by the displacements of the body within its environmental frame‖ (Paillard, 
1991:174). More recent research has confirmed the cooperative relationship between action-
oriented egocentric systems of orientation and allocentric positioning systems; aligning the 
bodily defined left and right axis with the geographically determined north-south axis (Wang 












functions in parallel with neural representations of the environmental geometry; constant 
updating between the systems ensures greater accuracy. ―…the egocentric nature of 
perception and imagery require that input to and output from allocentric systems are mediated 
by transient egocentric representations‖ (Burgess, 2006:555). 
Neural broadband: navigating the social world 
Such is the complexity of the mechanisms required to navigate physical space. But the 
environment that humans inhabit is defined by more than familiar landmarks; there exists a 
complex and dynamic interaction between the individual and other biological entities within 
the topographical frames of reference I have described. Berthoz believes the discovery of 
mirror-neurons lends support to his contention that the brain contains schemas within its 
neuronal structure, ―…a repertoire of preperceptions [emphasis in original] linked to a 
repertoire of actions … the brain can simulate actions to predict their consequences‖ 
(2000:20). His view is congruent in this aspect with Damasio‘s somatic marker hypothesis; 
however I argue that mirror-neurons have a greater significance: they provide a further 
validating mechanism through which we are able to position ouselves within our social 
environment. And furthermore, as Damasio suggests, by overlooking the role of emotion we 
limit our chances of understanding our own mechanisms of bioregulation, ―… especially as it 
regards the relation between an organism and the most complex aspects of an environment: 
society and culture‖ (2001:102).  
Psychologist and author Daniel Goleman has been documenting the emerging field of the 
‗social neurosciences‘: how the brain drives social behaviour and how the social environment 
in turn influences the brain and biology (2007). He places mirror-neurons at the center of the 
neural circuitry that operates as we interact; we grasp the minds of others through direct 
simulation rather than by conceptual reasoning; through feeling, not thinking. Goleman 
describes the ‗social brain‘ as the sum of the neural mechanisms that orchestrate our 
interactions within the social milieu, including our thoughts and feelings about other people 
and our various relationships. A specialised structure within the brain is emerging as the 
locus of interaction between cognitive and emotional functions: the ‗anterior cingulate 
cortex‘ (Allman et al., 2001). Allman and colleagues considered the anterior cingulate cortex 
to be highest order structure in the limbic system, integral to intelligent behaviour: emotional 













Within this structure is a rich supply of another specialised class of neurons that has been 
identified: studies have suggested that ‗spindle cells‘ are related to our ability to focus 
attention on a complex task; they are believed to integrate a variety of reward-related 
emotional and cognitive brain functions (Moss and Damasio, 2001). Spindle cells are rich in 
receptors for the particular brain chemicals associated with social interactions: serotonin, 
dopamine and vasopressin are known to be involved with the experience of depression, 
pleasure, love, and euphoria (Goleman, 2007). Another area where spindle cells are abundant 
is the orbitofrontal region of the prefrontal cortex, which activates during emotional reactions 
to others, most particularly those of empathy and romantic love (Bartels and Zeki, 2000).  
The spindle cells are so named because of their shape: a large bulb at one end and a long, 
thick extension, from which branch-off the dendrites and axons that serve as intercellular 
wiring (Allman et al., 2002). Goleman notes that a neuron‘s capacity for speed of 
transmission increases with the size of the long arms that project to other neurons. The 
disproportionately large dimensions of spindle cells in relation to other neurons is analogous, 
I suggest, to high-bandwidth internet connections. They ensure the extremely rapid 
transmission of information - laced with emotional overtones - to diverse parts of the brain, 
particularly to those highly specific motor centres that control vocalisation, facial expression 
and autonomic function (Nimchinsky et al., 1999).  
While most types of neurons in the human brain are found in other mammals, spindle cells 
are only found in our closest evolutionary relatives; but whereas orang-utans, gorillas and 
chimpanzees have upwards of a few hundred, human beings have close to a hundred 
thousand of them (Goleman, 2007). Significantly, spindle cells have been shown to develop 
postnatally in humans; they are not present at birth and begin to appear in the anterior 
cingulate cortex at around four months, continuing to proliferate along with the development 
of this structure into young adulthood (Allman et al., 2002). The postnatal development of the 
spindle cells is particularly significant in the light of recent studies that lend credence to the 
notions of neuroplasticity mentioned earlier, the ability of the human brain to change as a 
result of experience (Kolb and Whishaw, 1998; Draganski et al., 2004; Daraganski and May, 
2008; Begley, 2008). There is strong evidence that lived experience impacts on the 
development of spindle cells, thus influencing the acquisition of skills associated with social 
cognition. ―The survival of postnatally originating neurons … is enhanced by environmental 












2001:115). Allman and colleagues suggest that spindle cells may have a role in all of the 
slowly maturing functions of the anterior cingulate cortex, such as emotional self-control and 
impulse inhibition. In addition, there is some speculation that spindle cells may account for 
why some individuals are particularly sensitive to their own feelings as well as to those of 
others, making them more keenly socially aware.   
 People who have a high level of emotional awareness are especially good at  
 accurately detecting and discriminating emotional signals in themselves and others.
 Thus, a greater number of emotion targets may be identified within, or more internal 
 emotional information may be generated from, a given external emotional stimulus 
 (Lane et al, 1998:529) 
 
The self and the other: empathy and fellow-feeling 
Clinical psychologists have long been aware of the phenomena of sympathy, empathy and 
more extreme variants of emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo and Hapson, 1994; 
Barsade, 2002). The father of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, warned therapists to maintain 
their emotional distance from clients, advising a physician to ―… put[s] aside all his feelings, 
even his human sympathy‖ (1958:115). Carl Jung, on the other hand, stressed that since 
emotions are contagious, the patient‘s emotional state will have an effect on him despite the 
therapist‘s efforts to remain detached. ―He cannot do more than become conscious of the fact 
that he is affected … It is even his duty to accept the emotions of the patient and to mirror 
them‖ (Jung, 1968:155).  
It is perhaps ironic that the ‗social brain‘ may even be behind what many would call anti-
social behaviour, but placed in the necessary evolutionary context this paradox is somewhat 
dissipated. Incidents of emotional contagion that result in a frenzy of mob violence are well 
documented, from the Los Angeles riots of April 1992 (Harvey-Lintz  and Tidwell, 1997) to 
the more recent spate of xenophobic bloodletting in South Africa (Hadland, 2008). Without 
intending to wade into sociological speculation, I note that much of the literature reflects 
these cases to be rooted in adverse socio-economic conditions. I submit that under stressful 
circumstances there may be a greater tendency to adopt violent strategies. This perspective is 
borne out by psychologist Elizabeth Hatfield‘s assertion that before the industrial revolution 
the development of ‗kindness‘ as a human trait was inhibited by the ‗ghastly‘ conditions 












Hatfield and her colleagues refer to historical periods, before the enlightenment of the 
eighteenth century, which they maintain were characterised by violence, suspicion towards 
others and a lack of strong emotional ties between individuals. They describe the mass 
hysteria associated with the ‗Black Death‘ of twelfth century Europe, the 1789 storming of 
the Bastille that heralded the French Revolution and the New York City riots of 1863 that left 
scores of dead and injured in its wake. Given this context, a widespread sense of 
powerlessness amid extremely adverse circumstances is evidently able to mobilise entire 
communities to coordinated action.  
The Nobel Prize-winning Bulgarian author Elias Canetti completed an extensive study on 
crowd behaviour, in which he describes a lynch mob as a group of individuals who coalesce 
through the collective contagion of a single passion as they descend on their victim. ―Every 
arm is thrust out as if they all belonged to one and the same creature … the actions of all 
participants unite‖ (Canetti, 1984:49). It is my assertion that mirror-neuron activity attuned to 
a common purpose facilitates an alignment of biological systems; in Canetti‘s mob the 
possibility of empathy for the target of their rage is excluded as the multifaceted humanity of 
the ‗other‘ is diminished to the status of a simple object.  
The Austrian-born Jewish philosopher Martin Buber (2002) proposed that one‘s existence is 
defined by encounters with other individuals or inanimate objects and that one‘s interactions 
are characterised as either monologues or dialogues as expressed in the word-pairs Ich-Es: I-
It or Ich-Du: I-You. In the ‗I-It‘ relationship mode, an individual treats things and people 
alike as objects to serve his own ends, whereas an ‗I-You‘ relationship is typically a meeting 
of two beings characterised by mutuality and exchange. Buber argues that an individual is at 
all times engaged with aspects of the world in one of these modes. 
 The world is twofold for man in accordance with his twofold attitude. 
 The attitude of man is twofold in accordance with the two basic words he can speak.  
 The basic words are not single words, but word pairs. 
 One basic word is the word pair I-You. 
 The other basic word is the word pair I-It; but this basic word is not changed when He 
 or She takes the place of It. 
 Thus the I of man is also twofold. 
 For the I of the basic word I-You is different from that in the basic word I-It (Buber, 
 1996:53). 
 
Buber‘s I-It interactions, an individual has no empathy for the other person; there is no 












multi-tasking teenagers who believe themselves capable of following a dinnertime 
conversation while simultaneously ‗texting‘ a friend under the table or surreptitiously 
browsing the tunes on an iPod; the lack of connection is all too obvious for the recipient of 
the blank stare.  In contrast, Buber‘s I-You mode of interaction is one that is engaged with 
our most rewarding relationships: our close friends, family members and intimate partners. It 
is when such relationships are functioning optimally that, as Goleman (2007) suggests, the 
brain circuitry of the individuals concerned becomes synchronised in a single feedback loop 
involving mirror-neurons, the cingulate and orbitofrontal region and, via the spindle cells, the 
widely dispersed emotional areas of the brain.   
Of course, if all this circuitry were activated in each and every encounter with the 
supermarket check-out attendant, the bank official and the car-guard, it would burn out in no 
time flat. As Buber proposes, we encounter our world in an endless oscillation between the 
two poles of Ich-Du and Ich-Es. At the ‗I-You‘ apex of the pendulum‘s arc, each of the 
individuals, being reciprocal targets of the other‘s empathy, feels ‗felt‘; they feel that the 
other person shares their feelings, understands them and has genuine concern (Håkansson and 
Montgommery, 2003). At the other apex of the pendulum‘s trajectory, moving through 
indifference to outright exploitation, the target of the ‗I-It‘ relationship feels used and 
discarded. In practice, relationships are relatively fluid; every ‗It‘ is a potential ‗You‘, but 
when one expects to be treated as a ‗You‘, the cold shoulder of ‗It‘ treatment comes as a 
painful blow. ―I was really pleased to see her and she cut me dead.‖ Ouch! 
I argue that a cohesive community depends on the relatively unhindered swing of the 
pendulum: adverse circumstances left unremedied, as Hatfield and colleagues suggest (1994), 
could lead to dire social consequences.  
Empathy-overload: the urban trance  
In the late twentieth century and early twenty-first centuries, the large metropolitan 
environments have been increasingly characterised by fractured communities living cheek-
by-jowl. New York, for example, has a heterogenous population with diasporic communities 
forging distinct cultural niches in its midst (Laguerre, 2003). London is no different, claiming 
to be one of the most ethnically diverse cities on earth, with more than 300 languages spoken 
among more than 50 non-indigenous communities (Lee, 1997). Johannesburg, Durban and 












and, given South Africa‘s history of apartheid segregation and spatial planning, I maintain 
that even indigenous groupings seeking economic and political integration continue to find 
themselves relegated to economically subaltern and culturally distinct enclaves. I argue that 
under these circumstances the mainstream social landscape is littered with cliques, 
subcultures and other social factions that reflect the multi-layered ethnic mix, providing 
myriad opportunities for ‗in‘ and ‗out‘ groupings. ‗Us-Them‘ relationships are a restating of 
Buber‘s ‗I-It‘ pairing in the plural. ―Here the world is divided in two: the children of light and 
the children of darkness, the sheep and the goats, the elect and the damned‖ (Buber, 
1996:13). By definition, the relationship between one of ‗Us‘ and one of ‗Them‘ is one 
devoid of empathy; should one of Them have the temerity to address one of Us, they will not 
be heard, and so are the seeds of hatred sown.  
History is littered with examples of one group that turns violently against another in the 
manner of the Catholics and the Protestants in Ireland, the Serbs and the Croats in the Balkan 
states and the Hutus and the Tutsis of Rwanda (Pearson, 2001). However, I argue that in the 
modern urban environment, populated with a variety of subcultures, cliques and gangs, the 
distinction between those who belong and those that don‘t becomes more nuanced. The ‗in‘ 
group can round on one of its own for any of a number of reasons and ‗One of Us‘ can 
instantly become ‗Not One of Us‘, with the individual banished to social isolation. I watched 
as my son at an all boys school was ostracised by his circle of friends for no reason other than 
that on the rugby field many of them were being elevated to the ‗A‘ team while he seemed 
content to pitch up and play for the ‗C‘ team. Canetti describes a ‗hunting pack‘ as the most 
primitive dynamic unit among men; they often choose to inflict the death penalty on an 
individual through expulsion. 
 The individual is marooned where he is at the mercy of wild animals without any kind 
 of defence or where he will starve. The people to whom he formerly belonged will 
 have nothing to do with him anymore; they are not allowed to shelter him or give him 
 food; any intercourse with him defiles them and makes them guilty. Solitude in its 
 most rigorous form is the ultimate penalty here; separation from one‘s group is a 
 torture which very few can survive (Canetti, 1984:50). 
 
The pain of rejection feels very real; we frequently refer to ‗hurt feelings‘, ‗broken hearts‘ 
and even ‗being gutted‘. However, one recent study has shown that these descriptions go 
beyond the poetic license of a Country and Western song; the pain of physical injury and the 












anterior cingulate cortex, the structure in the limbic system discussed earlier, where 
emotional and cognitive functions interact and where adaptive responses are coordinated 
(Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004). It is argued that the overlap in function is evolutionarily 
adaptive: due to mammalian infants requiring maternal care for an extended period, a 
separation could prove fatal. The researchers suggest that as the social faculties evolved, 
existing pain mechanisms for detecting and averting physical danger were commandeered in 
order to identify threats of social separation: ―... pain captures attention, disrupts ongoing 
behaviour, and motivates action aimed at regaining safety and mitigating painful experience‖ 
(ibid:294). The emotional drive to ‗mitigate painful experience‘ can be particularly 
compelling, and I argue that it can lead to seemingly irrational actions with devastating 
consequences.  
Beyond the tipping-point 
Cognitive scientist Steven Pinker (1999) describes the process whereby an individual is able 
to brood over a thought, an idea or a perceived injustice, to the extent that their resentment 
provokes a loss of reason and they enter an amok state of blind rage. A number of ‗spree-
killers‘ have been described after the event as socially isolated individuals who ‗snap‘ and 
transmute into automatons as they mete out their vengeance (Pantziarka, 2000). One of the 
more famous cases involved two ‗outsider‘ schoolchildren at Columbine High School in 
Colorado in the United States (Cullen, 2004; Block, 2007). On April 20 1999, Eric Harris and 
Dylan Klebold embarked on a massacre, killing 12 fellow students and a teacher before 
committing suicide.  
It was by no means an isolated incident, described as only the fourth deadliest attack in the 
history of that country; a United States Secret Service report documents 37 such incidents, 
committed by 41 individuals over a 25-year period (Vossekuil et al. 2002). In a recent case in 
South Africa, 18 year old Jaco Harmse arrived at the Nico Diederichs Technical High School 
in Krugersdorp on 18 August 2008 wearing a mask, a replica of those worn by members of 
the heavy-metal band Slipknot, and brandishing a ceremonial Samurai sword. Later that 
Monday morning 16 year old Jacobus Pretorius was dead, his throat having been slit, and a 
number of bystanders were injured. Evidence presented to the court indicated the killer had a 












Toxic work environments have produced their fair share of spree-killers, with the phrase 
‗going postal‘ gaining currency following a series of incidents; between 1986 and 1997 more 
than 40 people were gunned down by spree killers in at least 20 incidents of workplace rage 
within the US Postal Services (Califano et al. 2000). The official report following an 
investigation concluded that the postal services are unfairly tarnished, implying that the 
phenomenon is more widespread. ―Postal employees are only a third as likely as those in the 
national workforce to be victims of homicide at work‖ (ibid:3). It would appear to be 
relatively common then for a lone-wolf to reach a tipping-point and to violently command 
attention.   
Provocative author Mark Ames (2005) describes killing sprees in both workplaces and 
schoolyards as ‗political acts‘, analogous with the 11 September 2000 attacks on New York‘s 
World Trade Centre. He argues that oppressive environments produce the odd rogue 
individual, pointing out that the history of slavery itself is marked by very few mass 
uprisings. This, Ames puts down to an innate human tendency to become submissive after 
being separated from one‘s cultural context, ultimately to become complicit in one‘s own 
oppression. He provides a compelling argument that slavery continues to be mythologised, 
only in the service of the status quo. 
 For contemporary Americans slavery is acceptable material only if framed as a device 
 imposed by evildoers, an obstacle to be overcome by heroes, rather than as an 
 ordinary and highly adaptive condition that releases an entirely unheroic side of our 
 psychology ... Through time slavery has adapted and mutated itself into our modern 
 condition. It is by examining this process that we will ultimately have answers to what 
 creates the rampage murders of today (ibid:34) 
 
Without disagreeing with Mr. Ames, I argue that some of the perennial questions regarding 
our ability to coexist in relative harmony with other members of our species may one day be 
settled through a detailed examination of the social brain. I propose that a more thorough 
understanding of the processes of empathy, will give insight into the cultural instruments 
through which social cohesion may be promoted and maintained.  It is evident that the 
mechanisms of empathy support a number of basic behaviours that are crucial for the 
reproductive success of animals living in groups: vicariousness of emotions; mother-infant 
responsiveness; social facilitation; alarm and the modelling of competitors and predators 













Empathy and social healing 
The literature provides a wealth of evidence to suggest humans have an instinct for altruism; 
it is most strongly evident within an individual‘s immediate social circle, but extends to other 
members of the community under particular circumstances (Goleman, 2007). A 1973 study 
conducted among seminary students concluded that someone in a hurry is less likely to 
interrupt their mission to render assistance to someone in distress, ironically even if they are 
on their way to deliver a sermon on the biblical Good Samaritan,  ―…thus inadvertently 
confirming the point of the parable‖ (Darley and Batson, 1973:107). Otherwise upright 
citizens are often too preoccupied with their individual agendas or even susceptible to the 
silent assumptions they make about others.  
Goleman conducted research on how the closure of mental hospitals had turned the streets of 
New York into a psychiatric ward, an experience he says has opened his eyes to the plight of 
the homeless (2007). He shares an anecdote wherein he observed a shabby, shirtless man 
lying motionless on the steps outside a New York subway with people simply stepping over 
his prone figure in their rush to get somewhere. Curious, Goleman crossed the street for a 
closer look. The moment he stopped to check on the stranger, others stopped too. Within 
moments someone had called an ambulance, while someone else had brought food to help 
revive the unfortunate individual who, it turned out, was a Spanish speaking man who had 
been wandering the streets for days before collapsing from hunger. Simply by taking notice, 
Goleman had directed the attention of others to the man‘s plight. Paying attention allows for 
emotional connections; without attention, empathy doesn‘t stand a chance. 
A recent incident that occurred not very far from my home in Cape Town illustrates how we 
are able to allow preconceptions to influence our response to the plight of others (Meyer, 
2010). Early one morning, Lucky Selepe, a security guard at a local supermarket noticed a 
woman sitting on the pavement in front of the Kenilworth Medicross Centre, a local clinic. A 
number of personnel from the facility had evidently passed her by, as had other members of 
the public. Selepe had been doing the night-shift and as he completed his final rounds, he 
went to take a closer look. He discovered that the woman was barefoot and sitting in a pool of 
blood; she had evidently been badly injured. The moment he took interest, others began 












It was discovered that the woman was Gubela Mji, the head of the Centre for Rehabilitation 
Studies in the Health Faculty at Stellenbosch University. On her early morning walk, she had 
been assaulted and robbed of her shoes and socks, and had stab wounds to her head and face. 
When questioned later, the clinic personnel admitted they had ignored her as they assumed 
this black woman to be a drunk and homeless person who had been involved in a fight. Such 
unfortunate stereotypes are built up through regular encounters with the large numbers of 
alcoholic homeless that roam the streets of Cape Town and for whom there are insufficient 
social services.  
It may be social divides or cultural rifts that numb us to the plight of others, but I suggest it is 
equally due to the ubiquitous ‗urban trance‘ that allows us to live in close proximity with 
others without being distracted from our personal preoccupations. I have always marvelled at 
the hospitality of rural communities where I have been treated by relative strangers as a long 
lost member of family. Gubela Mji was mistaken for a homeless person in her hour of need 
and not worthy of compassion. Ironically her academic area of expertise lies in the field of 
disability among the homeless.  
 I was born in a rural village that by today‘s standards one would describe as 
 impoverished, though that is not how we thought of ourselves. Sharing was the norm 
 and was not questioned … I was rediscovering in conversations with homeless 
 disabled people a capacity that I recalled from my childhood to recognise myself in 
 others, a capacity that had been slowly eroded by the rationality and instrumentalism 
 of my medical training and the bureaucracy and alienation of urban living (Mji, 
 2007:350-353). 
 
That capacity Mji describes is best expressed in the Nguni proverb: umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu, the closest English translation for which is ‗a person is a person through other 
people‘. It is most often referred to, simply, as ubuntu.  
In this chapter I have argued that fellow-feeling facilitates social cooperation and that many 
historical and contemporary examples of  public violence and the rupture of the social fabric 
are characterised by a lack of empathy and an objectification of ‗the other‘. I have traced the 
capacity for empathy to the efficient functioning of the neural networks of social cognition, 
including spindle-cells and mirror-neurons. I have also highlighted the composite 
interconnectedness of sensory modalities and the mutually dependent capacities for thinking 
and feeling in negotiating the complexities of our social environment. The notion of 












under adverse conditions, but that this is reversible; the brain can be encouraged to 
reconfigure itself with the appropriate positive stimulation. I will go on to make the case for 












The Passions, the Humours, Tempers and Sensibilities  
 
―To be or not to be …‖  
Shakespeare: Hamlet, Act 3, scene 2, 56  
 ―Cogito ergo sum‖  
Rene Descartes: 1637. Discourse on the Method: IV 
―Ke nako: Feel it, it is here 
TM
‖  
FIFA: Slogan of the 2010 Soccer World Cup 
As a young boy growing up the least robust of four brothers I often overheard my mother 
introduce me to others as ‗the sensitive one‘. That is to say I was the cowboy who, when 
circumstances necessitated, would allow himself to cry. This display of emotion was often 
prompted not so much by a skinned knee as a bruised ego, but was cause for some 
embarrassment to those around me; my father would regularly implore me to grow up, to pull 
myself together or simply to control myself.  I recall the sense of achievement I felt when, 
around the age of twelve, I finally managed to conquer that aspect of my personality which 
had brought such shame. I had at last robbed the neighbourhood bullies of the rewards for 
their regular taunts and turned saltiness to sweet victory.  It is with a degree of hindsight 
gleaned from my current research that I realise this rite of passage marked for me the triumph 
of Descartes: I had ultimately managed to separate mind from body, feeling from intellect 
and reason from emotion. 
I feel, therefore I think I am 
The disengagement of mind and matter, this misapprehension as to what we are and how we 
operate, can be traced back to Plato the Classical Greek thinker. But the notion is more 
familiar to us through his intellectual descendant, the seventeenth century French philosopher 
Rene Descartes (Damasio, 2005). This so-called ‗Father of Modern Philosophy‘ has 
dominated much of our thinking since the Age of Reason, his dualistic view of human 
existence defining us as a mind and a body that interact causally with each other but which 
remain two distinctly separate things. The splitting-off of parts of our selves, sometimes 
emphasising the importance of one aspect over the other, has been particularly evident in the 
theatre; the twentieth-century fascination with role of the actor in particular has tried to 
integrate our material being with what might be called the more transcendental or even 












In this section I find the courage to challenge Descartes head-on and argue for an integrated 
approach to the mind-body conundrum, where emotion is accorded the dignity it has long 
been denied. The 17
th
 century French philosopher proves to be an obstinate adversary though, 
but I‘m fortunate to be able to call on the support of influential thinkers and practitioners in 
both the theatre and the science laboratory in making my case. Among my literary sources, I 
am informed by Joseph Roach (1993) and Jean Benedetti (1998; 2007), and I‘m guided 
largely by the insights of Rhonda Blair (2000; 2002; 2008) who has done extensive research 
into the acting process and the application of cognitive science.   
I begin by looking to the earliest recorded obsession with the Passions, where the Classical 
teachers of oratory in Greece and Rome understood that skilful exploitation of emotion could 
persuade a judge to accept the validity of one‘s plea (Quintilian, 1920). I continue to track the 
fascination for feeling as it carried over naturally into the theatre where, with the help of a 
great thinker of the French Enlightenment Denis Diderot, emotion was treated with a wary 
scepticism that continued well into the 20
th
 century. I discuss how Diderot‘s Paradox of the 
Actor (Beck, 2000) came to exemplify the divergent approaches to theatre that characterised 
much of the past hundred years: Stanislavsky and his descendants assumed a stance of 
naturalistic monism, viewing the emotions as part of an organic whole; his detractors held to 
a mechanistic view that sought to hold emotion at bay lest it clog-up the works.  
Although I turn to Stanislavsky to illustrate much of my argument, it is with the proviso that  
it is short-sighted to assume that the practitioners of the past were groping towards the 
certainties that are now at hand, each contribution being validated by the extent to which it 
anticipated Stanislavsky. To do this would be as conceited as to suggest that the human 
species represents the telos of existence and that evolution has now achieved its objective. In 
his On the Origin of Stories, Brian Boyd echoes Darwin and argues for a ‗biocultural‘ 
approach to art and literature, viewing developments as part of an open-ended system with no 
final destination in sight. ―A Darwinian system . . . remains open, unpredictable, and free. It 
cannot presuppose a best option, an ideal fit, a goal that can be precisely determined 
beforehand‖ (Boyd, 2009:122). Accordingly I suggest that Stanislavsky, his contemporaries 
and their successors were influenced in their praxis by the ebb and flow of the zeitgeist: I 
argue that the legacy each leaves is not a definitive snapshot but a moving target reflecting 












Stanislavsky, for example, initially tried to reach the subconscious through the deliberate use 
of emotional memory techniques, where feeling follows thought (Stanislavsky, 1961; 1964). 
However, his ongoing research ultimately led him to refine his approach with a method of 
physical actions, where feeling follows action (Stanislavsky, 1989). The neuroscientific 
notions of ‗computational theory of mind‘ (Pinker, 1999) and the ‗motor theories of 
cognition‘ (Di Pellegrino et al. 1992; Hecht, Vogt and Prinz, 2001), provide perspectives 
which help to straddle the paradox. Finally, I introduce the neuroscientific approach of 
‗emotional induction‘ (Bloch et al. 1987; 1991; Bloch 1993; 2006), which demonstrates how 
affective states can be generated through purely physical means with minimal cognitive 
involvement. I conclude by arguing for the distinctly material, embodied nature of emotions. 
Feeling our way back to the future 
The historical record of developments in rhetoric and the theatre reflects a perpetual theme: 
the precise nature of the emotions and their appropriate deployment. Of course the 
phenomena we now refer to as emotions were at various junctures called the Passions, the 
Humours, Tempers and Sensibilities; it is incumbent on current researchers to contextualise 
outmoded terminology. For example, there was no notion of biology as a distinct field of 
scientific enquiry until the nineteenth century, but this did not preclude earlier thinkers from 
contemplating the mysteries of nature and the human body. Aristotle turned his attention with 
apparent ease from the poetics to midwifery and made no distinction between his 
philosophical and scientific investigations, dissecting and analysing rather than theorising 
(Aristotle, 2004). In The Art of Rhetoric he defined and classified the Passions in typically 
forensic fashion, concluding that they could be either pleasurable, painful or a blend of both 
and grouping them as either negative or positive (Benedetti, 2007).  
The Greek philosopher stressed the importance of emotion to effective rhetorical delivery: a 
sound legal argument, sympathetically delivered, was more likely to find favour with a 
judge.  In Classical Rome, some three centuries later, the central role of emotion continued 
to be recognised in both the theatre and the courtroom; Cicero took the effective 
coordination of the voice and body as his model for persuasive oration (Roach, 1993). The 
following century saw Quintilian write the twelve books of Institutio oratoria, in which he 
describes rhetoric as bene dicendi scientia, or ‗the science of speaking well‘ and wherein 













The prime essential for stirring the emotions of others is, in my opinion, first to feel 
those emotions oneself. It is sometimes positively ridiculous to counterfeit grief, 
anger and indignation, if we content ourselves with accommodating our words and 
looks and make no attempt to adapt our own feelings to the emotions to be 
expressed… Consequently, if we wish to give our words the appearance of sincerity, 
we must assimilate ourselves to the emotions of those who are genuinely so affected, 
and our eloquence must spring from the same feeling that we desire to produce in the 
mind of the judge (Quintilian, 1920:433).  
Quintillian concludes, paradoxically, that true emotion should be deeply felt by the one 
‗faking it‘. This sentiment reflects the ancient belief in a spiritual realm and the way in 
which the human body works: the intensity of the emotional experience is due to the volatile 
effect on the blood of inhaling the spirits. It was thought, for example, that the Greek god 
Apollo took the form of intoxicating vapours, breathing himself into the Pythoness of Delphi 
and speaking through her (Pocock, 1997). To this day we hear reference to any manifestation 
of unusual creativity as being ‗inspired‘, literally breathed-in, such achievements being 
readily attributed to the agency of a Divine guidance. 
Straddling the widening gulf  
The rhetoric of the passions dominated discussion on the theatre until the late eighteenth 
century when Denis Diderot proclaimed in his 1773 Paradoxe sur le comédien (Morley, 
2005), that the great enemy of consistent performance and good acting was the intrusion of 
Sensibility, the capacity to feel and to be swept away by strong emotion (Strasberg, 1987; 
Roach, 1993; Gordon, 2006; Benedetti, J. 2007). He believed, like Descartes before him, that 
man is a machine, that emotion is inherently prone to deception and is thus dangerous; 
Diderot questioned how an actor can be ―both harpsichordist and harpsichord, subject and 
object, self and creation of the self simultaneously‖ (Beck, 2000:264). Descartes had earlier 
likened the human body to the workings of a clock. 
It is true that one can have difficulty in believing that the disposition of the organs 
alone is sufficient for producing in us all the movements which are not determined 
by our thought; that is why I shall here try to prove it; and to explain the whole 
machine of our body in such a way that we shall have no more reason to think that it 
is our soul which excites in it the movements which we do not experience as being 
guided by our will, than we have to judge that there is a soul in a clock, which makes 
it show the hours (Descartes, 1664:226).   
Descartes‘ mechanistic view of the world led a number of practitioners into the twentieth 
century rejecting theatre‘s organic nature, intent on reducing an actor‘s status to that of a 












theorist and designer, and his determination to dispense altogether with actors and to replace 
them with the Über-Marionette. A notable production of Hamlet was conceived to be 
defined by an assortment of moving metal screens, prompting Stanislavsky to comment that 
―… the sheer weight would have necessitated rebuilding the entire theatre and installing 
hydraulic machinery‖ (Roose-Evans, 1996:43). For his part, Craig believed players to be 
subject to the ―tyranny of their own emotions‖ and apt to destroy the harmony of the ‗art-
object‘ (Benedetti, 2007:176). While Craig advocated the total subordination of the actor to 
the concept of the production, Stanislavsky was determined to embrace the paradox in 
creating a dynamic theatre; the actor as a human being always coexists with the performed 
persona – the harpsichordist is indeed the harpsichord - and so for him a workable theory 
would have to accommodate both aspects to remain true to the actor‘s experience (Beck, 
2000). 
It is important to note that, as Joseph Roach (1993) has pointed out, Stanislavsky‘s theory 
grew out of his practice; his methods were firmly grounded in the science and culture of his 
time but they were the result of an ongoing process of problem solving and exploration. His 
career as both artist and teacher was driven by a desire to develop and strengthen in himself 
and in his actors a consistent capacity to engage vitally with the roles they tackled. His aim 
was not to create an elegant theory of acting but rather a practical toolbox allowing actors to 
approach their roles in a systematic fashion.  
Like Diderot, Stanislavsky was well aware of the volatility of emotions, but his practice and 
research had liberated him to an extent from the circumspection of both Platonic idealism and 
Cartesian dualism. What‘s more, as Benedetti notes, he was living in an intellectual climate, 
where the relationship between reality and art was being questioned by the introduction of 
technologies like photography. For example, Leo Tolstoy had pointed out in an 1897 essay, 
What is Art?, that art had a capacity to induce an emotional response in the spectator through 
the conscious arrangement of the appropriate signs. His observations were particularly 
applicable to the Stanislavsky‘s work with actors. ―… if a man is infected by the author‘s 
condition of soul, if he feels this emotion and this union with others, then the object which 
has effected this is art‖ (Tolstoy, 2009:153). As Blair (2008) points out, Stanislavsky had 
through his own practice discovered that the audience‘s awareness is not detached or 












Marketers, advertising executives, consumer analysts and motivational trainers in today‘s 
commercial environment would be hard pressed to disagree with Stanislavsky‘s assertion that 
our daily behaviour is largely based on necessity and intention; we feel certain needs and we 
respond to them - if we are thirsty we drink and if we are hungry we eat. The latter day 
experts on human behaviour who seek to turn their insights into profits would agree further 
that our behaviour is moderated by our aspirations; our dreams lead us to formulate 
intentions, set goals and strive to achieve them.   
As shown in the previous chapter, it is through interacting with our environment that our 
emotional resources become evident, particularly when obstacles litter the path. Whether 
attempting to satisfy a hunger out of necessity or intentionally reaching for a dream there is 
always the chance of success or failure; the behaviour of others may either help or hinder us 
in our individual efforts to realise our ambitions, while under adverse physical circumstances, 
people really do die of hunger or thirst. It is the tensions created through the interplay of 
needs and desires and the forces that alternatively aid or hinder their satisfaction that produce 
actions capable of stimulating authentic emotional resonance in an observer.  
Finding a pulse in the Promethean clay   
Looking back on Stanislavsky‘s work through the prism of our current scientific knowledge, 
it is clear he was a man of his time, and I would argue that in some aspects of his legacy, he is 
proving to have been ahead of his time. More than half a century after his death, cognitive 
scientists, neurophysiologists, and psychologists are validating Stanislavsky‘s fundamental 
intuition on human behaviour. Linguist, cognitive scientist and philosopher Steven Pinker 
invokes the computational theory of mind in asserting that the brain, a ―physical hunk of 
matter‖ (1999:64), allows us to make sense of the ethereal world of meaning and intention; 
intelligence, desires, behavior, and body are interconnected. What Stanislavsky had left for 
those who followed in his wake was essentially a way of connecting behavior, body, emotion 
and intelligence, through the notion of a character wanting something or pursuing a goal. The 
computational theory roots the human organism in a physical realm that links symbols, 
neurons, sense organs, belief, and behavior. Blair observes that most of the terms Pinker uses 
have been employed in some way by Stanislavsky and his heirs, including such influential 
twentieth century theatre practitioners as Grotowski and Peter Brook (Blair, 2008). Pinker 
emphasises the central role of biology with its embedded notions of emotion and instinct, 












Pinker takes care to highlight the limitations imposed by a nature/nurture binary. The 
dichotomy between ‗biology‘ on the one hand and ‗social construction‘ on the other, he 
argues, excludes the possibility of a third option: certain constructs are ―products of a 
complex mind designed to mesh with what is in nature‖ (Pinker, 1999:57).   
From this position, I argue that the central elements of Stanislavsky‘s work are rooted in 
evolutionary biology; his lasting influence is due to the fact that his work reflects how we 
function organically. I further suggest that while culture and conscious choices have an effect 
on our behavior, our notions of self are grounded in our being as physical organisms. 
Moreover, as Blair (2000) maintains, Stanilvasky‘s work applies to styles of theatrical 
presentation beyond the restrictions of naturalism; the capacity for theatre to engage 
audiences transcends notions of realism, forms of representation and mimesis. No matter the 
style of presentation or degree of abstraction, an audience member recognises the presence of 
one or more fellow sentient beings; we are engaged by the exhibition of intelligent behaviour 
that appears to be motivated by will, desire, and objectives. I argue that any successful 
presentation of live theatre, of whatever form, is driven by such an internal logic. Even a 
complete phantasm, an alien being plucked from thin air, can be simultaneously compelling 
on the levels of emotion and cognition: science fiction author David Alexander Smith 
suggests two requirements for creating such an appealing creature: 
One, they have to have intelligent but impenetrable responses to situations. You have 
to be able to observe the alien‘s behavior and say, ‗I don‘t understand the rules by 
which the alien is making its decisions, but the alien is acting rationally by some set 
of rules.‘ . . . And two, they have to care about something. They have to want 
something and pursue it in the face of obstacles (Quoted in Pinker, 1999:61). 
I maintain that humans have evolved to be highly alert for signs of intelligent life: it is this 
capacity for anthropomorphism that has allowed Walt Disney‘s creations to define a 
generation of cinematic fantasy from Mickey Mouse to Pixar‘s Wall-E (2008). Moreover, I 
contend that the essential contract between performers and audiences is biologically 
underwritten: the ‗willing suspension of disbelief‘, allowing audiences to be transported into 
a speculative world of possibility, is predicated on an unconscious detection on the part of the 
audience of familiar biological processes. Through the skilful manipulation of the 
mechanisms of human behaviour, theatrical collaborators are able to invoke mirror-neuron 
networks, thus completing the emotional feedback loops that oblige spectators to endorse 












In addition, abstract concepts are held in the brain as mental representations in ‗mentalese‘, 
cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor‘s (1976) language of thought. The computational theory of 
mind describes how these images are connected to fundamental structures of language which 
are embodied in the two elementary metaphors of place and agency (Pinker, 1999). Abstract 
thought and embodied experience converge, thus clarifying the relationship between reality 
and imagination central to Stanislavsky‘s ‗magic if‘‘.  ―… our work on a play begins with the 
use of if [emphasis in original] as a lever to lift us out of the world of actuality and onto the 
plane of imagination‖ (Stanislavsky, 1964:59).  
Divergent views or misplaced emphasis 
Many of Stanislavsky‘s intellectual descendents agree that the imagination should underpin 
an actor‘s performance within a set of ‗given circumstances‘, but there have been differing 
interpretations as to how this aspect should relate to another crucial element of theatrical 
presentation, that of motivated action. I suggest that current research in the neurosciences 
may provide some clarity on the divergent schools of thought that prevailed throughout the 
twentieth century.  What I believe amounts to a difference in hierarchical emphasis of 
emotional memory in relation to motivated action, fuelled disagreements between 
Stanislavsky and his detractors in Europe, while in America vigorous debate ensued among 
that country‘s most influential acting teachers after aspects of Stanislavsky‘s earlier work 
began catching on there.  
Pinker‘s (1994) assertion that emotions and passions are set off in the mind purely by specific 
mental representations, images, and ideas would appear to lend credence to proponents of 
‗affective memory‘. However it is worth noting that Stanislavsky himself eventually turned 
away from these aspects of his earlier praxis, placing increasing emphasis on goal-directed 
action, which is more likely to find correlates in current ‗motor theories‘ of social cognition 
(Di Pellegrino et al. 1992; Hecht, Vogt and Prinz, 2001). These models propose that mirror 
systems in the brain allow an observed action to trigger an action-simulation at a covert level, 
engaging the motor systems together with those brain structures concerned with the sensory 
consequences of the action being simulated. Vittorio Gallese (2004) argues that this neural 
simulation applies equally to actions, intentions and observed expression of emotions, 
whereby we share to some degree the inner states of others with whom we are interacting. He 
takes care, however, to emphasise the distinction between his notion of simulation and that of 












According to Simulation Theory, the pretend state used by the interpreter in order to 
understand the behaviour of the agent is the result of a deliberate and voluntary act on 
the side of the interpreter.  The simulation process I am discussing is instead 
automatic, unconscious and pre-reflexive [emphasis in original] (Gallese, 2004:169). 
The motor theories of social cognition describe ways of experiencing the world and of 
gaining knowledge of the social environment primarily through our capacity to feel rather 
than through our ability to rationalise, and the mirror-neuron system provides the harmonic 
sounding-board. There is, for example, strong evidence to suggest the compromised 
emotional responses and impaired social functioning in people exhibiting autism and those of 
psychopaths are due to abnormal or absent mirror neuron activity (Agnew et al., 2007). 
Political polar-shifts  
I have previously stated my contention that the development of theatre practice tends to be 
shaped by the prevailing intellectual climate, consistently responding to the world view of its 
particular epoch. But this may equally be said of the ideological circumstances; I maintain 
that an analysis of theatre cannot be divorced from the socio-political context of its nativity. 
In the early part of the twentieth century the notion of art and its purpose was being redefined 
throughout Europe with the emergence of a series of movements such as Post-Impressionism, 
Cubism, Fauvism and Futurism; art was being defined by its very artificiality, where what 
humans produced was considered infinitely more important than the natural world (Benedetti, 
2007). The zeitgeist was given a powerful ideological expression by the Russian revolution 
and the resurgent writings of Diderot found favour with the new Soviet order (Miller, 1971); 
his revolutionary science, atheism and materialism sparked critical debate as several new 
editions of his Paradoxe sur le comedien were released more than a hundred and forty years 
after the work was penned. As Roach recounts, in the preface to one such edition the 
Commissar of Education and Enlightenment, Anatoly Lunacharskii, noted that there were two 
styles of acting vying for historical supremacy: 
… one, turning inward, draws on the actor's own inner psychological resources of self 
[emphasis in original] and leads to subjective impressionism; the other, drawing on 
the actor‘s powers of detached observation, opens outward on the objective world, on 
nature and society (Roach, 1993:196). 
Two titans of the Russian theatre came to personify this contradiction, each appearing to 
inhabit one of the poles, although I suggest that Stanislavsky and Myerhold were no more 












The young Vsevolod Meyerhold had been a founder member of the Moscow Art Theatre with 
Stanislavsky, the figure who had dominated the theatrical landscape before the revolution and 
a man to whom he remained devoted despite their apparent disagreements. Each of the men 
went on to develop his own system of actor training rooted in the principles of Diderot‘s 
revolutionary text and both turned to the psychophysiological research of the time. However 
the two differed as to the role of emotion and the experience of feeling in the process of 
acting: Meyerhold dismissed the older man‘s efforts aimed at recreating lived experience on 
stage, as entirely too subjective, describing them as a form of ‗self-hypnotic narcosis‘ 
(Benedetti, 2007). In opposition he devised his system of ‗Biomechanics‘, a technique for 
achieving maximum physical preparedness and responsiveness, but in which the creation of 
a theatre performance is no different to the production of consumer goods in a factory. His 
approach was informed by Taylorism, the scientific organisation of labour for maximum 
efficiency, which was being championed in the new Soviet Union (Blair, 2008). At the time 
the nascent field of psychology was developing into an objective science of behavior, 
underpinned by the ideological assumption that external conditions determine human nature. 
This implied that an objective and controlled manipulation of the physical environment 
would influence the inner state of the person (Roach, 1993).  
It was Myerhold‘s contention that no meaningful distinction can be drawn between the 
psychological and the physical, between the vital and the mechanical; a view which I 
suggest was not far removed from that of his erstwhile mentor. Meyerhold had not worked 
with Stanislavsky for a number of years, during which time the master‘s System was 
constantly being revised and updated based on his regular work with actors and his changing 
appreciation of the science of that period. Examining the timeline of the two men‘s careers 
(Leach, 2003), I believe Meyerhold would have had little knowledge of Stanislavsky‘s later 
notions of intentionality and physical action and suggest that his criticisms were largely 
misplaced. He did concede much later that he had failed to appreciate the significance of 
certain actions Stanislavsky had given him as a young actor in rehearsals for The Three 
Sisters (Benedetti, 2007). Nonetheless his misrepresentations of Stanislavsky gained 
currency with the avante-garde and notably, German director Bertold Brecht (1965;1977) 














Objectivity and shifting subjectivities 
Elements of Myerhold‘s 1906 production of Balaganchik (Crone, 1994) suggest that Brecht 
may have been influenced by aspects of biomechanics, as they appear to have characterised 
much of his work: eliminating curtains; changing scenery in full view of the audience; 
revealing ‗stage secrets‘ and creating runways that connect spectators with the actors. But 
above all, it was Brecht‘s strategy of defamiliarising the presentation that distinguished his 
theatre as one intended to create a consciousness that would facilitate transformation in a 
society ripe for change. The verfremdungseffekt was calculated to make the everyday seem 
strange and unfamiliar and therefore open to rational evaluation (Brecht, 1977). Although 
Brecht‘s stated intention was to promote criticical engagement with the presentation rather 
than evoking empathy, which he believed would cloud the intellect, the dynamic 
nevertheless continued to include emotions and feelings; the audience is invited to identify 
with the performer who in turn exposes contradictions within the character‘s behaviour. 
―This is one of the most fundamental tenets of epic acting, promoting a type of spectatorship 
capable of infinite degrees of self-reflexiveness‖ (Gordon, 2006:234).  
I argue that it is this aspect of shifting perspectives that defined epic theatre, rather than 
emotional detachment. It is the thrust of my thesis that theatre‘s capacity to create empathy 
is one of its greatest strengths as an agent for change: by inviting a spectator to be 
emotionally ‗moved‘ as they experience events from the conflicting perspectives of multiple 
subjectivities they are encouraged to confront the paradox on both rational and visceral 
levels. 
I am fortunate enough to have experienced this phenomenon both as a performer and as a 
spectator in two separate productions that use shifting subjectivities to great effect. In a 
presentation of David Mamet‘s Oleanna (1993) at the Baxter Theatre Studio in 2005, I 
played John, a professor anxiously waiting for the university to sign off on his tenure when 
one of his female students accuses him of sexual harassment. During rehearsals I became 
aware of the pitfalls of tackling such a role: there are aspects to this persona that were 
immediately distasteful to me; he is patronising and dismissive and appears to relish the 
status advantage he enjoys over Carol. As an actor I was forced to set aside my personal 
misgivings, however, and to probe beneath the surface of his annoying idiosyncrasies. By 
the time we were ready to perform the piece I had managed to reconcile myself with a 












particular set of circumstances and according to the set of values he embraces; I had 
discovered how, under similar conditions, I would have made the identical choices.  
But as the onstage power struggle progressed in the presence of an audience it became a 
challenge to remain emotionally rooted in the character‘s reality, to resist the temptation to 
stand in judgement of the man as I felt the sympathy swing to his adversary. I was aware the 
members of the audience were making their own discoveries, as acute silence was 
alternately punctuated by restlessness, the odd stifled gasp or even a derisive snort 
emanating from the auditorium. Despite the actor‘s need for approval I had to remain 
committed to the subjective dimension of the character I inhabited, affording the audience 
the opportunity to ‗know‘ him the way I did. Following the performance the foyer and bar 
buzzed with heated arguments surrounding gender roles, manipulation and the abuse of 
power within the dynamic of relationships between authority figures and their subordinates.   
More recently I attended a performance of David Harrower‘s Blackbird (2007) presented at 
the University of Cape Town‘s Intimate Theatre. Here two characters confront each other 
over a series of incidents amounting to sexual abuse of a minor that had taken place fifteen 
years previously. Throughout the tangle of recriminations, accusations and explanations, I 
became acutely engaged in each character‘s emotional point-of-view as the balance of power 
fluctuated, warped and finally melted altogether. As I watched, each shift in perspective 
resulted in a moment of verfremdung while I was forced rationally to contemplate the 
validity of my loyalties. Even as I write I continue to feel gutted at the recollection and I‘m 
not sure whether to blame Stanislavsky or Brecht. 
Hitting moving-targets from a distance  
Although he did have certain reservations, Brecht was a stated admirer of Stanislavsky 
(Brecht and Mueller, 1964) and was particularly complimentary towards his work with the 
body which, as I‘ve noted, represented a significant departure from Stanislavsky‘s earlier 
work with emotional recall. It is clear that Stanislavsky himself never considered his System 
to be a fait accompli and it remained a work in progress until the time of his death in 1938. 
The final 10 years of his life were devoted to the development of his ‗method of physical 
actions‘, based on the ‗objective aspect of the mindbody continuum‘ (Roach, 1993:197). 












Stanislavsky‘s influence on his own work and considered Stanislavsky‘s research into 
psychophysical actions to be his most significant legacy (Sacharow, 2004).  
Brecht continued to be skeptical of Stanislavsky‘s earlier fascination with the ‗cult‘ of 
subjectivism and attributed the more progressive ‗method of physical actions‘ to the 
―influence of Soviet life and its materialistic tendencies‖ (Brecht, 1965:124). I suggest 
however, that Brecht‘s perspective was clouded by a skewed version of Stanislavsky he had 
encountered while in exile in New York in the 1930s. One of his earliest collaborations in his 
adopted city was with a supposedly ‗left-wing‘ group who claimed to use the Stanislavsky 
‗system‘ but who treated his play Die Mutter ―as an excuse to explore their own feelings.‖ 
(Benedetti, 2007:198). This episode led to a reportedly acrimonious parting of ways although 
neither he nor the cast could have known at the time that Stanislavsky had specifically 
denounced a narcissistic concern with actors‘ emotion. ―Love art in yourself and not yourself 
in art‖ (Stanislavsky, 1989:250). 
There is some irony that, while Brecht had misread some of Stanislavsky‘s principles, he has 
himself been the subject of a widespread misconception: that his theatre is purely didactic 
and, as a consequence, unavoidably dull. On the contrary, both the tone and the fundamental 
attitude of Brechtian performance is one of irony and irreverence. ―A theatre that can‘t be 
laughed in is a theatre to laugh at. Humourless people are ridiculous.‖ (Brecht, 1977:173)  
The sense of enjoyment or spass, to which Brecht aspired, he found in popular entertainment 
forms such as silent films, cabaret, and music-hall clowning, in street performance and sports 
matches (Gordon, 2006). In this aspect I believe Brecht echoed Myerhold, whose work 
showed a direct influence of the Commedia Del Arte mixed in with the common Russian 
tradition (Crone, 1994).  
Above all, Gordon notes, Brecht aimed to replace the ‗bourgois theatre‘of escapist illusions 
and emotional manipulation with a form that actually expressed the realities of twentieth 
century life. He believed that Naturalism mesmerised by stressing the total coherence of the 
theatrical illusion, while Expressionism disarmed the spectator by emphasising the subjective 
power of complete identification with the emotions of the characters (Brecht, 1977). He held 
that both forms functioned by deception, exploiting the empathy between actor and spectator. 
Nevertheless Brecht realised that he was increasingly being seen as someone who promoted 












It becomes clear to me that the antagonistic configuration ‗reason in this corner – 
emotion in that‘ has to go. The relationship of ratio and emotion [emphasis in 
original], with all its contradictions, has to be examined minutely, and opponents 
cannot be allowed simply to present epic theatre as rational and counter emotional.‖ 
(Quoted in Benedetti, 2007:95).   
Brecht had by now encountered the inevitable limitations inherent in Cartesian dualism and 
had clearly expressed his determination to confront, if not entirely embrace, the paradox. In 
doing so he was able to acknowledge that the stage is inhabited by actors who are live, 
passionate, contradictory and three-dimensional people rather than stuffed animals in a 
museum, and his actors are able to ―… succeed  in being people because of our principles, 
not in spite of them‖ (Brecht, 1977:235). 
Stanislavsky meets the American Dream 
Meanwhile Stanislavsky‘s influence had reached the shores of America in the early 1920s, 
during a visit by the Moscow Arts Theatre. It is worth noting that his earliest teachings were 
being transplanted into a different ideological climate to that which prevailed in Europe and, 
in particular, the Soviet Union. I suggest that the ‗cult of subjectivism‘ found fertile soil in 
the socio-political ethos of America. There were differing interpretations of his work with 
various individuals laying claim at some point to the ‗true‘ principles Stanislavsky had 
initially articulated, and figures such as Stella Adler, Sanford Meisner and Lee Strasberg each 
continued to develop their own particular technique with independent exploration of the 
psychological literature of the day. The differences in approach came to reflect what I 
contend were essentially competing theories of emotion as either a cognitive phenomenon or 
an embodied experience, although the relationship between these apparent polarities is being 
shown by current research in cognitive neuroscience to be considerably nuanced (Damasio, 
2005). 
By the time of the ‗Cold War‘ stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union in 
the 1950s, the personally expressive approach to performance called ‗Method‘ acting had 
thoroughly penetrated American popular consciousness (Conroy, 1993). The 
commercialisation of culture under capitalism saw such iconic Method actors as Marlon 
Brando and James Dean regularly depicting rebel heroes marked by an authentic 
individuality. The ‗cult of subjectivism‘ flourished in America largely due to the star system 












It is worth noting that Stanislavsky‘s teaching reached his American counterparts second-
hand: following a tour with the Moscow Arts Theatre to the United States in 1923 and 1924, 
actress Maria Ouspenskaya remained behind with a colleague, Richard Boleslavsky, who had 
already spent some years there (Carnicke, 1998). Together they established the American 
Laboratory Theatre where they trained local actors in Stanislavsky‘s System.  
Among the first beneficiaries of this instruction was Lee Strasberg, together with Harold 
Clurman and Stella Adler. Strasberg went on to collaborate with Clurman in forming the 
Group Theatre, a collective dedicated to the creation of  a disciplined ensemble of artists, 
founded on the principals espoused by Stanislavsky (Clurman, 1983). Two other individuals 
who were to become leading figures in the development of theatre in America, Stella Adler 
and Sanford Meisner, were among the Group Theatre‘s original members. From relatively 
early in the life of the project, there were disagreements over Strasberg‘s excessive focus on 
emotion; it was felt that affective memory was only part of the ―Stanislavsky puzzle‖ 
(Gordon, 2000:47).  
When the Group Theatre disbanded barely ten years after its inception internal differences 
were widely cited, and theatre historian Wendy Smith agrees that the problems inherent in 
communal life contributed to the difficulties they faced. However she argues that another 
obstacle proved insurmountable: the ―external pressures posed by a society set up to offer 
individual rather than collective rewards‖ (Smith, 1994:427). While the group enjoyed 
critical success, the box-office takings remained modest with the artists leading a hand-to-
mouth existence. These circumstances made individual members vulnerable to overtures 
from Broadway or Hollywood producers who could offer them stardom with its attendant 
financial spoils in place of lofty principles and penury. It is clear that Stanislavsky‘s ideals 
were being subjected to forces rather different from those encountered in Soviet Russia. New 
York critic and theatre practitioner Robert Brustein notes that the American version of the 
Stanislavsky system created many more movie stars than theatre artists.  
Stanislavsky had famously demanded of his company that they love the art in 
themselves rather than themselves in the art, which was his way of urging them to be 
dedicated actors instead of egocentric careerists. By contrast, one of Lee Strasberg‘s 
leading examples of a great American actress was Marilyn Monroe. (Brustein, 
1997:30). 
Three influential teachers to emerge from the vestiges of the Group Theatre experiment had 












shared the same goal for the actor as Stanislavsky had:  to live truthfully under imaginary 
circumstances, to strive for ―the creation of this inner life of a human spirit, and its expression 
in artistic form,‖ (Stanislavsky, 1964:16). The extent to which each of them may or may not 
have departed from Stanislavsky‘s intentions has been the source of much recrimination and 
debate, but all three went on to have a major impact on American theatre and actor training. I 
propose that their distinctive contributions provide an opportunity to examine the 
implications of Stanislavsky‘s research outside of its original Soviet milieu, a welcome 
opportunity to re-contextualise an area of inquiry that is, by definition, highly subjective. 
The most controversial of the three is Lee Strasberg, whose name is synonymous with the 
Method. The key elements for Strasberg were relaxation, concentration and affective memory 
– the ability to recall in vivid detail a personal situation that evokes a desired feeling. 
Through practice and experience he devised sequences of drills, underpinned by a basic logic 
that progressed from the simple to the more complex, shifting the focus of attention from 
external objects to internal objects that exist only in the imagination. The exercises were 
designed with the purpose of training ―the actor‘s  sensitivity to respond as fully and as 
vividly to  imaginary objects on stage as he is already capable of doing to real objects in life‖ 
(Strasberg, 1987:123). In biological terms these exercises relate to how an organism is able to 
negotiate its environment or ‗given circumstances‘ in order to prioritise and accomplish its 
goals (Berthoz, 2000). 
Rock, paper, scissors: biology trumps ideology   
Pinker describes the ability to shift the ‗spotlight of attention‘ between a conscious ‗serial‘ 
processing and an unconscious ‗parallel‘ processing where only information relevant to the 
task at hand is routed to the conciousness (Pinker, 1999:140). He explains that certain sensory 
information, which is relevant only some of the time, should nevertheless be accessible to a 
computation if and when it becomes pertinent; it exists in the interim as free floating mental 
representations. Computational theory asserts that what we consciously percieve is actually a 
highly processed product: consider our ability to eavesdrop on a conversation across a 
crowded room, particularly when mention of our own name emerges from the acoustic 
cocktail. Stanislavsky appears to anticipate this approach when describing the link between 
attention, interest, desire and creativity (Stanislavsky, 1964:87-90). Pinker seems to endorse 
this when identifying the main features of consciousness as ―sensory awareness, focal 












and will as ―three impelling movers in our psychic lives, three masters who play on the 
instrument of our souls‖ (Stanislavsky, 1964:266).  Both of these perspectives align with 
Strasberg‘s conclusion that ―the most effective way of arriving at the actor‘s imagination, 
emotion and inspiration [is] through concentration and affective memory‖ (1987:67). 
Pinker‘s notions of behaviour, focal attention, mental representations and information 
processing are equally useful in explaining the ‗repetition‘ exercise that underpins Meisner‘s 
approach (Meisner and Longwell, 1987). But I propose that they shed a more significant light 
on the immediacy and emotional specificity of the relationships Meisner‘s training 
encourages actors to create in performance. The fundamental exercise underpinning the 
approach requires actors to work with partners, each closely observing and responding 
impulsively to what they receive from the other. At its simplest the game involves a 
straightforward repetition of the partner‘s utterances in a neutral and unaffected manner. With 
the emphasis on spontaneity rather than pretense or contrivance, this apparently mindless 
repetition would appear to be aimed at distracting the actor‘s rational faculties and allowing 
impulsive, emotion-based responses to come to the fore. From a neurobiological perspective 
Pinker argues that evolution has handed down an apparent ‗firewall‘ between passion and 
reason to mandate the emotions with the task of evaluating the credibility of propositions 
being contemplated by the intellect.  
 The intellect is designed to relinquish control to the passions so that they may serve 
 as guarantors of its offers, promises and threats against suspicions that they are 
 lowballs, double-crosses and bluffs (Pinker, 1999:412). 
I propose that Meisner‘s exercise allows actors to breach this firewall in order to replicate 
behaviour that is emotionally spontaneous and unshaped by habitual conditioning. Pinker‘s 
perspective also begins to hint at why emotionally credible performances are able to move 
audiences in profound ways; abstract thoughts are given expression in embodied emotional 
experience and mind is transformed into matter. 
Embodiment of thought and feeling 
Emerging neuroscientific research appears to confirm this interdependence of ‗thinking‘ and 
‗feeling‘; philosopher Mark Johnstone and linguist George Lakoff (1999) refer to three 
significant findings of cognitive science: the mind is inherently embodied; thought is for the 
most part unconscious; and abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. From this position 












inferences are computed by the same neural architecture used in perception and body 
movement. From the perspective of evolutionary biology it is conceivable that our capacity 
for reason grew out of the motor and sensory systems that had already evolved to allow us to 
function within the physical environment. This suggests that our sense of our ‗selves‘ located 
in time and space, and such notions as causality and even morality, arise directly out of our 
experience of our physical being. Many of our common metaphors of expression echo this 
legacy with such phrases as to ‗grasp‘ an idea, to be ‗beside‘ oneself or to act on a ‗gut 
feeling‘. It is no small coincidence that an irksome individual is frequently referred to as ‗a 
pain in the neck‘; more often though, the ‗pain‘ is indelicately located in a rather more private 
part of the anatomy, indicating an acute somatosensory awareness on the part of the 
commentator. 
Stanislavsky appears to have preempted these arguments with the culmination of his life‘s 
work in his Method of Physical Actions, based on his conviction that our psychological and 
physical beings are indivisible and that truthful fulfilment of a physical action involves an 
actor‘s authentic emotion. ―The physical action is the ‗bait‘ for an emotion‖ (Moore, 
1965:92). Among the most influential figures in American theatre and actor training, Stella 
Adler (2000) is the only one to have had any personal contact with Stanislavsky, having spent 
some weeks with him in Paris in 1934. She had been sceptical of the undue emphasis being 
placed on emotional memory and her time with Stanislavsky reaffirmed her commitment to 
the importance of action; that ―feeling is a by-product of doing‖ (Hammer, 2000).  
A recent innovation that seeks to manage emotions purely through physical means has been 
developed by Susanna Bloch, a research psychologist specialising in neurophysiology. For 
her, emotion is ―a complex functional state of the entire organism, which includes 
physiological activity, expressive behaviour and inner experience‖ (2006:34-35). Bloch 
considers her research on emotion to be experimental demonstrations of William James‘ 
(1884) view, referred to in the previous chapter, that emotions are manifestations of bodily 
changes that occur immediately following the perception of  an ‗exciting fact‘.  
Neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux (2000) conducted studies that precisely mapped the limbic 
system, proving that there are two routes of transmission for sensory perception: information 
first travels through the thalamus and via a single synapse to the brain‘s emotional centre - 












branching allows the amygdala to begin to respond before the neocortex is able to mull the 
information through several levels of brain circuitry to initiate a more finely tailored 
response. ―The cortical systems that try to do the understanding are only involved in the 
emotional process after the fact‖ (LeDoux quoted in Barry, 1997:18).    
Bloch divides the study of emotion into three strata, the physiological, expressive and 
subjective levels (Chabora, 2000). The physiological research concerns itself with the 
visceral manifestations of emotion: the endocrine, chemical, molecular and autonomic 
respiratory reactions. The expressive domain includes the somatic indicators of emotion: 
muscles, posture, gestures, facial, vocal and controlled respiratory movements. The focus of 
investigation at the subjective layer stresses the internal, affective and personal experience of 
emotion: what we call ‗feeling‘. Bloch is clear that these three levels of emotion exist in 
constant and dynamic interaction, with changes on the one level registering consequent 
adjustments on each of the others. Echoing Damasio, Bloch (2006) is careful to note that 
emotion and feeling are not one and the same; rather feeling is a cognitive product of 
emotion. In addition, she stresses that a human being is always experiencing an emotion and 
thus is always feeling. Accordingly, emotional indicators are constantly communicating 
something in a non-verbal, paralinguistic mode, whether intentionally or otherwise. This 
unconscious expression of emotions, running as a perpetual parallel process, communicates 
information that is often more salient than that contained in the words being spoken. By way 
of illustration, I offer the following scenario of blissful domesticity: 
 We‘re in the living-room of a contemporary middle class South African suburban 
 home. He comes in through the front door and takes occupation, carelessly dumping 
 his briefcase in the armchair, tossing his keys on the coffee-table and draping his 
 jacket over the back of the sofa as he announces his presence.  
 ―I‘m home! Where‘s my precious?‖ 
 ―Where else? How was your day?‖  She strolls into the room and they exchange a 
 peck. She begins rearranging his discarded stuff as he replies. 
 ―Presentation went well. Client was impressed. Not so sure about the agency 
 though. Yours?‖ 












 ―Your day. How was it?‖ 
 ―Oh. It was OK.‖ 
 ―But then I say, who‘s more important, the client or … ‗OK‘? You sure?‖ 
 ―Ja, no. It was fine.‖ 
 ―Good. But John doesn‘t know which side his …‖ He interrupts himself, 
 contemplating her for a moment. 
 ―What?‖ She is startled. 
 ―Are you OK?‖ 
 ―No, I said I‘m fine.‖ 
 ―There‘s something wrong.‖ 
 ―Nothing‘s wrong.‖ She laughs, flippantly. 
 ―It‘s OK. You don‘t have to tell me if you don‘t want to.‖ 
 ―There‘s nothing to tell. You wouldn‘t understand.‖ 
 ―Aw, honey. My love! You can trust me. What is it?‖ 
 ―It‘s nothing. It‘s stupid.‖ 
 ―No, it‘s not. C‘mon …‖ He reassures her. 
 ―Well. Last night. At the Nicholsons …‖ 
 ―Ja?‖ 
 ―Frank said he liked my new hairstyle.‖ 
 ―I heard that. It was an honest compliment.‖ 
 ―But you just sat there. You said nothing. And the look Julia gave me …‖ 
 ―But what could I say? He‘s right.‖ 












 ―But I do! It‘s a great cut. I‘ve told you before, it suits you … brings out your …‖ 
 ―It‘s too late now!‖ Clearly upset, she leaves the room. He stands there, stunned and 
 trying to work out the logic of what has just transpired. 
As the 19
th
 century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche pointed out when referring to 
human behaviour and the spoken word, ―One can lie with the mouth, but with the 
accompanying grimace one nevertheless tells the truth‖ (Quoted in Rabin, 1994:187). 
This ‗cognitive dissonance‘, I argue, is fundamental to the dramatic tension that characterises 
many types of theatrical performance, forming the bedrock of what we call ‗subtext‘, that 
which is evoked rather than explicit and which is perceived on a purely emotional level. 
Incidentally, I attended a lecture in which theatre and film director Sir Peter Hall made a 
convincing argument concerning the use of masks in the Classical Greek theatre. He suggests 
they were not primarily intended to create a megaphone (as is often supposed), but rather to 
create cognitive dissonance, the fixed visage being at odds with the large passions being 
expressed through vocal and physical means (Hall, 2005). 
Emotional nuts and physical bolts 
Bloch‘s research into the physical stimulation of human emotions began in 1970 as an 
interdisciplinary investigation, in a medical school laboratory in Santiago, together with 
colleague Guy Santabiñez and the Chilean theatre director Pedro Orthous. ―The study was not 
concerned either [sic] with the causes which may produce an emotional state, nor with 
cultural implications or social consequences, but with the emotional state per se [emphasis in 
original]‖ (Bloch, 1993:124). Accordingly they spent two years measuring the heart rates, 
blood pressure, temperature, breathing, facial and bodily postures of both normal and 
neurotic human subjects, among whom were professional actors and students of psychology. 
 Using emotional memory techniques and deep hypnosis Bloch and her team were able to 
generate a vast body of data which, on analysis, rendered specific repeated patterns of 
breathing, facial expression, body tension and postural behaviour associated with the 
corresponding autonomic markers indicating pure emotional states. Bloch would come to 
refer to these reproducible arrays of indicators as ―effector patterns‖ (Bloch et. al. 1987). The 
data was particularly significant in that it was generated through an interdisciplinary 
approach that transcended the dualistic body-mind view that had traditionally fragmented the 












measurable external characteristics of emotions while physiologists examined the internal 
chemical, electrophysiological and neurohumoral processes. Bloch notes that the subjective 
states of emotion had hitherto been kept safely out of scientific hands, being best left to the 
speculative musings of the philosophers and poets. 
Bloch continued to work with actors and emotional effector patterns, honing the findings of 
her earlier research, and identifying six distinct categories on the matrix of primary emotional 
states: happiness, characterised by laughter, pleasure and expressions of  joy; sadness, 
marked by crying and indicators of  sorrow, grief and depression; fear, including anxiety and 
panic; anger, with  displays of aggression and hate and characterised by attacking behaviour; 
tenderness, including friendship and love of the maternal, paternal and filial variety and 
eroticism marked by sensuality and lust (Santibañez and Bloch, 1986).  
The last two categories are of particular interest when considering the differentiation between 
primary or basic emotions and secondary, mixed emotions: tenderness and eroticism 
generally co-exist and the one is frequently mistaken for the other, often with dire social and 
even legal consequences. However Bloch‘s initial research established that they are quite 
distinct in their particular configuration of physiological parameters such as heart rate, blood 
pressure, skin resistance, and skin temperature as well as in their underlying autonomic 
neuroendocrine and neuromuscular reactions. The same is true for each of the other basic 
emotions which are akin to the primary colours on an artist‘s palette; most of the emotions we 
experience in our day-to-day existence consist of idiosyncratic blends of two or more of the 
‗big six‘. Jealousy, for example, could consist of a mix of fear, anger and erotic love in one 
person; while in another an undertone of sadness might prevail. A further factor to consider in 
the blending of emotions is their relative duration and intensity: ―emotions may be ‗phasic‘ if 
they are short-lived or ‗tonic‘ if they are maintained in time‖ (Bloch, 2006:59). So a bad 
mood is a state of anger maintained over a period of time, while anxiety is a state of chronic 
and lasting fear and depression reflects a state of enduring sadness. 
Many ancient practices such as yoga are founded on the principle that breathing and emotion 
are interconnected and techniques of respiratory control have for some time been a 
recognised treatment for distressing episodes of panic attack (Clarke et. al 1985; Rapee, 
1985). It‘s also been known for some time that ‗laughter is the best medicine‘, and studies 












neuroendocrine hormones involved in the classic stress response (Berk et al., 1989). Bloch 
was able to demonstrate similar reciprocal dynamics between the various levels of the 
emotional event and through her research with actors was able to isolate, across a wide 
emotional spectrum, those somatic elements of passion that can be voluntarily controlled and 
reproduced at will. She found that the precise and conscious control of the expressive 
elements of respiratory and muscular-skeletal configuration galvanises biofeedback 
mechanisms which in turn trigger the corresponding involuntary physiological factors, 
arousing the subjective component of a particular emotional event. One of the fundamental 
tenets of my thesis is that the involvement of mirror-neuron systems extends the emotional 
experience beyond the individual and into the community and that this is substantially 
significant to theatre practice.  
Hands-on the emotional joystick, drawing breath 
While I was heading the department of actor training at the South African School of Motion 
Picture Medium [sic] and Live Performance (AFDA) in 2005, I participated in a series of 
workshops conducted by Jeanette Ginslov, a movement specialist who had trained with Bloch 
in her Alba technique. My first-hand experience of this process of stimulating emotional 
responses through adopting conscious breathing patterns and postural attitudes was 
something of an epiphany: much of what I thought I understood about the nature of emotions, 
all at once I now knew on a visceral level. I experienced pure anger, tears, laughter and fear, 
but my consciousness was unencumbered by personal emotional memories and I was free to 
fill the cognitive vacuum with whatever associations I cared to invite. But what was for me 
the most astounding discovery in those sessions was the powerful empathic sensation I 
experienced when merely observing another actor being put through their paces. Time and 
again I found myself catching my breath as my corporeal being resonated with another 
individual‘s inner state while they were given over to the experience of even the most subtle 
of pure emotions. I felt like Pavlov‘s dog salivating at the sound of a bell or, more accurately, 
one of Rizzolatti‘s monkeys contemplating the allure of a peanut. 
The interdisciplinary nature of Bloch‘s research challenged the scientific paradigm, 
particularly through its focus on the subjective dimension of emotional phenomena. As a 
consequence she had to be particularly rigorous in recording her results before being accepted 
for publication in peer-reviewed scientific journals. But Bloch is steadfast in her assertion 












in the study of emotions‖ (2006:90), arguing that a naïve witness is able to correctly identify 
the specific emotion being induced by a faithful reproduction of the effector patterns. Based 
on my subjective experience I propose that it is through the involvement of mirror-neurons 
that an un-primed observer is able to recognise the emotions; not through a conscious process 
of identifying the signs, but through an analogous subjective feeling. 
Among the commentators who have criticised the research of Bloch and her colleagues is 
Paul Eckman (2003), a pioneer in the study of emotion with particular regard to facial 
expression; he is considered to be an expert in the field of deceptive behaviour, or ‗lie 
detection‘. He questions Bloch‘s categorisation of basic emotions: like her he identifies six 
classes of primary emotion, but includes surprise and disgust on his list, while excluding 
erotic love and tenderness (Eckman, 1988). Bloch points out, though, that her research refers 
to basic human emotions in a Darwinian evolutionary and adaptive sense; they are 
biologically primitive with a ―particular evolutionary significance, in relation to a need to 
survive for both the individual and the species‖ (2006:50). Apart from their clearly 
differentiated specific effector patterns, this difference in conceptual approach would explain 
Bloch‘s inclusion of tenderness and eroticism alongside the typically accepted basic emotions 
of joy, sadness, anger and fear. In this context, disgust and surprise would be described as 
secondary emotions. Furthermore, it must be noted that Eckman‘s overriding consideration is 
facial expressions which he found to be common across cultures for the same emotional state 
(2003). Bloch and her colleagues used facial expression as just one of the indicators of 
emotion and consequently did not involve themselves with micro-expression in the manner of 
Eckman‘s minute detailing of individual muscular actions. If any single aspect is granted 
principal focus in Bloch‘s research, it is respiration, which as Frans Boiten points out, is 
commonly accepted as being connected to emotion but which had been curiously neglected in 
serious investigations until she, Santabiñez and Orthous took the plunge (Boiten, Frijda and  
Wientjes 1994).  
Embarking on a course of inquiry that straddles science and the humanities courts inevitable 
risk, and Bloch has had to contend with differences of opinion on both sides; some theatre 
practitioners, for example, fear that actors will once again be reduced to ‗bio-mechanical 
robots‘ (Chabora, 2000). But Bloch‘s contribution doesn‘t negate any of the more established 
approaches and should not be seen to displace thorough textual analysis, detailed 












provided an additional tool, a physiological and organic means of consciously reaching the 
unconscious, which would no doubt please Stanislavsky. She has also validated through 
science the poetically expressed conviction of the visionary French playwright, poet, actor 
and director Antonin Artuad that an actor is an ‗athlete of the heart‘. 
 For breath, which nourishes life, allows its stages to be ascended rung by rung. And 
 an actor can arrive by means of breath at a feeling which he does not have . . . Breath 
 accompanies feeling, and the actor can penetrate into this feeling by means of breath 
 provided he knows how to select among the different kinds the one appropriate to the 
 feeling (Artaud, 1959:137) 
 
Artaud detour: the cruel plague 
As a leading proponent of the surrealist movement of the 1920s, Artaud rejected rationality in 
all its forms and is today hailed more for his prophetic vision than for any methodological 
approach to his work; his lasting legacy was identifying the body as the primary site of 
performance (Gordon, 2006). At a time when Stanislavsky was refining his method of 
physical actions, Artaud had likewise become obsessed with the bodily incarnation of thought 
(Driver, 1969). He denounced all notion of Cartesian dualism, proclaiming that theatre is not 
for the elevation of the spirit but rather for the direct revelations of the physical being, ―… the 
body of the actor working directly on the nervous system of the audience‖ (Ward, 1999:126). 
Artaud believed that performance arose out of sacred rituals that cruelly overwhelm the 
senses in a mystical, metaphysical experience.   
Stanislavsky had long emphasised the ‗fourth wall‘ or traditional proscenium as a frame for 
the performance, separating it both from the world of the audience and the external social 
environment. Brecht, on the other hand, sought to collapse the boundary between 
performance and spectator, notably allowing the auditorium to remain illuminated as his 
actors directly addressed the audience. Artaud‘s vision was to go even further: to allow 
theatre to penetrate the flesh of both performer and spectator with the physical experience of 
the passions transmitting themselves like a plague from the bodies of the actors to those of 
the onlookers. His theatre of cruelty was conceived as a thoroughly visceral incarnation that 
aspired to put the spectator at the centre of the theatre and to treat them ―… like the 
snakecharmer‘s [sic] subjects and conduct them by means of their organisms [emphasis in 
original] to an apprehension of the subtlest notions‖ (Artaud, 1959:81). It is clear that for 












the light of the recent discoveries in the neurosciences that suggest a capacity for the direct 
communion of the passions, Artaud appears to exhibit a prophetic sense of theatre existing in 
that liminal realm where biology and culture intersect. A week before his death in 1948, he 
addressed a letter to Paule Thévenin, a lifelong editor of his writings. 
 … I will devote myself from now on  
 exclusively  
 to the theatre  
 as I conceive it,  
 a theatre of blood,  
 a theatre which at each performance will stir  
 something  
 in the body [emphasis in original] 
 of the performer as well as the spectator of the play,  
 but actually,  
 the actor does not perform,  
 he creates.  
 Theatre is in reality the genesis [emphasis in original] of creation:  
 It will come about … (Schumacher, 2001:233) 
I have traced the phenomenon of emotion and the shifting attitude to affect from classical 
times to the present day, noting how attitudes to the Passions have reflected both the 
cosmology and the political perspectives of the various epochs. Although theatre practitioners 
reflected these shifts in philosophical points of view, I have shown that current 
neuroscientific perspectives reveal that the foremost theatrical figures were at the leading-
edge of intellectual climate-change. I contend that the advantage they enjoyed was that 
through practical exploration of abstract ideas they had all along been practicing ‗embodied 
philosophy‘: giving bodily expression to abstract musings, simultaneously engaging intellect 
and emotion and in so doing, courting intuition.  
Artaud never saw his distinctive vision realised, but the notion of the body as site of 
performance inspires a lineage that includes Jerzy Grotowski, Richard Schechner and Peter 
Brook, a view of theatre that relies first and foremost on the continuous physical presence of 
the actor to the spectator. I propose to argue that as our civilisation moves deeper into the 21
st
 
Century, the notion of presence becomes an increasingly vital element in our construction of 
both the personal and the environmental gestalt. In the shrinking global village of the internet, 












impersonal email and text messaging, while we gravitate towards social networking and the 
ironically named ‗facebook‘ in search of communion.  
While the cybernetic pioneers of artificial intelligence strive to replicate the emotional 
dimensions of cognition, innovators in communications technology have singled out the 
simulation of presence, a sense of ‗being there‘, as their new frontier (Witmer and Singer, 
1998; Waterworth and Waterworth, 2001; Slater, 2002; Watts, 2011). In their quest for this 
Holy Grail they are turning to the emerging neuroscientific research on empathy and presence 
to guide them. I suggest Theatre practitioners do the same in order to take stock, more fully to 
understand and better to exploit our fundamental evolutionary heritage. A neurobiological 
understanding of presence provides insight into how the human organism survives, both 













Present Company: Theatre and Social Ritual 
 That absence doth sharpen love, presence strengthens it;  
 that the one brings fuell, the other blowes it till it burnes cleare. 
 Thomas Overbury, (2009:190) 
 
 Morton Hull: Do you realise that more people will be  
 watching you tonight, than all those who have  
 seen theatre plays in the last forty years?  
 Chance the Gardener:  Why? 
 Being There, (1979. [Film] Dir. Hal Ashby.)  
 
A small group of black protestors sings mournfully outside the venue where the inquest is 
being held.  A uniformed white policeman keeps watch over this display of defiance, a 
portrait of composure; his eyes in a fixed gaze partly shielded by the patent-leather peak of 
his standard-issue hat, his lips drawn thin beneath his youthful moustache.  
Senzenina 
Sono sethu ubumnyama 
Sono sethu yinyaniso 
Sibulawayo 
Mayibuye i Africa. 
[What have we done?] 
[Our sin is that we are black] 
[Our sin is the truth] 
[They are killing us] 
[Let Africa return.] (Pollard,1999:113).  
 
Now the dirge breaks into a chant. The gathered crowd becomes restless. The policeman‘s 
temple pulses as if keeping time with the chant as he clenches his jaw. 
Impimpi! Hayi. Hayi.  
Impimpi! 
Voetsek! Voetsek!  
ugathsha lona 
Voetsek!  
[A spy! No. No.] 
[A spy!] 
[Get out! Get out!] 
[This one‘s a traitor] 
[Get out!] 
 
It is 1985 and South Africa is living under a repressive State of Emergency; the smell of 
suspicion attaches itself readily to anyone seen to be collaborating with the authorities and 
mob-lynching is not uncommon.  A black man elbows his way to the front of the crowd that 
has gathered. Well-dressed and overly-respectful, he tentatively steps up to the policeman. 
―Askies, my Baas, please can you help me?‖ 
The cop tuns his head and stares the man down. 
―Askies meneer ... but the tsotsis, they stole my car just now.‖ 
The policeman is taken aback; a momentary twitch of his brow, a flicker of doubt. He is torn; 












He cannot ignore the man, but the ‗uniform‘ and fake insignia he wears confer upon him no 
statutory authority. In fact, he is not a policeman at all. He is an actor.  
I was playing the role of this young constable in a production of Saira Essa‘s Steve Biko: The 
Inquest (1985) at the Wits Theatre in Johannesburg. Each night in the foyer, as a prelude to 
the performance of the play itself, the actors – in character – would mingle with the audience 
and create an improvised scenario. However the complainant who had materialised was not a 
member of our ensemble and this turn of events was not part of the set-up. As a fledgling 
actor I suppose I should have been flattered that at least one person had been convinced by 
my characterisation. But here was a man in genuine need, and I was no more than an 
impostor; a sheep in wolf‘s clothing! Thankfully the front-of-house manager was able to take 
my cue as I barked an order for him to drop everything and assist the man. Nevertheless I was 
thoroughly rattled by the encounter as the magical world of make-believe collided with the 
social reality out of which it arose and within which it exists.  
 The core of theatre is an encounter. The man who makes an act of self-revelation is, 
 so to speak, one who establishes contact with himself … It is the experience which 
 we take upon ourselves when we open ourselves to others, when we confront 
 ourselves with them in order to understand ourselves – not in the scientific sense of 
 re-creating the context of an epoch in history, but in an elementary and human sense. 
 (Grotowski, 1984:56-59) 
Confronting the encounter 
In this section I argue that theatre is a cultural expression of an evolutionary imperative 
rooted in human socio-biology. Approaching theatre as a manifestation of social-ritual 
through which society is able to know itself (Turner, 1982), I set out to reveal it as a means 
through which individuals may construct their identities in relation to a social group, and 
through which the group explores a common identity, rediscovering, reinvigorating or 
reinventing their binding narrative. I begin by examining the work of a man perhaps destined 
to take up Artaud‘s discarded mantle: Polish theatre director Jerzy Grotowski hailed the 
French prophet as a man who ―…knew that the transgression of myth renewed its essential 
values‖ (1984:89).  
I present Grotowski as a man shaped by and responding to the evolving intellectual climate in 
which he operated, a climate inspired by the revolutionary physicists of his time (Baggot, 
2011). I suggest that quantum theory endorsed Grotowski‘s endeavour to embrace apparent 












body/mind integration. Eclectic in his methodology, Grotowski deliberately courted 
seemingly incongruous propositions, adopting spiritual practice while discarding religious 
dogma in a quest for ‗Secular Holiness‘ (Lavy, 2005). I go on to argue for a material basis to 
mystical states and profound aesthetic experience by consulting the scientific literature that 
locates the neural correlates of transcendent consciousness (D‘Aquili and Laughlin, 1975). I 
proceed to establish similarities between those altered states of consciousness variously 
induced through meditation, through the use of psychoactive drugs and by means of 
traditional ritual practices (Bowker and Bowker, 1998; Newberg et al. 2001;2003; Biello, 
2007; Nelson, 2011). 
Turning to the work of cultural anthropologist Victor Turner, I identify an analogue for 
transcendence in the interstitial ‗liminal‘ state of ritual, an intuitive phase of creative 
possibility flanked on the one side by a structured past and on the other by a reconstituted, 
ordered future (Olaveson, 2001). I investigate how a state of liminality facilitates communion 
or communitas, characterised by mutuality where individual participants are acutely aware of 
and reciprocally affected by their co-presence in time and space (Turner, 1969). I go on to 
explore the notion of presence and investigate how the arrangement of the spatial 
environment acts directly on neural networks (Kaplan, 1968). I conclude by reviewing the 
neural manifestations of deep religious and intense aesthetic experience, discussing the 
mechanisms through which our cognit ve and affective functions are simultaneously 
activated: all at once we feel-thinkingly and think-feelingly (D‘Aquili and Laughlin, 1975; 
Lex, 1979; Nelson, et al. 2006). It is my contention that the deeply moving experience 
provoked by the most profound of theatrical events is akin to the ineffable transcendence of 
ritual liminality; both are facilitated by distinctly material states rooted in our neurobiology.  
Beyond the proscenium: redefining the frame 
At the time that Artaud was becoming known beyond the enclave of French intelligentsia, 
Polish theatrical innovator Jerzy Grotowski was coming to prominence mainly through the 
work of British director Peter Brook (Benedetti, 2007). Grotowski confesses to having 
encountered Artaud‘s writings for the first time only in 1964, leading Robert Gordon (2006) 
to conclude that many of his own views on theatre were likely to have been independently 
formed. Nevertheless he acknowledges a debt to his antecedent: in an essay ‗He wasn’t 
entirely Himself’ (1984), Grotowski praises Artaud for his courage in exploring the 












laments Artaud‘s use of ephemeral language and fleeting metaphors to articulate his 
prophetic vision; ―the paradox of Artaud lies in the fact that it is impossible to carry out his 
proposals … whatever is imperceptible demands precision‖ (ibid.:86). Grotowski advocated a 
more rigorous approach, akin to a scientist‘s use of a microscope to examine elusive bacteria, 
going so far as to underline the analogy by calling his theatre a ‗laboratory‘.  
I contend that, like Stanislavsky before him, Grotowski‘s world view was shaped by the 
prevailing intellectual climate of his time. But science and philosophy had moved on in the 
intervening generation; Descartes‘ mechanistic understanding of nature had been challenged 
by the advent of quantum mechanics and a world view that is necessarily more tolerant of 
paradox (Baggot, 2011). The classical physics of Sir Isaac Newton had, up until then, 
provided a satisfactory explanation of the physical world. It did this by assuming a direct 
relationship between cause and effect while observing and predicting the behaviour of objects 
in motion under the action of a system of forces. Jim Baggot recounts how by the late 1920s a 
bunch of upstarts, including Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr, had come to upset Newton‘s 
apple-cart: they were intent on peering into the inner workings of the atom while 
contemplating break-neck velocities approaching the speed of light. Under these 
circumstances a number of phenomena became apparent which were irreconcilable with the 
classical physical models. In response, theories of quantum mechanics emerged that relied on 
unprecedented degrees of mathematical abstraction in order to reconcile contradictions 
inherent in the wave/particle duality of atoms and molecules (Greiner, 2000).  
Einstein had postulated that energy and matter are two aspects of the same thing and 
essentially interchangeable, representing the notion in his most famous equation e=mc
2
. 
Classical physics draws a distinction between the two states where energy is defined by its 
waveform properties while matter is distinctly particulate in character. Walter Greiner 
explains that on a subatomic level this distinction becomes fuzzy with entities exhibiting the 
properties of both wave and particle, neither of which can be observed simultaneously 
although both aspects are necessary to fully describe their behaviour. The limits of common 
sense are stretched by the preponderance of such qualifiers as ‗and‘, ‗but‘, ‗or‘ and ‗except‘ 
in contemplating the proposition that something is neither the one thing nor the other, but 
essentially both; alternately it is either one or other but never both simultaneously. Nobel 












understand quantum physics is either a fool or is lying. To this I would mischievously add 
that they are undoubtedly both, but not necessarily at the same time.    
 The theory of quantum electrodynamics describes Nature as absurd from the point of 
 view of common sense. And it agrees fully with experiment. So I hope you can accept 
 Nature as She is – absurd (Feynman, 1988:10). 
Given this intellectual climate, I maintain it is little wonder that Grotowski himself became 
increasingly enigmatic: after an all too brief stint creating performances he left the confines 
of his laboratory to conduct field work for the greater part of his career, the results of his 
research becoming more inscrutable with each successive phase (Osiński, 1991).  
Out of the lab and into the field 
Peter Brook emphasises Grotowski‘s scientific approach, in which his Laboratory Theatre 
represented a centre of research where, for the first time since Stanislavsky, ―…the nature of 
acting, its phenomenon, its meaning, the nature and science of its mental-physical-emotional 
processes [is investigated]‖ (2009:9). Grotowski‘s focus was on a methodology through 
which, by means of practical experimentation, he hoped to solve questions as to the precise 
nature of theatre and what it is that makes theatre unique, particularly when compared to 
those other media of dramatic presentation that were becoming ubiquitous: film and 
television. His quest led him to define two key conceptual propositions: the ‗poor theatre‘ and 
performance as an ‗act of transgression‘ (Grotowski et al.,1967).  
The act of transgression is what leads to the ‗encounter‘ that Grotowski believed to be at the 
core of theatre. Through the deliberate violation of cultural and religious taboos, the social 
mask is ripped off, and spectators and performers alike are challenged to confront their 
essential selves. Artaud had earlier described the body of the actor working directly on the 
nervous system of the audience (Ward, 1999). Now Grotowski‘s practical explorations were 
leading him to a perception of the encounter as ―… more jarring because it is imaged in the 
human organism‘s breath, body, and inner impulses‖ (1984:22).  
The concept of the ‗poor theatre‘ presents the other side of this coin: just as the actor is 
relieved of the social carapace, the presentation of the performance itself is stripped to its 
bare essentials, leaving the actor nowhere to hide. Grotowski considered the technical 
trappings of the theatre to be a hindrance to his mission and chose to eliminate all those 












left after all the paring down were the two ingredients essential to theatre: the actor and the 
spectator.  
―A man walks across this empty space whilst someone else is watching him, and this is all 
that is needed for an act of theatre to be engaged‖ (Brook, 1968:11). Here, Brook echoes 
Grotowski‘s conclusion, but elsewhere he bemoans the fact that the man‘s contribution to the 
theatre is limited to a handful of productions early in his career. ―Then he abandoned that, 
and for other reasons went into work which today is nontheatrical and is not linked to 
presenting performances in public to other people‖ (Moffitt, 1999:36-37). I suggest that the 
‗other reasons‘ motivating him were not quite as unconnected from those impulses that gave 
rise to Grotowski‘s theatrical presentations as Brook appears to assume. I contend 
furthermore that Grotowski‘s later work is indeed linked to performance in much the same 
way as the laboratory work of a physicist, examining the tensile properties of materials, 
contributes to the construction of skyscrapers.  
Others were similarly disappointed and openly hostile towards Grotowski‘s decision to turn 
his back on conventional theatre: director and critic Charles Marowitz was particularly 
contemptuous, ―What is the relationship between your ideas and the living theatre as we 
know it in our daily practice? …None!‖ (Gordon, 2006:306-307). Yet I argue that 
Grotowski‘s later work was never entirel  divorced from the broad ambit of theatre practice 
with the two spheres retaining some measure of osmotic reciprocity. Lisa Wolford (2001) 
describes how Grotowski and his collaborators made the results of their research accessible to 
a wide circle of theatre scholars and practitioners, while young actors and directors would 
return to continue their careers after completing their contracted period of residence. 
Despite the controversial reception to his later work, I maintain that there was a consistency 
to be found with Grotowski‘s earlier contribution. Giving expression to aesthetic notions 
inherent in Artuad‘s Theatre of Cruelty (1958), he explored the multi-faceted relationship 
between the actor and the spectator; Grotowski‘s stated quest was to remove all impediments 
to the direct communion of two organisms that are co-present in space and time (Grotowski 
et al., 1967). I assert that he remained true to this cause: while his earlier experiments had 
focussed on stripping away barriers and investigating the dynamics of spatial relationships 
between the actors and the audience, in his later work he was compelled to confront the 












participants in a shared ritual. Relocating his activities to the area of anthropology, where 
performance and ritual intersect, Grotowski was able to continue to explore the elusive 
boundaries of performance phenomena. This shift of focus, I argue, affords valuable insights 
into the mechanisms through which theatre interacts with its social context.  For Grotowski, 
theatre steadily became a means of exploration rather than an end in itself.  
 In appearance, and for some people in a scandalous or incomprehensible manner, I 
 passed through very contradictory periods … but I have more the impression of a 
 thread I have followed, like Ariadne‘s thread in the labyrinth, one sole thread. And I 
 am still catching clusters of interests that I had also before doing theatre, as if 
 everything must rejoin. (Wolford, 1997:6) 
A quantum leap  
Grotowski‘s ‗contradictory‘ periods are testimony to his proclivity for borrowing from 
seemingly incongruous philosophical systems: from the Hindu concept of sunyata to the 
Jewish religious existentialism of Martin Buber, from the interpretive anthropology of Victor 
Turner to the quantum physics of Niels Bohr (Lavy, 2005). His evident determination to 
examine ideas by reconciling contradictions led to Grotowski‘s fundamental notion of 
conjunctio oppositorum, which holds that seemingly irreconcilable points of view are not 
necessarily contradictory, nor are they mutually exclusive (Slowiak and Cuesta, 2007). On 
the face of it, I maintain that Grotowski‘s dialectical approach of confronting paradoxical 
notions can be traced to the revolutionary field of quantum physics. Of particular 
significance, I suggest, is Niels Bohr's Principle of Complementarity, which seeks to 
accommodate the paradox of wave-particle duality: 
 The wave and particle properties of electrons and photons, matter and radiation, [are] 
 mutually exclusive yet complementary aspects of the same phenomenon … evidence 
 obtained under different conditions cannot be comprehended in a single picture but 
 must be regarded as complementary [emphasis in original] in the sense that only the 
 totality of the  phenomena exhausts the possible information about the objects 
 (Kumar, 2008:242). 
Grotowski (1984) himself credits his methodological approach to an abiding admiration for 
the activities of the Bohr institute. While acknowledging that theatre itself might not be 
described as a scientific discipline, he adopted logical procedures to identify those objective 
elements of the actor‘s craft that could be honed in order to minimise the influence of such 












Grotowski‘s scientific approach led him to refine his method of actor training, aiming to 
achieve maximum expressiveness through an organic psychophysical process rooted in body-
mind integration (Gordon, 2006). In this pursuit I suggest he was intent on exploring that 
ground common to Myerhold‘s ‗biomechanics‘ and Stanislavsky‘s ‗method of physical 
actions‘. But above all, I argue, Grotowski found himself within a revolutionary intellectual 
climate that enabled him to take up the challenge of Diderot‘s paradox in earnest; to 
contemplate a transcendence of the mind-body continuum where the distinction between 
subject and object becomes infinitely nuanced, where the self and the creation of the self 
coexist, where music is the fusion of the harpsichord and the harpsichordist.  
Interestingly, science writer Barbara Cline (1987) offers an anecdote that illustrates Bohr‘s 
foreshadowing of Grotowski‘s concept of via negativa, a process whereby unconscious 
inhibitions are removed so that the time-lapse between impulse and action is eradicated. 
―Impulse and action are concurrent: the body vanishes, burns and the spectator sees only a 
series of visible impulses‖ (Grotowski, 1984:16). Cline recounts how Bohr, as an avid 
watcher of ‗Westerns‘, had noticed that in a gunfight the man who drew first typically lost, 
presumably landing up in an unmarked grave on ‗Boot Hill‘. The physicist speculated that the 
intentional act of drawing and shooting was slower to execute than the action in response: the 
man in the black hat invariably sacrifices the moral high-ground and so claims his just desert. 
―Because the hero had not planned to kill he would feel no guilt and therefore … his 
reactions would be faster than the villain‘s‖ (Cline, 1987:129).  
Bohr‘s intuition, recently confirmed in a series of laboratory simulations, points to a 
fundamental interplay characteristic of human conduct, an oscillation between stimulus-
driven behaviour and intentional, planned actions (Welchman et al., 2010). As discussed 
previously, the distinction between different classes of action goes beyond a semantic 
exercise: neurophysiological evidence reveals distinct neural bases for intentional actions on 
the one hand and reactive movements on the other. As touched on in the previous chapter, 
Joseph Le Doux‘s (2000) studies, mapping the limbic system, proved that there are two 
routes of transmission for sensory perception: while a conscious action ropes-in the 
neocortex, to mull the information through several layers of brain circuitry before initiating 













The spiritual dimension: a social conscience 
Bohr‘s gunslingers introduce the notion of morality into the decision-making process, another 
prescient intuition. I argue that moral behaviour is an adaptive function of human socio-
biology embedded in the same neural mechanisms that underpin religious thought, 
counterintuitive belief in supernatural entities and mystical experience. I propose that 
Grotowski left the conventional theatre and ventured into the wilderness on what was a 
sacred quest: in striving to achieve the total act, one in which the actor makes no distinction 
between character and self in offering himself up as a ‗gift‘, Grotowski (1984) was in search 
of a divine sacrificial gesture.  
Introducing Grotowski at a conference Peter Brook once remarked that ―… in another epoch, 
this work would have been like the natural evolution of a great spiritual tradition‖ (1991:94). 
Without suggesting that spiritual experience is simply reducible to a series of biological 
impulses, I note that a number of scholars in the fields of comparative religion, social and 
cultural anthropology, as well as the medical sciences, have observed that distinctive mystical 
experiences frequently transcend socio-cultural boundaries (Lex, 1978; Azari et al. 2001; 
Alcorta and Sosis, 2005; Alper, 2008; Nelson 2011). I argue that such experiences are 
common to all of humanity because they are essentially embodied phenomena, arising from 
identical physiological structures in the brain and viscera.    
American research psychiatrist and anthropologist Eugene D‘Aquili (1975;1978;1998; 
2001;2003) observes that despite the advent of the Age of Reason three hundred years ago, 
belief in the supernatural has continued to proliferate within Western societies.  
 … belief in supernatural powers, gods, or demons, like all other universal human 
 behaviours embedded within a cultural context, derives its source from the 
 functioning of neural structures, which evolved and became progressively elaborated 
 because of the adaptive advantage they conferred on their bearers (D‘Aquili, 
 1978:258). 
 
What possible advantage is afforded by a belief in the supernatural? The evolutionary 
adaptation is perhaps best understood in terms of ‗group selection‘, which recognises the 
emergence of mechanisms favourable to social cooperation (Alcorta and Sosis, 2005). The 
commonly held view, as espoused by 19
th
 century German sociologist and political economist 
Max Weber (1993), is that religion serves as a system through which a society regulates and 












French sociologist and moral philosopher Émile Durkheim (2008) held a similar view: that 
religion and sacred practices help to maintain and foster social stability and cohesion.  
A more current perspective is offered by Canadian neurophilosopher Patricia Smith 
Churchland, who believes that cooperative behaviour is a crucial aspect of our evolutionary 
heritage: she argues that concern for how our actions may impact on other members of the 
group is essential to the survival of an individual within a community. In her argument she 
describes how oxytocin, together with other neurochemicals primarily responsible for 
cementing the bond between mother and infant, spills over to promote empathy between  
more distant kin and members of one‘s in-group (Shea, 2011).  Churchland suggests that the 
inner voice of moral conscience sounds from a neurological platform, compelling us to 
grapple with difficult social issues, to strive to listen to all sides and to accommodate 
differences, to negotiate with understanding and wisdom and to consider the consequences of 
our choices. ―Perhaps life would be a whole lot simpler if there were a divine being who 
could reliably be appealed to for a straight answer on moral issues, an answer made clear to 
all‖ (Churchland, 2011:199). A metaphysical conception of a supernatural deity appears to 
offer such a solution: whether it‘s a conviction that the ancestors are looking over us, or a 
belief in the omniscience of Santa Claus. Developmental psychologist Jesse Bering endorses 
such a view: 
 … humans intuitively view culturally prevailing supernatural agents as knowing 
 ‗what we‘re up to‘ despite the fact that we might pull off proscribed behaviours 
 without members of our social group being any the wiser (2005:420). 
 
Yale professor of psychology and linguistics Paul Bloom (2005) disagrees, insisting that any 
apparent advantage afforded by the conception of a deity is no more than an illusion. Bloom 
maintains that the human predisposition to believe in supernatural phenomena is an 
unfortunate spin-off of biological adaptations that serves no useful purpose. In debunking the 
evolutionary hypothesis however, Bloom succeeds in unmasking the neural mechanisms 
likely to be at play. He argues that our brains are hard-wired for a duality of experience: the 
world of objects is perceived as separate from the world of minds. This, he says, 
inadvertently allows for counter-intuitive notions such as a concept of deity to take root.   
Working with children as young as six-months old, Bloom has been able to demonstrate that 
they have an innate capacity to perceive the physical world as distinct from the psychological 












of cause-and-effect are sufficient to navigate the physical environment, the social landscape 
requires us to grasp the minds of others through attending to their emotions: through feeling 
rather than thinking (Goleman, 2007). Bloom suggests that the apparent Cartesian split in 
human neural architecture allows us to conceive of the disembodied soul and notions of an 
afterlife and even to infer goals and desires where none exist. A proclivity for such inference 
and a hypersensitivity to signs of agency, Bloom believes, finds intention where only artifice 
or coincidence exists, rendering us vulnerable to the peddlers of conspiracy theories and 
religious teachings alike.  
 Nobody is born with the idea that the birthplace of humanity was the Garden of Eden, 
 or that the soul enters the body at the moment of conception, or that martyrs will be 
 rewarded with sexual access to scores of virgins. These ideas are learned. But the 
 universal themes of religion are not learned. They emerge as accidental by-products 
 of our mental systems. They are part of human nature (Bloom, 2005:112).  
 
In his eagerness to denounce religion, Bloom mistakenly conflates mystical experience and 
doctrinal practice, a trap that Grotowski was careful to avoid in his conception of an 
‗objective spirituality‘. Half a century before Grotowski, William James provided a 
conceptual framework that referred to the two faces of religion: the institutional and the 
personal. The former he described as the art f managing the relationship with the deity, 
cultivating a flair for pleasing the gods, while in the case of the latter, it is ―…the inner 
dispositions of man himself which form the centre of interest, his conscience, his deserts, his 
helplessness, his incompleteness‖ (James, 2002:28). Although Grotowski made use of 
religious symbolism in his productions, he recognised the distinction between institutional 
religion and deeply personal spirituality. ―Don‘t get me wrong. I speak about ‗holiness‘ as an 
unbeliever. I mean ‗secular holiness‘ (1984:34). Grotowski uses metaphysical terminology to 
describe the dialogical encounter with the spectator, but he firmly holds that religion does not 
have exclusive claim to notions of spirituality and discourse of the sacred. ―Even when he 
borrowed from theological philosophies … Grotowski‘s new application of the theory did not 
also borrow the religion‖ (Lavy, 2005:180).   
Casting off religious dogma, Grotowski granted himself the freedom to explore the breadth 
and depth of a range of religious and philosophical thinking, much of which, I argue, was 
directly expressed in his work. Jewish philosopher Martin Buber‘s (2002) influence can be 












deepest intimacy, with confidence, as when one gives oneself in love‖ (1984:38). Buber‘s 
Ich-Du or I-You encounter is successfully achieved only when a human being is 
‗concentrated into a unity‘ and the boundaries of individuality are transcended (Buber 2002). 
The fundamental concept of via negativa is similarly infused with eastern ideas of 
transcendence: Grotowski‘s most basic philosophy for actor training, the eradication of 
obstacles rather than the acquisition of skills, mirrors ancient Indian meditation practices said 
to eliminate impurities caused by a process of conditioning to achieve ‗oneness‘ with your 
essential nature: ―They help us minimise obstacles and attain samadhi‖ (Satchidananda, 
1990:83). ‗I‘ merges with ‗you‘ to form part of a greater whole where there is no distinction 
between objects; there is only a mutually inclusive subjective experience and an awareness of 
the ‗interconnectedness of all things‘. ―When ‗I‘ and ‗mine‘ have stopped, then also there is 
not [sic] an outside nor an inner self‖ (Streng, 1978:12).  
It is tempting to assume that, in embracing the esoteric, Grotowski had abandoned his earlier 
commitment to the sustained and methodical research epitomised by the Bohr Institute. But 
that would be misguided: an element common to all phases of his work, both in its theatrical 
incarnation and the later paratheatrical manifestations, is a dedication to achieving exalted 
states of subjective experience through the pursuit of an objective methodology.  
 …certain songs and sounds are constant, universal, objective. They will take you  to 
 the intended plane, they will evoke or connect you with proper emotions or states of 
 being. They will lead to ―seeing‖ or true consciousness (Quoted in Winterbottom, 
 1991:143). 
Looking back on the totality of Grotowski‘s life-work, I detect that it is characterised by the 
desire to strip away all that is superfluous, to dissect and scrutinise the essence of humanity; I 
argue that in this endeavour he was determined to isolate the biological organism within a 
pure, untainted consciousness. Performance served purely as a means to this end, a method of 
research. ―Drama or performing arts … is a vehicle for my work‖ (Quoted in Amankulor, 
1991:156). Having become increasingly averse to the Western conception of theatre - which 
sees performance as a product to be bought and sold rather than an experience to be shared - 
and having discarded its unnecessary trappings, Grotowski travelled widely in search of 
elements of traditional cultural ritual that might induce distinct and predictable states in 
participants (Grimes, 1981). Then he began to strip ritual practices of their particular 
religious or cultural belief structures to reveal objective techniques, which he believed could 












culminated with the notion of performance-as-presentation being made redundant to the 
conception of performance-as-ritual. Collaborator Thomas Richards explains that Grotowski 
was no longer concerned with a mimetic enactment of ritual performance, but in ritual itself: 
―It‘s finding its value in the act of doing, and that act of doing exists in a structure which 
accepts the fact that there is someone there watching, and also that there is not someone 
watching‖ (Quoted in Wolford, 2001:128). 
Neural correlates of transcendence 
Clearly intent on poking his head through the clouds, I maintain that Grotowski was 
determined to keep his feet firmly planted in the material world as he continued to encourage 
observation and scepticism and to reject arbitrary subjectivity (Winterbottom, 1991). 
Scientists continue to peel back the layers to probe beneath surface appearances just as he 
did, and we are now able to draw on a wealth of supporting evidence to conclude that the 
mystical experience Grotowski sought has distinctly material roots. It is my argument that 
theatre is able to evoke a transcendent consciousness, simultaneously engaging the cognitive 
and emotional systems by exploiting innate biological mechanisms. In an increasingly secular 
world, I argue that the value of the numinous dimension of experience should not be 
discounted:  it enables the transmission of a class of knowledge that is otherwise elusive due 
to its ineffable quality.  
Theatre practice is a material craft that seeks to embody abstract philosophical questions, to 
manipulate physical reality in order to reveal intangible truths. Current neuroscientific 
perspectives are able to give empirical substance to metaphysical musings, in which light 
Theatre should welcome the intervention of anthropologist Eugene D‘Aquili who 
collaborated in a number of studies with American neuroscientist Andrew Newberg (Bowker 
and Bowker, 1998; Newberg et al., 2001; 2003). Using a variety of imaging techniques, the 
two measured the blood flow in the brains of Tibetan monks to determine which regions are 
responsible for their subjective feelings in deep meditation. In one such technique, single-
photon-emission computed tomography (SPECT), researchers injected the subjects with a 
radioactive isotope as they reached their self-reported meditation peak, a state in which they 
lose their sense of existence as separate individuals (Biello, 2007). The isotope is carried by 
the blood to active brain areas where, with a specialised camera, investigators were able to 












The researchers found that the frontal lobe and limbic system became gradually more active 
as the monks descended deeper into meditation. This observation, I note, was not unexpected 
as the frontal lobe is known to be associated with concentration and attention, while the 
limbic system is responsible for processing powerful feelings, including ecstasy and bliss 
(Nelson, 2011). However, an unanticipated finding was that the parietal lobe at the back of 
the brain became increasingly inactive as the meditation progressed.  Since this is the region 
that orients an individual in time and space, the observation could explain the frequently 
reported feeling of being ‗at-one-with-the-universe‘ as the boundaries of the self fall away 
(Kluger, et al. 2004).  
Further testimony comes from Ramachandran, who points to the frequency of temporal lobe 
epilepsy manifesting as an experienced union with God and a heightened empathy for others. 
―I sometimes wonder whether such patients … have access to another dimension of reality, a 
wormhole of sorts into a parallel universe. But I don‘t usually say this to my colleagues, lest 
they doubt my sanity‖ (Ramachandran, 2011:280). Interestingly, the 19
th
 century Russian 
writer Fyodor Dostoevsky suffered from epileptic seizures which he meticulously 
documented during the last two decades of his life (Jeeves and Brown, 2009). Through the 
character of Prince Myshkin in The Idiot, the author provides a subjective insight into the 
experience: 
 His mind and heart were bathed in an extraordinary illumination. All his agitation, all 
 his doubts and anxieties, seemed to be instantly reconciled and resolved into a lofty 
 serenity, filled with pure, harmonious gladness and hope, filled too with the 
 consciousness of the ultimate cause of all things (Dostoevsky, 2008:237). 
 It has been the legacy of theatre practitioners to seek objective insights into subjective states 
and there is perhaps no more elusive experience than that of disembodied ‗astral-travel‘. 
Fortunately, neurologist Kevin Nelson has done extensive research into such apparently 
supernatural phenomena as ‗out-of-body‘ and ‗near-death‘ experiences (Nelson et al. 2006; 
2007). He notes that such events, characterised by a sense of floating above one‘s body, have 
found expression in folklore, mythology, literature, art and religion and are frequently cited 
as ‗proof‘ of an immaterial spirit. However, Nelson convincingly argues that these states are 
produced within the brain, sharing many of the neurobiological characteristics believed to be 
at the nexus of the meditative Void of Nagarjuna (O‘Grady, 2005). He describes the 
frequently reported sense of rapture associated with such events as an ‗experiential‘ state in 












(Nelson, 2011:224). This is the transcendent consciousness which I argue lies at the root of 
profound aesthetic experience associated with theatre. 
Giving further credence to my argument as to their material roots, altered states of mind 
typical of mystical practice are even able to be reproduced under scientifically valid 
laboratory conditions. Lysergic acid diethylamide, more commonly known as ‗acid‘ or LSD, 
was a popular recreational drug of the 1960‘s counterculture, while psilocybin is the 
psychoactive component of various hallucinogenic mushroom species known to have been 
used in religious ritual for centuries (Harris, 2010). Controlled research into the effects of 
these and other psychaedelic drugs has yielded subjective reports of transformed states of 
consciousness analogous to the mystical nirvana (Griffiths et al. 2008). But drug-induced 
transcendental states are not limited to brushes with illicit narcotics favoured by hippies or 
the sacramental herbs of exotic rites: they are more common than one might expect, being 
frequently encountered in everyday clinical circumstances. Professor Andrew Bowdle at the 
University of Washington notes that patients emerging from anaesthesia have routinely 
reported a variety of hallucinatory experiences, often characterised by a detachment from the 
physical body. In a study that Bowdle and his colleagues conducted on the psychaedelic 
effects of ketamine, a commonly administered anaesthetic, one volunteer subject reported: 
 ―The experience seems to be a m stical experience, an incomprehensible 
 comprehension of the universe. There seemed to be no past, present or future, no 
 time, just existence. Life and death at the same time‖ (Bowdle et al. 1998:85)  
It is important to note that both LSD and psilocybin strongly mimic the naturally occurring 
brain chemical serotonin; the molecules of both compounds ―… bind tightly to serotonin-2 
receptors and cause nearly identical neurochemical actions and mystical experiences‖ 
(Nelson, 2011:243). Although the mystical state is able to be replicated through the 
introduction into the body of chemical compounds, I submit that these molecules merely 
exploit an innate neurobiological capacity for transcendent consciousness. At the same time, 
as I will argue, this innate capacity is often invoked through ritual practices in traditional 
societies, and is accessible to spectators of a performance event through the involvement of 















Betwixt and between: liminality and communitas 
Cultural anthropologist Victor Turner has observed that the various activities and behaviours 
exhibited by the youth-subculture during the psychaedelic age were an attempt to reclaim the 
traditional ritual space:  
 These are the ―cool‖ members of the of the adolescent and young adult categories – 
 which do not have the advantages of national rites de passage [emphasis in original] – 
 who ―opt out‖ of the status-bound social order and acquire the stigmata of the lowly, 
 dressing like ―bums‖, itinerant in their habits, ―folk‖ in their musical tastes, and 
 menial in the casual employment they undertake. They stress personal relationships 
 rather than social obligations, and regard sexuality as a polymorphic instrument of 
 immediate communitas rather than as a basis for an enduring structured social tie 
 (Turner, 1969:112-113). 
 
American performance theorist and theatre-maker Richard Schechner (1965;1968;1973;1985; 
1986;1988;1993;1997;1997b;1999), a long-time ally of Turner‘s, agrees that the diverse 
manifestations of the counterculture - later to find expression in the New Age movement - 
were ―… in part an attempt to recuperate the force and unity of traditional liminality‖ 
(Schechner, 1997:62). The term ‗liminality‘ is derived from the Latin limen, denoting 
‗threshold‘, and had been coined by French ethnographer Arnold van Gennep to describe the 
second phase of three in transitional rites-of-passage marking the progression from one 
culturally recognised state to another, as in puberty, marriage and even death (Turner, 2001).  
However Turner maintained that Van Gennep‘s model - comprising separation from ordinary 
life; the margin or seclusion from the everyday scene; and aggregation or a return to the 
mundane - should not be confined to rites-of-passage alone; he argues that this paradigm 
applies equally to all types of ritual activity (Olaveson, 2001). Turner described the threshold 
phase as a ‗betwixt-and-between‘ condition, flanked on one side by a structured past, and on 
the other by an anticipated future that is once again structured by the society‘s need for a 
normative influence over biological developments: 
 …ritual processes contain within themselves a liminal phase which provides a stage 
 (and I use this term advisedly) for unique structures of experience … in milieus 
 detached from mundane life and characterised by the presence of ambiguous 
 ideas, monstrous images, sacred symbols, ordeals, humiliations, esoteric and 
 paradoxical instructions, the emergence of symbolic types represented by maskers 
 and clowns, gender reversals, anonymity and many other phenomena and processes 
 which I have elsewhere described as ―liminal‖ (Turner, 2001:41). 
 
 It was on the betwixt-and-between phase that Turner focussed much of his research, 












explored how the structural limits and boundaries of the social group are re-defined in terms 
of its current needs; structure is replaced by anti-structure, and a state of communitas is 
reached. ―Communitas is of the now; structure is rooted in the past and extends into the 
future through language, law and custom‖ (Turner, 1969:113). Outside of normal social 
hierarchies, roles and distinctions, communitas is a state characterised by equality and 
comradeship; an appreciation for common humanity, ―… a direct unmediated, and total 
confrontation of human identities, often ephemeral in duration, akin to Buber‘s I-Thou or 
‗Essential We‘ relation [emphasis in original]‖ (Turner, 1986b:44).  
Of particular relevance to theatre and performance, I argue that a relationship in the liminal 
realm is rooted in the present moment, arising in an instant mutuality where each person is 
affected by the other‘s presence and so fully experiences the being of the other. Importantly, 
the encounter of communitas ―… is also usually a ‗deep‘ or intense one, and belongs in the 
intuitive or emotional realm, as opposed to the rational one‖ (Olaveson, 2001:104). 
I argue that Turner‘s communitas describes the encounter that lies at the heart of Grotowski‘s 
theatre; it is also central to Artaud‘s vision of infection, as the passions transmit themselves 
like a plague from the bodies of the actors to those of the spectators, penetrating the flesh of 
performers and audience members alike (Artaud, 1959). While it is reasonable to infer that 
communitas lies at the nexus of biology and culture, the current neuroscience is beginning to 
afford significant insights into the mechanisms through which it operates: the ‗objective 
means‘ that Grotowski was striving to isolate and through which he believed access to 
subjective states could be gained.  
Liminal lite: the liminoid option 
For his part, Turner was somewhat critical of Grotowski, suggesting that a favoured status 
with the Polish Communist party spurred his intention to create role-stripped self through a 
secularised rite-of-passage ―…which is to replace older forms, especially those carried in the 
great religious traditions‖ (Turner, 1982:117). The anthropologist warned of the ‗grave 
dangers‘ that lurk within initiation processes, emphasising that in traditional societies initiates 
are stripped of one set of status-roles, only to have them permanently supplanted by another; 
novices are initiated into something as part of a normative cultural practice, their re-
emergence ―…by instruction, partly in practical skills, partly in tribal esoterica, [which] 












Grotowski was evidently preoccupied with the journey to the ‗inner sanctum‘, while 
neglecting the re-exposure to the mundane that must follow. I contend that Turner‘scepticism 
was not unwarranted: at a 2002 symposium a number of participants in paratheatrical events 
reported depression and feelings of helplessness as they returned to their everyday lives, 
citing the lack of a reintegration process (Slowiak and Cuesta, 2007).  
Most importantly though, Turner insists that theatre is necessarily distinct from ritual, 
stressing that traditional rites are obligatory, while participants in theatre and other forms of 
post-industrial social-ritual are granted some degree of choice as to the extent of their 
involvement.  
 Even as audience people can be ‗moved‘ by plays; they need not be ‗carried away‘ by 
 them – into another person‘s utopia or ‗secular sacrum‘, to use Grotowski‘s phrase. 
 Liminoid theatre should limit itself to presenting alternatives: it should not be a 
 brainwashing technique (Turner, 1982:118). 
 
Turner proposes that in complex and large-scale modern societies, the ‗liminoid‘ 
phenomenon supersedes liminality, ―… where individuality and optation in art have in theory 
supplanted collective and obligatory ritual performances‖ (Turner, 1986b:29). In tribal and 
early agrarian societies, Turner stresses, liminality is integrated into the entire social process 
where ‗work‘ and ‗life‘ coalesce, governed by seasonal and ecological rhythms (Turner, 
1982). In later societies, he goes on to note, a wedge has been driven between the obligations 
of the work world and the options of the world of leisure, where the diversions of most 
liminoid activities such as sports, games and other entertainments are to be found. 
I suggest that today‘s corporate world recognises this schism and attempts to straddle it 
through the introduction of so-called ‗team-building‘ activities, an effort to induce a 
voluntary submission to the bureaucratic imperatives of the work environment. It is surely no 
co-incidence that ritual activities such as karaoke-singing and djembe-drumming are a staple 
element of many team-building events, while I submit that corporate ‗adventure training‘ is a 
liminoid exercise designed to foster mutual cooperation by shifting participants beyond their 
comfort zones. ―The acquisition and maintenance of trust is critical to the success of a team 
and goes hand in hand with cooperation and communication‖ (Priest, 1998:31).  
His reservations concerning Grotowski aside, Turner (1982) was nevertheless keen explore 












anthropologist Colin Turnbull and theatre-maker Peter Brook, in which the degradation of 
Uganda‘s nomadic Icáám people was dramatised. Turnbull‘s (1987) published research 
recounted the alienation of the tribe from their traditional landscape and sacred hunting 
grounds, chronicling the subsequent decay of the social fabric of the community. Brooke‘s 
production of The Ik was able, by means of performance, to transform Turnbull‘s 
ethnographic data into an immersive experience that allowed the spectators to engage 
intimately with the events of the narrative: ―… we became implicated in the disappearance of 
the Ik‖ (Todd and Lecat, 2003:58).  
Turner dreamed of liberating anthropology from the ingrained prejudices inherited from the 
natural sciences that required ―…a systematic dehumanizing of the human subjects of study, 
regarding them as bearers of an impersonal ‗culture‘ or wax to be imprinted with ‗cultural 
patterns‘ …‖ (Turner, 1986b:72). He was distressed by the accepted notion of turning fellow 
beings into objects for investigation, neglecting the subjective dimension of their person-
hood, and so negating their humanity. The American social psychologist George Herbert 
Mead had argued that a conception of the ―Self‖ in relation to a social group is dependent on 
the ability to reflect one‘s actions and experience through the perspective of another person, 
the ‗Generalised Other‘: ―This requires the appearance of the other in the self, the 
identification of the other with the self, the reaching of self-consciousness through the other‖ 
(Mead, 1967:253). Turner speculated that performance could afford an opportunity for 
anthropologists to transcend the limitations of the ethnographic literature in rendering the 
complexity of the total ‗lived experience‘ of the investigator in the field: 
 One possibility may be  to turn the more interesting portions of ethnographies into 
 playscripts, then to act them out in class, and finally to turn back to ethnographies 
 armed with the understanding that comes from ―getting under the skin‖ of members of 
 other cultures,  rather than merely ―taking the role of the other‖ in one‘s own culture 
 (Turner,1982:90).   
 
The anthropologist became aware that the noted theatre practitioner and performance theorist 
Richard Schechner shared his view that social processes are essentially performative. He 
therefore  welcomed the opportunity to explore these ideas practically when Schechner 
invited him to participate in an interdisciplinary workshop involving the performing arts and 
the social sciences. ―I had often thought about the relationship between processual forms of 
social conflict in many societies, described by anthropologists and genres of cultural 












Defining the space, framing relationships 
I argue that the relationship that had been instigated between the fields of performance and 
anthropology was necessarily a reciprocal one with a cross-pollination of ideas to the mutual 
benefit of the two intellectual territories. As theatre had begun to liberate itself from the 
strictures of the proscenium arch, ultimately to escape the confines of four walls altogether, I 
contend that it lacked appropriate devices through which the performance event is framed:  
the established field of anthropology had access to the essential tools for framing ritual and 
cultural experience. Grotowski (1984), Brook (1968) and Schechner (1968) had begun, 
individually to interrogate the dynamics of the performance space; each acknowledged that 
the framing of the performance defines the relationships that are expressed between the 
various objects inhabiting the volume, including actors, audience and environmental 
elements. 
The dynamics of these relationships are necessarily fluid and the elements configured in a 
manner specific to each production or, more accurately, to each unique performance. The 
architecture of a traditional theatre building tends to cast in stone a number of these variables, 
limiting the range of options available for any particular theatrical event. Schechner points 
out that the proscenium theatre was originally designed not only to separate performers and 
spectators, but also to segregate audiences according to wealth and class. ―It was meant to 
have very good seats, medium seats, poor seats, and very bad seats‖ (1973:31). With their 
numbered ticket-stubs representing a temporary title deed to their piece of turf, audience 
members remain self-consciously detached from one another as they settle in for what they 
expect will be a stimulating evening‘s entertainment. Unfortunately, in many instances this 
expectation is sabotaged by the environment and the audience is effectively anaesthetised, 
their sensory responses dulled rather than excited.  
Avante-garde musician and artist John Cage believed sight and sound to be ‗public senses‘ 
while he considered those of taste, touch, and smell to be reserved for private, more intimate 
occasions (Kirby and Schechner, 1965). It can be argued that a proscenium arch theatre caters 
primarily to the public senses, although relatively few seats in the house are optimally 
positioned for both seeing and hearing the performance satisfactorily. Through an easing of 
the regimented space, I suggest that the more intimate senses are able to be engaged and so 
contribute to an immersive experience. I furthermore propose that among these senses are 












constitute a network of interacting sensory data; a matrix which is ultimately consolidated on 
a neural level into an environmental gestalt (Paillard, 1991; Berthoz, 2000; Burgess, 2006).  
American Psychoanalyst Donald M. Kaplan (1968;1994) asserts that the arrangement of 
space induces distinct body states in an observer by operating directly on the somatosensory 
mechanisms: 
 Architecture is able to evoke moods, affects and emotions because perceived forms 
 vitalize an observer's kinesthetic sense, a sense exemplified by a bowler‘s listing 
 empathetically to one side or another as he follows a bowling ball visually down an 
 alley toward the pins at the far end. Like the bowling ball, but with far more subtlety 
 and variety, architectural forms are capable of arousing and organizing our 
 neuromuscular inclinations and playing upon them with rhythms of tension and 
 release. The appeal to our kinesthetic system accords with idealizations of body 
 attitudes, which are experienced as psychological epiphenomena. (Kaplan, 1968:105-
 106) 
Scenographer Jean-Guy Lecat worked alongside Peter Brook for 25 years as technical 
director and space-designer, and I was fortunate to have participated in a series of workshops 
he conducted in Cape Town (2003). As we physically explored a variety of existing theatres 
and found environments, Lecat exposed us to his and Brook‘s guiding principles; we were 
encouraged to experience the dynamics of volume and proportion, of spatial harmony and 
discord and to question assumptions about physical proximity and intimacy. One memorable 
morning as participants sat in the auditorium of the Artscape Opera-House, Lecat asked us to 
yell ‗stop‘ when we felt our personal, intimate connection with him to be broken. Then, in 
silence, he began to take determined steps backwards from the lip of the thrust. I‘m sure I 
was not the only one who expected to ‗feel‘ the alienating effect of the proscenium-arch. But 
it was only when he was four or five paces behind that threshold when, as if with one voice, 
we all shouted ―STOP!‖ 
Then, as he calmly took a few steps forward I felt Monsieur Lecat return, his presence re-
established. ―You see?‖ he said. ―I have just stepped out of the circle‖. He went on to explain 
how each one of us, unknowingly, carried with us a mental conception of the circle as defined 
by the lateral dimensions of the volume in which we sat. A well-designed space maximises 
the dynamic possibilities presented by this phenomenon, while a poor space would 
unnecessarily exclude sections of the audience from the full experience, keeping them ‗on the 
outside looking in‘. Lecat outlined his belief that much of our psychological relationship with 












and safety; how the glow of a campfire had defined the circle of social nourishment and had 
distinguished it from the sinister world beyond, where danger lurked and to which those out-
of-favour were banished or left ‗out in the cold‘.  
As the workshop progressed we discovered how the early humanoid conception of a deity 
was likely stimulated by the great vertical dimensions of a forest with dappled light piercing 
the overhead canopy, akin to the sense of awe frequently experienced at the sight of light-
shafts streaking out from behind the silver-rimmed or fire-tinged clouds above. We were 
asked to consider an architectural analogue in the structure of the great cathedrals with their 
vast overhead volumes, strong vertical lines, concealed sources of natural light and the 
unearthly glow of stained-glass. Irrespective of religious convictions, many are deeply moved 
in such a setting; an experience that accords with Kaplan‘s notion of ‗architectural 
kinesthesis‘. 
Peter Brook (1968) notes that all the great temples, cathedrals and mosques were shaped by 
the sacred ceremonies and rituals for which they were built. Victor Turner suggests that the 
building of a temple is a ritual in itself; Indian temples are built in the image of the human 
body with a ritual ―that begins with digging in the earth and planting a pot of seed … the 
temple is said to rise from the implanted seed, like a human‖ (1974:281). Turner points out 
that the different parts of the temple are accordingly named after parts of the body: the 
śikhara is the head; the wings on either side are hasta or hands; and the innermost shrine is 
the womb or garbhagŗha. The English architectural historian Geoffrey Scott would no doubt 
agree, contending as he did that mankind has a need to engineer his environment to reflect his 
inner experience: ―The tendency to project the image of our functions into concrete forms is 
the basis, for architecture, of creative design‖ (1999:159).  
This view informs Kaplan‘s notion of architectural kinesthesis, where the arrangement of 
space evokes the memory of body states; he believes the configuration of a theatre space is 
able to facilitate a visceral, non-verbal meta-dialogue, akin to Turner‘s ‗communitas‘: ―a 
theatre, then, structures an opportunity for a primal dialogue between the audience and the 
actors‖ (Kaplan, 1968:109). However, as with the sacred spaces of antiquity, I suggest that 
the outer form can only assume the powers Kaplan describes in proportion to the authority 
commanded by the ceremony itself. Brook maintains that while theatre has its genesis in 












lost; a ‗deadly sentimentality‘ now compels us to create hollow imitations of the ceremonies 
and the spaces within which they thrived: ―It is not the fault of the holy that it has become a 
middle-class weapon to keep the children good‖ (Brook, 1968:51). He suggests that the 
performance space should be rediscovered even as the contemporary rituals emerge, and 
reminds us that ―the focus of the audience‘s attention in any theatre space is the human body‖ 
(Todd and Lecat, 2003:116)  
While the words ‗human body‘ conjure an image of inert matter and lifeless substance, no 
more than the flesh and bones of a corpse, Artaud is adamant: ―one cannot separate body and 
mind, the senses and intellect …‖ (1958:76-77). In what I consider is a direct swipe at 
Descartes, Artaud distinguishes the vital flesh of the human body from a lump of dead meat 
not by ‗consciousness‘, but by an awareness of bodily presence:  
 The flesh is autonomous, is able, at the level of brute bodily awareness and bodily 
 presence, to be the perfect mirror of itself … it is identical to itself. The ‗esprit dans le 
 chair‘ is as quick as lightening, so prompt and rapid there is no moment in which a 
 gap may open up between the flesh and the intellectual apprehension of the flesh … 
 there is nothing that can insinuate itself between the flesh as sensor and the flesh as 
 sensed (Morfee, 2005:46).   
It is in full bodily awareness that Artaud suggests the distinction between subject and object 
disappears as the body becomes the sovereign site of essential knowledge, informed from 
within and dependent on nothing but itself. I maintain that Peter Brook‘s favoured 
configuration of the performance space facilitates communitas by promoting a mutual 
awareness of bodily presence. Whether the event takes place in a modern theatre building or 
an African village square, the space is defined by Lecat‘s circle, comprising a central acting 
area with a three-quarter wrap-around embrace of spectators: ―the audience forms a circle of 
community [emphasis in original], a society in microcosm momentarily assembled around the 
action, in full awareness of itself and the space it occupies‖ (Todd and Lecat, 2003:VII). 
Maintaining presence in the present  
I first encountered the disconcerting notion of ‗presence‘ when I entered drama school as an 
undergraduate in the 1980s: certain individuals were singled out as having ‗it‘, while others 
were dismissed as not being possessed of any presence whatsoever. At the time I was 
frustrated that no-one could put forward an adequate definition of this elusive quality, much 
less offer any practical guidance as to how it may be acquired. On the contrary, we were 












‗talent‘, with which some are fortunate enough to have been born while the rest of us are 
relegated to the ranks of the envious unanointed. Of course I was relieved some years later 
when the British voice coach and theatre director Patsy Rodenburg (2007) announced that, in 
fact, everyone is born with a sense of presence; she explained that it is often diminished 
through the pressures of modern urban living, but that it is possible to reconnect with this 
faculty in later life. For her, presence is a function of attentiveness and responsiveness, an 
explanation which rang a distant bell; I recalled from high school biology classes that 
‗irritability‘ distinguishes living protoplasm from inert matter: it is the property of cellular 
material and of living organisms that permits them to react to stimuli.   
 Irritability and autonomous activities are smaller waves of processes superimposed on 
 the continuous flux of the system, irritability consisting in reversible disturbances, 
 after which the system comes back to its steady state, and autonomic activities in 
 periodic fluctuations (Von Bertalanffy, 1950:27)  
Rodenburg describes the exchange of ‗energy‘ between an individual and their environment 
and defines three circles of presence: in first circle the focus is inward and withdrawn, 
minimising the impact one makes on the world; third circle is at the opposite end of the 
spectrum with the focus directed outward in a general and non-specific manner; while second 
circle presence facilitates ‗connection‘ with the environment as energy ―…moves out toward 
the object of your attention, touches it and then receives energy back from it‖ (2007:21). 
Rodenburg suggests that any one of these states of ‗being in the world‘ may becomes habitual 
to a particular personality, but she argues that individuals tend to move between these modes, 
depending on the prevailing circumstances. In biological terms then, true ‗second circle‘ 
presence is a dynamic homeostasis where all sensory modalities are engaged and the 
organism is optimally receptive and responsive to even the most subtle of stimuli. In the 
course of a truly engaging theatrical event, I assert that mirror-neurons in the brain are likely 
to be activated as both performers and spectators enter a communal tempero-spatial presence.  
With ritual in mind: neurobiology of cultural practice  
It is notable that towards the end of his life, Victor Turner had himself begun to probe the 
connections between the body, brain and ritual behaviour; ―For him, the human brain is a 
liminal organ operating somewhere between the genetically fixed and the radically free‖ 
(Schechner, 1986:12). Turner was concerned however, that by venturing into the realm of the 












 I am having to submit to question some of the axioms anthropologists of my 
 generation – and several subsequent generations – were taught to hallow. These 
 axioms express the belief that all human behaviour is the result of social conditioning. 
 Clearly a great deal of it is, but gradually it has been borne home to me that there are 
 inherent resistances to conditioning ... exciting new findings were coming from 
 genetics, ethology, and neurology, particularly the neurobiology of the brain (Turner, 
 1986b:156-159). 
 
Turner‘s caution was not misplaced: the prevailing sentiment among anthropologists was one 
of hostility towards claims of a genetic predisposition in humans for particular behavioural 
traits. The influential British social anthropologist Edmund Leach (1966) warned that such 
notions tend to form the basis for racial prejudice wherever it is encountered.  ―It cannot be 
too strongly emphasized that ritual, in the anthropologist‘s sense, is in no way whatsoever a 
genetic endowment of the species‖ (Leach, 1966:403).  However, Turner was encouraged by 
the speculations of the English evolutionary biologist Julian Huxley (1966), a pioneer in what 
was at the time an emerging field of ethology, or animal behaviour.  
Huxley had done extensive research into the ritualised activities of many species and noted 
similarities with such behaviour among the higher mammals, suggesting that aspects of 
human conduct exhibit traces of adaptive function consistent with natural selection (Turner, 
1986b). Treading warily lest he offend the sensibilities of anthropologists, Huxley (1966) was 
at pains to acknowledge an interplay between innate and cognitive behaviour; while 
biological evolution in all animals is based on genetic transmission, human cultural evolution 
is premised on non-genetic cultural transmission, an aspect he was content to leave for those 
more qualified than he to explore in detail.  
Huxley did go on to note though, that man‘s capacity for language could itself be regarded as 
ritualised behaviour, while his unique learning faculty promotes a greater variety and 
complexity in ritual activity than that found in any other type of animal. The two fields of 
study came to be defined by the relative emphasis on ‗nature or nurture‘ in their competing 
conceptions of ritualisation: the anthropologists insisted that ritual is a culturally transmitted, 
learned behaviour with strong links to the development of language, while the ethologists 
insisted that ritual is a manifestation of genetic programming that contains significant non-
verbal components. This tendency for mutual exclusivity is a manifestation of the binary 
logic of Cartesian dualism, which advances in the sphere of the neurosciences at the time 












As an anthropologist Turner was resigned for some time to fall in with the status quo, but 
continued to keep abreast of developments in the fields of ethology, genetics and neurology. 
He became especially interested in the neurobiology of the brain and began to ask questions 
regarding this unique organ‘s role in the appropriate mixing of genetic and cultural 
information in producing organic behaviour (Turner, 1986b).  He was particularly drawn to 
the work of American neuroscientist Paul MacLean (1949;1976;1982;1985) who, decades 
earlier with technology no more sophisticated than electroencepholography, had begun to 
probe the brain mechanisms associated with emotion and psychosomatic illness.  
MacLean went on to conceive of the brain as a three-in-one structure: the ‗triune brain‘, 
where each distinct but interconnected component has its own evolutionary heritage or 
‗phylogenetic‘ history. As the human forebrain evolved and expanded, MacLean explains, it 
maintained cohesion between ―three neural assemblies that reflect an ancestral relationship to 
reptiles, early mammals, and late mammals‖ (1985:219). I suggest that the triune brain is 
analogous to a computer with a three-core processor or, perhaps more accurately, a network 
of separate computers working in parallel but running on a variety of operating systems 
ranging from an early IBM-701 to the latest generation Mac-OS X  (Brinch Hansen, 2000).  
―It is inferred that each cerebrotype has its own special kind of intelligence, its own special 
memory, its own sense of time and space and its own motor and other functions‖ (MacLean, 
1976:180).  
In the proto-reptilian brain there is no emotion and no cognitive appreciation of past or future 
events, however the basal ganglia are vital in maintaining life by controlling the 
cardiovascular and respiratory systems (Stevens and Price, 1999). The midbrain or paleo-
mammalian brain of the earliest mammals comprises subcortical structures of the limbic 
system which coordinate the homeostatic mechanisms that maintain internal stability in 
response to environmental changes (Turner, 1986b). The forebrain or neo-mammalian brain 
of MacLean‘s model is the neocortex, a brain like yours and mine, responsible for cognition 
and more sophisticated perceptual processes, as opposed to the emotionally-driven behaviour 
of the limbic system or the purely instinctive processes controlled by the basal ganglia 
(Stevens and Price, 1999). A limited sense of control and partial awareness is typical of 
emotional behaviour arising from the limbic system, whereas there is a relative lack of 












basal ganglia. By contrast, there is a high degree of awareness and a sense of personal control 
over the conscious, voluntary or rational behaviour arising in the neocortex.  
MacLean flags three types of emotional behaviour that most clearly signify the evolutionary 
transition from reptile to mammal: maternal care and nursing; ‗audiovocal‘ communication, 
which initially helps to maintain mother-to-infant proximity, but which later evolved to 
maintain contact between members of a group; and play activity, which he suggests ―… 
serves originally to promote harmony in the nest and then, later in life, group affiliation‖ 
(1985:220).  
It is worth noting that Turner considers playfulness to be an interstitial mode of behaviour, 
which is akin to the liminal phase of ritual and which cultural institutions often seek to 
contain within games, sports and competitions and ―…in modes of simulation such as theatre, 
and in controlled disorientation, from roller coasters to dervish dancing …‖ (1986b:168)  
Our language and culture reflect a tacit awareness of the triune arrangement: throughout the 
ages the functions of reason, emotion and instinct have variously been attributed to the head, 
the heart and the viscera. I suggest that the phylogenetically distinct aspects of the triune 
body/mind would exhibit the differing processes under different circumstances: ‗showing 
guts‘ or ‗wearing the heart on a sleeve‘ when it comes to either displaying bravery on the 
battlefield or wooing a potential mate in courtship. This understanding has carried through to 
the clinical environment: a conception of phylogenetic inheritance played an important role 
for both Freud and Jung, in their respective theoretical formulations (Hoffer, 1992). The two 
giants of analytical psychology independently observed that the mind appears to possess 
separate functional mechanisms that compete with each other for the overall control of 
behaviour. The triune brain provides a neurobiological basis for Freud‘s model of the id, ego 
and super ego, while at the same time it is highly compatible with Jung‘s collective 
unconscious and archetypes, which he had speculated reside in phylogenetically older parts 
of the brain: ―They are, in a sense, the deposits of all our ancestral experiences, but they are 
not the experiences themselves‖ (Turner, 1993:99)  
Theatre shares with pre-industrial ritual a fascination for narrative and mythology, a framing 
of experience through story, using both culturally-specific and archetypical imagery as 
currency. Turner observes that archetypes manifest themselves both subjectively and 












collective depictions occur in myth and ritual (Turner, 1986b). D‘Aquili and his colleague, 
biogenetic structuralist Charles Laughlin, argue convincingly that the human ability to create 
myth is driven by a ‗cognitive imperative‘, an instinctive need to ―… look for the causes of 
the phenomena which were occurring around him and to attempt to control or adapt to them‖ 
(1975:45). They explain that man is driven to understand the world around him and has no 
choice but to order sensory data within an analytic framework or cognitive matrix. This he 
does with the help of the higher cortical functions which include conceptualisation and 
abstract causal thinking. Significantly though, D‘Aquili suggests that higher cortical 
functions afford man the ability to contemplate paradox, to which I will add that these brain 
structures afford audiences the faculty for appreciating cognitive dissonance which provides 
the dramatic tension sitting at the heart of much theatre. 
The ability to arrange abstract concepts in linear sequences is a function of the inferior 
parietal lobule and its reciprocal interconnections with the frontal lobes, a nexus which 
provides the capacity for abstract causal thinking: the ‗causal operator‘. D‘Aquili describes 
how the causal operator is able to organise a strip of reality into what are perceived as causal 
sequences going back to the primary initiator; where such root cause is not provided by the 
senses, the causal operator is compelled to provide one, ―… in the same way that a 
mathematical operator functions … if the initial terminus is not given by sense data then the 
causal operator grinds out an initial terminus automatically‖ (1978:266-267). Since untoward 
phenomena cry out for a cause, ―… gods, powers, spirits, personified forces or any other kind 
of causative ingredients are automatically generated by the causal operator‖ (Turner, 
1986b:165). It‘s no wonder that in communities denied ready access to information, 
conspiracy theories are readily propagated.  
American neuro-anthropologist Barbara Lex (1979) provides an insight into neural 
characteristics of ritual trance, which others have built upon to investigate why we are able to 
be deeply ‗moved‘ during an intense aesthetic or religious experience (Nelson, et al. 2006). 
D‘Aquili explains how a relentless combination of visual, audio and tactile ‗driving stimuli‘ 
disrupts the mutually inhibitive relationship between the sympathetic and parasympathetic 
neural networks  resulting in a simultaneous discharge of both subsystems and intense arousal 
of both cognitive and affective faculties. Victor Turner‘s ‗as-is‘ indicative state coexists with 
the ‗as-if‘ subjunctive state as ―…logical paradoxes or the awareness of polar opposites as 












(D‘Aquili and Laughlin, 1975:52). An unsophisticated, though immediate analogy is to be 
found in the ineffable experience of an orgasm and the sense of one-ness that ensues.  
From the sacred to the mundane, I assert that in both religious and secular rituals, 
performative activities promote the embodiment of either the prevailing mythology or indeed, 
a speculative cognitive matrix. Whether it is achieved through evoking the manifestation of a 
supernatural deity, to healing a social breach in a court of law or celebrating a rite-of-passage 
at a ‗hen-party‘, the structural order through which a community makes sense of itself is 
either reinforced, maintained, restored, or – particularly in the case of theatre – re-imagined. 
Social rituals therefore range in function from the conservative to the generative and function 
at the nexus of culture and biology. Victor Turner identifies many of the contemporary social 
rituals through which we are able to feel/think our experience within a shared cognitive 
matrix: from the sports-field to the dance-floor, from the houses of parliament to the law 
courts, social dramas play out as ―a sequence of social interactions of a conflictive, 
competitive, or agonistic type‖ (1986b:30). Social dramas and ritual activities are embodied 
processes through which humanity both defines and imagines itself. As I have argued, theatre 
and performance emerge from this milieu; through an integrated understanding of the 
cultural, social, psychological and biological dimensions of the environment we share, 
theatre-makers are best positioned to contribute to the dynamic and healthy functioning of 












Reflecting on reflexes: making sense of sensations. 
 The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting. 
 Milan Kundera (1999:4) 
 
 The liveliest, the most important memorial is not out there; it is in our heads,  
 conveyed through words and images, songs and gestures. 
 Albie Sachs (Jaffer, 2006) 
 
The concept of ‗Transitional Justice‘ can be traced back to Europe after the Second World 
War and the ‗Nuremberg Trials‘, which sought to hold accountable the perpetrators of gross 
violations of human rights (Méndez, 1997). Since that infamous example there has been a 
growing awareness of the rights of the victim and a concomitant shift from ‗retributive‘ 
justice towards ‗restorative‘ justice.  More latterly, an acknowledgement of the needs of the 
community at large has prompted the creation of measures aimed at transitional stability and 
reconstruction.   
South Africa‘s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was initiated in 1995 and has a 
diverse pedigree descending from both European and Latin American forebears. There were 
sixteen incarnations of such mechanisms around the world prior to the TRC, and even on our 
continent South Africa‘s experience is not unique; on the contrary, there are a number of 
examples, both  before and since, that have operated with varying degrees of success 
(Amnesty International, 2010). The Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearance of people 
in Uganda was set up by Idi Amin Dada in 1974, ostensibly to examine the disappearances of 
308 individuals during the preceding three years. One of the few commissions to be called 
outside a time of transition, the report was not published and its recommendations were never 
enacted. More recently, Burundi resolved in 2007 to set up a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in the wake of twelve years of civil war. To date it has yet to be implemented 
(Puddington, 2011). There have been commissions staged in Chad, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Ghana, Morocco, and the DRC (Amnesty International, 2010). At the time of writing, 
Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu - who chaired the South African TRC - has agreed to 
support Ivory Coast in setting up a commission there, after four months of internecine 
violence following disputed elections in November 2010 (Malterre, 2011).  
 In all these processes, the essential problem is how to balance peace and justice, 












 attempts to balance these competing claims, pride of place always goes to South 
 Africa. It remains the template, the most ambitious and far-reaching of the attempts at 
 catharsis and justice (Edelstein, 2001:15). 
In this chapter, I examine the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an 
example of social ritual: how its performative aspects transcend its legal framework in its 
mission to promote social healing. I explore a number of psycho-social perspectives on the 
performative nature of apologies and their restorative value. I investigate the limitations of 
language in conveying the varied dimensions of experience and adopt Diana Taylor‘s (2003) 
notion of the performed repertoire as a viable repository of knowledge to supplement the 
archive. I then recall briefly a number of theatrical manifestations of the TRC repertoire 
before examining in some detail Truth in Translation, a project that was initiated with the 
overt intention to foster dialogue and promote healing among communities burdened with the 
legacy of conflict.   
Truth and Reconciliation 
It was Tuesday 16 April 1996, the second day of hearings in the East London Town Hall, and 
the Committee for Human Rights Violations was hearing the testimony of Nomonde Calata, 
the widow of an assassinated activist, in case number EC0028/96. The transcript reflects the 
facts that emerged: 
 MRS CALATA (continued): … I looked at the headlines and one of the children said 
 that he could see that his father‘s car was shown in the paper as being burned. At that 
 moment I was trembling because I was afraid of what might have happened to my 
 husband, because I wondered, if his car was burned like this, what might have 
 happened to him? I started distributing the papers as usual, but I was very unhappy. 
 After a few hours some friends came in and  took me and said I must go to Nyami, 
 who was always supportive. I was still twenty at the time and couldn't handle this. 
 When I got to Nyami‘s place, Nyami was crying terribly and this affected me also. 
 (sobbing) 
 MR SMITH: Mr Chairman may I request the Commission to adjourn maybe for a 
 minute? I don't think the witness is in a condition to continue at the present moment.  
 CHAIRPERSON: Can we adjourn for ten minutes please? (TRC, 1996a:10) 
  
‗Sobbing‘? That‘s what the record reflects. Well, the official record in this case; it has been 
pointed out that the original Xhosa transcription of the testimony is more nuanced, bearing 
certain markers that more accurately convey her state of shock (Bock and Mpolweni-Zantsi, 
2006; Mpolweni, 2008). But neither account can do justice to the scene I witnessed. 
Nomonde Calata had flung her body in a backward arch that nearly toppled her chair, as she 












her being. An attendant placed a comforting arm around her shoulders and tenderly patted her 
chest, while mouthing soothing sounds. I was now required to speak but my diaphragm had 
begun to quiver as a wave of emotion washed over me and my mouth turned dry. At this 
point the observers began a plaintive rendition of Senzeni Na? ―What have we done? Our sin 
is that we are black …‖ As they sang, I was able to breathe deeply, momentarily disengaging 
from the experience as I gathered my wits. 
The radio audience, listening in real-time, relied on my voice to describe the action each time 
there was a lull in proceedings. In an effort to transport them to the scene, I would earlier 
have described Mrs. Calata and how the vivid red of her sweater stood out against the drab 
surroundings of the old town hall, while on the makeshift stage a semicircle of 
commissioners flanked the purple-clad Archbishop and his deputy, the silver-haired Dr. 
Boraine. I would have tried to convey the image of a spectator, an old black woman with the 
walking-stick, shoulders hunched under a knitted patchwork-blanket: someone‘s mother, 
someone‘s grandmother, being helped into a chair and looking bewildered as she tried to fit 
the headphones through which she‘d be able to follow the proceedings in translation. For 
those who had just tuned-in for the live coverage on the SABC‘s Radio 2000, I would bring 
them up-to-speed with some background to the case being heard and provide a précis of the 
testimony so far. Fort Calata had been abducted along with his colleagues, Matthew Goniwe, 
Sparrow Mkhonto and Sicelo Mhlawuli, as the so-called ‗Cradock four‘ returned from a 
meeting in Port Elizabeth (TRC, 1998b). It is alleged they were taken via Olifantshoek Pass 
to Port Elizabeth where they were assaulted, killed and their bodies burned, along with the 
vehicle in which they were travelling. When Mrs Calata had regained her composure, the 
hearing resumed. I slid open the fader on the audio-feed, turned off my microphone and, once 
again, simply sat and witnessed, together with many thousands of others. 
I was playing one of the diverse backstage roles in the massive media deployment that 
brought the public hearings into the lives of many who would not otherwise have had access 
to the ritual. The TRC hearings were initially to have been heard in camera, shielded from the 
public eye, but a number of non-governmental organisations intervened and, through a court 
action, succeeded in opening the proceedings to the broadcast media (Cole, 2010). Mark 
Sanders, professor of comparative literature at New York University, suggests that the TRC 
made itself a proxy for the perpetrator in relation to the victims whose testimony it solicited. 












phantasmatic perpetratorship became available, in principle, to anyone‖ (Sanders, 2007:9). 
The commission faced the reality that perpetrators were unlikely to come forward en masse to 
take responsibility for their deeds, and so the TRC assumed a surrogacy role, demonstrating 
its readiness to restore the dignity of the victims. At the same time, through the simultaneous 
translations and the involvement of the broadcast media, the fantasy and impulse to make-
good was generalised across the entire social body and made available to all. 
Deputy chair Alex Boraine acknowledged the role of the media, and radio in particular, in 
bringing the hearings to the poor, the illiterate and those living in far-flung rural areas; it 
created a truly national experience out of what might otherwise have been restricted to a 
select handful of commissioners (Cole, 2010). Boraine recalls being deeply moved by 
Nomonde Calata‘s display of anguish:  ―It was like a howl in the darkness, an expression of 
all the horror of the apartheid years that transformed the hearing from a litany of suffering 
and pain to an even deeper level‖ (Boraine, 2008:187). It was a cry that came to define the 
commission as it played over and over on radio and television, resonating in the recesses of 
the South African psyche and echoing around the world. 
Its international prominence notwithstanding, South Africa‘s TRC has been criticised for its 
limited success, specifically with regard to unfinished business concerning both the victims 
and perpetrators of human rights atrocities. Despite its optimistic promises to victims, the 
commission‘s powers were restricted to making recommendations only, which the 
government largely chose to disregard. ―Reparation payments came too little and too late‖ 
(Cole, 2010:123). On the other hand, the TRC had controversially been given full powers to 
grant amnesty, which it did for hundreds of applicants. But once again the administration has 
failed to follow through, with the majority of unrepentant perpetrators of atrocities unlikely 
ever to be brought to book, ―...and those who cocked a snook at the TRC have continued to 
do so with mounting confidence‖ (Carter, 2006:158). However, despite this ambivalence 
towards its success, the TRC received unprecedented exposure with its public hearings for 
both victims and perpetrators, and it featured unique amnesty provisions: ‗carrot-and-stick‘ 















Dimensions of accountability  
Priscilla Hayner heads the International Policymakers Unit at the International Centre for 
Transitional Justice in New York. She is somewhat dismissive of a Truth Commission‘s 
capacity to facilitate emotional healing, suggesting that such remedy is more likely due to the 
passage of time than to any therapeutic effect of the ritual itself: 
 As well, it is often asserted that digging into the truth and giving victims a chance to 
 speak offers a healing or ‗cathartic‘ experience. Again, this turns out to be a 
 questionable assumption, at least in some cases. Though little scientific evidence is 
 yet available on this question, it is clear that this notion of healing is a bit overstated, 
 at least (Hayner, 2001:6).  
 
It is against this sceptical view of emotion that I argue. I submit that Hayner‘s position arises 
from a dualistic Cartesian paradigm which can and must be challenged in light of the 
emerging scientific evidence regarding emotional function, both within the individual 
organism and within communities. The legal perspective, which is overwhelmingly rational, 
seeks to put a price on human suffering, reducing liability into readily quantifiable units of 
monetary reparation and numbers of successful prosecutions. I argue that a neuroscientific 
perspective is increasingly likely to offer Hayner the evidence she lacks. 
 The notion of accountability is multi-faceted, with political, legal, ethical and emotional 
constituents, and South Africa‘s TRC set a precedent by acknowledging the spectrum: with 
the eventual aim of facilitating reconciliation, it blended elements of storytelling with aspects 
of inquisitorial prosecution tempered by offers of clemency. The concept of reconciliation 
itself has implications of penance and absolution, notions reflected in the pervasive religious 
undertones of the commission: from the moral authority of the chair, Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu, and his deputy, former cleric Dr. Alex Boraine, to the involvement of a number of 
theologians as counsellors (Kotzé, 2001).  
Political scientist Dirk Kotzé attributes the absence of widespread calls for retribution to 
religious considerations, although others ascribe this to the dominance of a specific doctrine 
at the expense of others. The Muslim scholar, Dr. Farid Esack, in his submission to the Faith 
Communities hearing, expressed his concern that the TRC courted the risk of elevating the 
Christian values of atonement and forgiveness above respect for the suffering of victims and 
the need for justice (Jaffer, 2000). Without intending to negate the importance of this 












and mysticism: from a neurological perspective, divine experience is essentially emotional in 
nature and a function of the limbic system (Bowker and Bowker, 1998; Newberg et al., 2001, 
2003). However, in raising his concerns Esack articulates the polarised imperatives at the 
core of Transitional Justice: the hunger for vengeance predicated on rational certainty on the 
one hand, and the facilitation of emotional healing and the promotion of social cohesion on 
the other. Ambiguity flourishes in the liminal territory where reason and emotion converge; 
the TRC‘s enduring achievement lies in its readiness to embrace the paradox.   
In effect the TRC sought to spearhead a process for the rehabilitation of the collective 
psyche; the extent to which it ultimately achieved this aim resists evaluation through the 
application of logic alone. I argue that the depths of human suffering and our converse 
capacity for depravity are distinctly emotional in character and so cannot easily be quantified; 
instead they must be embodied and subjectively ‗felt‘, while being processed with the help of 
the body/mind‘s emotional brain structures, including the hippocampus, amygdala, anterior 
thalamic nuclei, septum and limbic cortex, together with the endocrine and autonomic 
nervous systems (De Kloet et al. 2005). Moreover, I contend that the resultant body of 
knowledge is able to be further disseminated via a heuristic process involving the mirror-
neuron system.    
The TRC published its report in five initial volumes, with a codicil in two further tomes 
detailing its findings and recommendations (TRC, 1998a;2002;2003). In addition, transcripts 
of all the hearings are catalogued and available on the internet, while all evidence gathered 
has been deposited in the state archive. Nevertheless TRC investigator Piers Pigou laments: 
―The vast majority of South Africans, including those who directly engaged the commission, 
have … never seen what the commission actually found and why‖ (Cole, 2010:7). Most of 
the documentary residue in the state archive has been placed out-of-bounds, requiring 
intervention through the Promotion of Access to Information Act before access can be 
secured (Harris, 2002). I propose that an under-explored factor inhibiting the flow of 
knowledge is the nature of the record itself. 
The archive and the repertoire  
The French critical theorist and philosopher Roland Barthes suggested that other sources of 
meaning or significance are lost in the process of ‗embalming‘ the text as written word 












testimony presented to the commission are of an ethereal quality and thus unable to be 
entombed alongside the other mummified remnants. In a series of lectures in 1955, British 
analytic philosopher J.L. Austin identified a type of statement which he called the 
‗performative‘, its truth value ―…a function of the fact and condition of its utterance rather 
than its conceptual content alone‖ (Walker, 2003:10). In other words, non-verbal and 
paralinguistic modes of communication, including gesture, facial expression, pitch, volume 
and intonation of speech, are able to moderate the purely verbal signifiers to produce a layer 
of meaning that is affective and experiential in nature, rather than purely conceptual. 
Tony Sitembiso Yengeni, an activist who had been violently assaulted in detention, took full 
advantage of the performative dimensions of the Truth Commission while cross-examining 
his tormentor; ―the roles were reversed and the torturer . . . was confronted by the tortured‖ 
(Sanders, 2002:588). In a departure from the legalistic protocols that shaped the amnesty 
committee hearings, a number of victims had been granted an opportunity to confront their 
Security Branch interrogator Jeffrey Benzien. Yengeni demanded that the policeman re-enact 
one of his torture methods: the infamous ‗wet-bag‘ technique, in which a blindfolded victim 
is suffocated with a water-soaked bag that is placed over his head.  
 MR YENGENI: Now, is it possible f r you to do a demonstration of how, I as a 
 victim I would want to see what happened to me. 
 CHAIRPERSON: When you say demonstration, I mean, has he not described it 
 satisfactorily to you? 
 MR YENGENI: I also want to see it with my own eyes what he did to me …  
 CHAIRPERSON: Mr Yengeni, could it be done here in front of you ... [to a 
 volunteer] Will you lie down on your stomach please and Mr Benzien, will you show 
 us the position you occupied. 
 MR YENGENI: Yes, a little bit further, there in the middle, so that I can see. 
 CHAIRPERSON: Yes.  
 MS KHAMPEPE: We can‘t see Mr Benzien. 
 CHAIRPERSON: We will just have to stand and have a look. Bring that bag. Mr 
 Yengeni, can you see?  
 MR YENGENI: Yes, but what I want to ask just as he is in that position, at what point 
 does he release the bag for more air? How does he know that now I am about to loose, 
 to die, then he releases the bag?  (TRC, 1997:59-60) 
Poet and author Antjie Krog describes this incident as one that ―will remain one of the most 
loaded and disturbing images in the life of the truth commission‖ (Krog, 1998:73). By 
eliciting such embodied testimony rather than a purely verbal recollection, Yengeni prompted 
a dramatic departure from the ‗storytelling‘ mode of the victims hearings and shattered the 












certain degree of action, I contend that the official record of the event has been stripped of 
much of its meaning.  
Diana Taylor is the founding director of the Hemispheric Institute of Performance and 
Politics at New York University. She postulates an alternative repository of memory and 
knowledge, to be found in the embodied ‗repertoire‘ rather than in the archive. ―The 
transitive notion of embodied memory … entails a relational nonindividualistic understanding 
of subjectivity‖ (Taylor, 2003:191). I argue that the underlying value of the TRC resides, not 
in its legalistic framework, but rather in its ritualistic and performative dimensions. From this 
perspective it is not surprising that when the commission solicited applications for assistance 
from the victims, many asked for no more than an opportunity to further ritualise their 
experience. There were numerous requests for the return of the bodies or body-parts of 
relatives, for information on the location of burial sites and pleas for exhumation and suitable 
re-interment. ―Sometimes the claims for funeral rites were made in the name of ‗tradition‘ 
and ‗custom‘; although this mourning could take highly specific local forms - such as the 
Zulu ukubuyisa, or bringing back the spirit [italics in original]‖ (Sanders, 2007:10).  
One ritualised gesture, arising out of the TRC and arguably forming part of its repertoire, 
drew a range of reaction: the widely reported ceremonial foot-washing performed by former 
police minister Adriaan Vlok on his erstwhile victim, anti-apartheid cleric Rev. Frank 
Chikane (Berger, 2007; Swart, 2008). Vlok had appeared before the TRC in connection with 
a number of apartheid-era crimes, but had never sought amnesty for authorising the attempted 
assassination of the then secretary-general of the South African Council of Churches 
(Associated Press, 2007). In 1989 Chikane had fallen gravely ill after his clothing had been 
laced with an organophosphate – Paraoxon - a deadly neurotoxin favoured as an instrument 
of assassination due to its easy absorption through the skin (Gould and Folb, 2002). The 
identities of the perpetrators had remained a mystery until, 18 years later and some time after 
his appearance at the TRC, Vlok arrived by appointment at Chikane‘s office, tendered a 
personal apology and, in a re-enactment of a biblical ritual, washed and dried his victim‘s feet 
(Swart, 2008). He later pleaded guilty in court and was handed a ten-year suspended 
sentence; at the trial, Vlok and Chikane were seen to exchange smiles and handshakes 












Chikane had initially resisted the overture, but then gave in, ―having understood that my 
refusal would deprive him of his liberation and his release from psychological torture‖ (Day, 
2009). The cleric had hoped that Vlok‘s gesture might inspire others and provide a beacon for 
reconciliation, but many were understandably sceptical. Among those was activist Shirley 
Gunn, who had been detained together with her 16-month old son after Vlok had framed her 
for the 1988 bombing of Khotso House, the Johannesburg headquarters of the South African 
Council of Churches (TRC. 1996b). ―He can‘t just wash Frank Chikane‘s feet and think that 
that is the end of it ... he needs to apologise to his victims directly‖ (Maughan, 2006). Of 
course, the TRC never required an apology or expressions of remorse in exchange for 
amnesty: ―All that was required was full disclosure of wrongdoing and acceptance of 
responsibility for that wrongdoing‖ (Murphy, 2007:440).  
Promoting restorative justice over retributive justice was undoubtedly a delicate balancing act 
for the TRC; the notion of repentance appeals primarily to emotion and sits more comfortably 
within a paradigm of religious morality than within an adversarial legal culture. Nevertheless 
the commission did hear many apologies, including a reluctant statement of regret famously 
coaxed out of Winnie Madikizela-Mandela (Klopper, 2001); the commission found she was 
implicated ―in a range of incidents – including assaults and abduction, and the murder and 
attempted murder of at least a dozen individuals‖ (TRC, 1998c:556). However, I maintain 
that a formal requirement of apology in exchange for amnesty might have proved 
counterproductive: it may well have elicited a rash of self-serving fake displays of contrition, 
which would have undermined the reconciliatory intentions of the commission. ―And to the 
degree that we hand out rewards to those who fake repentance and remorse, then to that same 
degree do we cheapen the currency of repentance and remorse - making us less likely to treat 
the real article with the respect it deserves‖ (Murphy, 2007:440). While in civil and tort 
litigation, monetary compensation for injuries suffered may be calculated rationally and duly 
recorded, the psychological, emotional and spiritual healing facilitated by apology is more 
rightly ‗felt‘ and passed into the repertoire. 
The primacy of remorse   
The restorative effects of repentance and remorse are not confined to those who share 
religious convictions, though: I assert that the notion of apology has significant secular 
relevance, and further submit that it has deep-rooted socio-biological implications. Dutch 












reflect that, following agonistic interactions, the animals repeatedly chose to make contact 
with former opponents rather than with third parties; the range of distinctive reconciliatory 
behaviour was frequently characterised by ‗mouth-to-mouth kissing‘ (De Waal and Van 
Roosmalen, 1979). Subsequent detailed studies with Rhesus monkeys included a series of 
controls, and yielded more detailed results that replicated the earlier data, but which included 
a distinctive array of conciliatory activities observed in contacts with third parties: most 
notably ‗embracing‘ behaviour (De Waal and Yoshihara, 1983). That this type of conduct 
appears to be shared across the primate order, suggests it is encoded in the phylogenetically 
earlier parts of the brain. While anthropomorphic correlations are generally considered taboo 
in science, De Waal contends that observing such post-conflict behaviour may assist our 
understanding of conflict resolution, the reduction of tension and the promotion of social 
cohesion among human primates (De Waal, 1988). 
American sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis is frequently cited for his detailed work on the 
cultural implications of apology. He maintains that the primary function of an act of 
contrition is to resolve conflict and to restore a prior moral order by eliminating the damaging 
effects of past actions - a paradoxical proposition: ―an apology, no matter how sincere or 
effective, does not and cannot undo what has been done. And yet, in a mysterious way and 
according to its own logic, this is precisely what it manages to do [emphasis in original]‖ 
(Tavuchis, 1991:5). As I have shown elsewhere, apparent paradoxes are to be expected where 
emotional function is concerned, where effects appear to be disconnected from their causes 
but for the intervention of a peculiar ‗affective logic‘. South African legal scholar Mia Swart, 
a specialist in Public International Law and Global Justice at Leiden University, worked on 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. She introduces yet another 
paradox when she argues that even incomplete or insincere apologies have restorative value 
due to their essentially performative nature: she notes that such apologies are particularly 
effective ―if the apologist exhibits shame or if the apology involves public humiliation‖ 
(Swart, 2008:51).   
Drawing a distinction between ‗guilt‘ and ‗shame‘, a group of researchers in the social 
aspects of moral emotions note that offers of reparation often cause further insult, while a 
sincere emotional act of contrition mitigates the slight: ―… expressing shame can have a 
beneficial effect on others, in a situation where intergroup boundaries, and some level of pre-












justice on the Constitutional Court of South Africa, lost an arm and an eye when targeted by 
agents for the apartheid regime in a bomb-blast while exiled in Mozambique (Sachs, 1990). 
Commenting on whether apologies should be isolated from civil liability through protective 
legislation, Sachs insisted that his suffering would be alleviated, not by monetary 
compensation, but through the experience of witnessing his enemy‘s humiliation, ―that he 
would rather have his enemy ‗on bended knee‘ than not at all‖ (Taft, 2006:603). It is my 
contention that such restorative healing is available by proxy through appropriate exposure to 
the affective repertoire.  
In its final report, the TRC acknowledges four conceptions of truth: ―factual or forensic truth; 
personal or narrative truth; social or ‗dialogue‘ truth and healing and restorative truth‖ (TRC. 
1998a: 110). Accordingly, the Commission had a fourfold mission: to diminish the lies that 
are circulated unchallenged in public discourse; to give individuals the opportunity to speak 
their personal truth while embracing the inherent paradoxes of subjective experience; to 
establish the truth of lived experience by promoting transparency, discussion, debate and 
interaction; and to place revealed truths within a living context of human relationships while 
restoring dignity. The first two categories of truth were served by the amnesty and victims‘ 
hearings respectively, while the third was facilitated by the various Special Hearings that 
included those for faith communities, business groupings and the media. As long as the 
emerging society continues to respect transparency and open access to information, the social 
or ‗dialogue‘ truth will continue to be serviced through the archive and the involvement of 
academia. But I assert that the benefits of the fourth notion of truth, that of restoration and 
healing - the most central aspect of the Commission‘s work - are best dispensed by the 
ongoing repertoire. 
 Telling tales 
One of the first performed theatrical manifestations of the TRC repertoire was Duma 
Kumalo‘s anecdotal The Story I am About to Tell, created in collaboration with human rights 
activist Bobby Rodwell and poet Lesego Rampolokeng (Graham, 2003; Urbsaitis, 2009). The 
play featured real-life recollections by survivors of gross human rights violations (TRC, 
2003). Kumalo himself had spent four years on death row as one of the ―Sharpeville Six‖: 
convicted under the ‗common purpose‘ doctrine for the 1984 mob-killing of Lekoa town 
councillor and deputy mayor Kuzwayo Jacob Dlamini (Hamber 2006; Coetzer, 1988). Just 












before the TRC detailed the miscarriage of justice that had seen him convicted on perjured 
testimony (TRC. 1996c). Making specific reference to a presentation of Kumalo‘s drama, the 
final report of the TRC acknowledged the healing power of performance: ―After the play, an 
elderly white South African man approached one of the players … embraced her, sobbing, 
and then left without saying a word. For the actors, no words were necessary: such was the 
power of this intimate encounter‖ (TRC, 2003:157).  
On the other hand, after seeing a performance of The Story I am about to Tell at 
Johannesburg‘s Market Theatre, American literary scholar Shane Graham expressed 
disappointment that the piece seemed to be impaled on Diderot‘s paradox: ―Ironically, the 
literalness of the play‘s contrived reenactments detracts from the ‗realness‘ of the 
experiences that the play tries so hard to convey [emphasis in original]‖ (Graham, 2003:15). I 
argue here that the actual survivors‘ re-presentation of their original TRC testimony served 
the embalmed record at the expense of the embodied repertoire. By the time Graham 
experienced the performance, the witnesses had repeated their testimony several dozen times 
and it had evidently become devoid of emotional immediacy. Holocaust scholar Lawrence 
Langer distinguishes between layers of memory and suggests that while ‗surface memory‘ is 
calcified in the text, ‗deep memory‘ makes itself available through the immediate 
―unencumbered flow of the oral testimony‖ (Langer, 1991:18). The surface meaning is 
socially constructed, skipping across the exterior façade of words as it engages the intellect, 
while the deeply experienced meaning ―... is not known in words, but in the body‖ 
(Culbertson, 1995:170). Embodied performance of the repertoire transcends the spoken text; 
meaning is constructed not literally through words, but is evoked metaphorically and 
experienced heuristically through the body.  
Distinguished literary figure and academic Njabulo Ndebele welcomed the Truth 
Commission as an opportunity to restore our individual and collective narratives, but 
highlighted the need to embrace a metaphorical reality:  
 Only now has South Africa succeeded in becoming metaphor, in becoming a true 
 subject of philosophy. That is why the real challenge is not in maintaining competitive 
 levels of capability in science and technology. That is a relatively easy task. The real 
 challenge is in grounding science and technology in lived life, in the capacity for our 
 society to stimulate the imaginations of its peoples through voices that can go beyond 













Ndebele speaks here about re-imagining ourselves as we reconstitute our individual 
narratives which, in turn, inform the over-arching meta-narrative: the guiding mythology that 
defines our communal efforts. But these narratives resist objective construction: they are 
ideally assembled through subjectively felt experience and grounded in ‗lived life‘. And, like 
the mythologies that have defined civilisations throughout history, including those that have 
shaped the great religions, the narrative serves the community to the extent that it is 
underpinned by a commonly accepted Truth. In our secular world however, such Truth is 
increasingly elusive; it exists as fragments to be accumulated or discarded in the service of 
the latest faddish cult, the next marketing-drive or the tightening grip of the incumbent 
despot. If a society is to re-imagine itself, I suggest that linear narrative contiguity – the text – 
might be revisited, with fragments of paradoxical truths being presented through metaphor to 
be re-assimilated into a cohesive whole. This view is echoed by Truth Commissioner Mary 
Burton: ―The pieces of the jigsaw puzzle have been taken out of the box and shaken up. Now 
they need to be put together to create a picture in which all will be able to see themselves 
reflected‖ (Burton, 1998:24). 
Two subsequent theatrical presentations were able to forego the literal and embrace the 
lateral, and each did so through the audacious deployment of aesthetic devices designed to re-
contextualise actual testimony, allowing it to resonate simultaneously in several registers: 
emotion, reason and experience. Ubu and the Truth Commission, created by Jane Taylor, 
William Kentridge and the Handspring Puppet Company, is a multi-media presentation that 
blends the TRC testimony with Alfred Jarry‘s hundred-year old surrealist play Ubu Roi 
(Taylor, J. 1998). Live actors represent Pa and Ma Ubu, while Pa‘s minions and witnesses are 
portrayed by puppets, with photographic images and Kentridge‘s animations punctuating the 
action. The use of puppets, to represent both perpetrators and victims as they confront their 
flesh-and-blood tormentor, serves as a powerful two-pronged metaphor: perpetrators are seen 
to have been doing their master‘s bidding, while their victims are stripped of agency, able to 
find a voice only through the mediation of a presence outside of themselves (Graham, 2003).  
Johannesburg Composer Philip Miller‘s REwind: A Cantata for Voice, Tape and Testimony 
gives centre-stage to the voice itself: it provides a musical metaphor for the restoration of the 
ability to speak-up and speak-out; fragments of recorded testimony are blended with a string-
ensemble, choir and soloists to provide a re-imagined context within an orchestrated aural 












guided less by the content than by the acoustic qualities and character of the sounds, vocal 
inflections and nuances offering musical cues for his composition; ―To describe REwind as 
weaving spoken word with music ... does not do it justice, for the music actually originates 
with the recorded voices and their timbre and emotional intensity [emphasis in original]‖ 
(Cole, 2008:88). Tapping into the aural dimensions of the TRC, Miller succeeds in evoking 
the experience of the majority of the population in following proceedings exclusively through 
radio broadcasts. What‘s more though, in foregrounding the human voice the composer 
amplifies an underexplored dimension of the embodied repertoire; ―Unlike verbal 
signification, vocal signification can create, augment and/or reverse the presumed meaning of 
words by using pronunciation, tone coloration, and inflectional variation to speak to an 
emotional as well as conceptual register of ‗meaning‘‖ (Walker, 2003:160)  
The damage done 
Presenting shards of TRC testimony juxtaposed with striking images and disjointed sounds, 
both these presentations are able to evoke the experience of the ‗shattered‘ self that is 
commonly associated with trauma (Herman, 1994; Shay, 1994, 2002; Field, 2006). American 
anthropologist Roberta Culbertson is a first-hand survivor of trauma: the daughter of a 
humanitarian aid official in Lebanon, she was kidnapped as a five-year-old girl by a violent 
fringe group and exposed to unspeakable cruelty (Sorenson, 2007). Fifty-six years later, she 
directs the Institute on Violence and Community in Virginia, and has worked with survivors 
of atrocities in Burundi, Rwanda, Guatemala, Cambodia, India and Pakistan. Culbertson 
makes a crucial distinction between violence, and violation: whereas the former may involve 
a contestation of power by various antagonists, the latter entails a target being stripped of 
agency and left with an existential dilemma characterised by dissolution of the self 
(Culbertson, 1995;2006). 
While violence has no specific locus of action, the site of violation is the physical body of the 
targeted victim. Traumatic experiences are all painful, but it does not follow that all painful 
experience is traumatic: ―...‗trauma‘ refers to the rupturing of an individual‘s sense of internal 
and external worlds which leaves post-traumatic legacies such as dissociation, depression and 
hypersensitivity‖ (Field, 2006:31). Psychic lesions are associated with particular neurological 
responses in the body that retain the memories of traumatic events as they were experienced 
and how they were responded to, whether they were understood at the time or not. Culbertson 












sensations of movement within the body, accompanied by an energising suffusion of 
adrenaline into the cells, or the numbing effects of cells awash with noradrenaline. These 
‗flashback‘ episodes are a physiological echo of the body‘s evolutionary ‗capitulate-fight-or-
flight‘ response at the time of the traumatic event: the hormonal neurotransmitters ensure the 
survival of the physical body above all else; instincts take control of the action while the 
senses of panic and fear are redirected to parts of the brain where they are less likely to 
interfere in the execution of the primal survival strategy. ―Thus events and feelings are 
simply not registered, but this does not mean they are forgotten; they are located in other 
parts of the mind and the parts of the body affected as well, though separated from the 
continuing integrated story of the self‖ (Culbertson, 1995:174 ). 
Jonathan Shay is an American psychiatrist who has focussed his career on healing the scars 
of trauma in war veterans: for fourteen years he was involved in a specialised intensive 
outpatient treatment programme for Vietnam combat veterans with Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder, PTSD (Shay, 2002). Shay asserts that human memory exists, simultaneously, in a 
number of manifestations: physically in the brain and body/mind, psychologically, socially 
and culturally. A fragmentation of the personal narrative, as described by Culbertson, would 
leave a deep-seated physical legacy that has a reciprocal disruptive effect on the social and 
cultural dimensions of the wider narrative. It is understandable then why trauma is able to 
destroy the bonds between the individual and society: the traumatic event represents a 
betrayal of the social and cultural norms and ideals that sustain community. A lingering 
mistrust of others and erratic antisocial behaviour - triggered by uninvited flashbacks – 
accompany a loss of self-respect and deepening sense of alienation. Significantly, Shay 
highlights the destruction of the capacity for democratic participation as one of the lasting 
effects of unhealed PTSD: passionate debate within the rules of fairness, and the notions of 
persuasion and compromise, imply the trustworthiness of words; the betrayal of trauma 
obliterates the capacity for trust altogether. Unhealed trauma ―... destroys the unnoticed 
substructure of democracy, the cognitive and social capacities that enable a group of people 
to freely construct a cohesive narrative of their own future‖ (Shay 1994:181). The individual 
and the community clearly share the burden of trauma, with their prospects for recovery 
mutually intertwined. I submit that a holistic approach to healing should seek to rekindle the 
affective bonds of the commune. ―Those who have survived learn that their sense of self, of 













As with Ubu and REwind, the staging of Truth in Translation reflects a range of choices that 
incorporates the various ideological strands of the early twentieth-century avant-garde. 
However, rather than a post-modern blend of self-perpetuating inter-textuality, each work is 
constructed in such a way as to bring about an integrated, aesthetically mediated experience 
of transcendence. The German-American Slavonic scholar Raoul Eshelman argues that a 
successor to post-modernism is to be found in performatism; so called after J.L. Austin‘s 
speech-act theory in which a statement derives meaning through the fact and condition of its 
utterance. ―In general, performatism encourages self-therapy, it suggests we can transcend the 
force of rampant, oppressive contexts by repeatedly asserting our own selfhood‖ (Eshelman, 
2000:5). Accordingly, I argue that Truth in Translation presents aesthetic choices which 
encourage the audience to engage actively with the presentation, to enter the subjunctive 
‗what-if‘ mood of Victor Turner‘s liminal state, to re-imagine and to construct meaning from 
the metaphorical mosaic.  
A backdrop of shirts hanging on washing-lines serves as a screen onto which images are 
projected; a collage of visual memories punctuates the characters‘ introspective journeys, 
while the multi-coloured mix of empty shirts evokes the missing bodies that haunt our 
history. Rugged flight-cases are moved about the stage to serve as items of furniture, from a 
bed or bar-counter to a juke-box or telephone-booth; the cases suggest a journey over 
treacherous terrain with freight-loads of personal baggage. All the while the evocative 
musical score performed by three on-stage musicians sets the tone and ―… reinforces the 
play‘s emotional arc. At first it keeps its distance, as the translators are supposed to. As they 
give in to their feelings, so do the songs‖ (Taitte, 2007). 
Music and song were woven into the culture of resistance in South Africa, they ―... helped 
people of diverse tribal and racial identities transcend differences that remained salient in 
other contexts‖ (Macky, 2007:1). Whether at political gatherings or funerals, spontaneous 
outbursts of song provided expression for emotions that were too complicated or painful for 
spoken words. The TRC hearings were no exception, with chairman Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu notably leading spectators in song on the first day of hearings after Nomonde Calata‘s 
emotional breakdown (TRC, 1996a). In this context Hugh Masakela‘s original score blends 
with traditional struggle songs to create an organic but vital dimension to the presentation: ―It 












like a requiem for truth itself‖ (Gardner, 2007).  The lyrics to the original songs are largely 
constructed from TRC testimony, and so conjure images of crushing brutality: 
 Mayi-ba-bo-o-o-o 
The hair of your husband was pulled out.  
I-i-yoh! Hey! 
His tongue was pulled and stretched. His fingers were cut off.  
Achoo-wee-iyoh! 
Forty-three wounds in his body. They poured acid in his face. 
Mayi-ba-bo-ho-ho-ho 
Chopped off his right hand. Then he was blown up. 
His pieces were... scattered... all over the floor... 
His pieces were... splattered... all over the wall... 
His pieces were... plastered... on the ceiling. 
Splattered... (Lessac et al., 2008:9-10). 
 
―The ‗beautiful but chilling‘ lyrics and music‖ (Jaruzel, 2007) form a jarring counterpoint to 
the action on stage, enforcing a critical distancing in the Brechtian tradition. But I argue that 
the musical element - which, in addition to accompanying songs, underscores much of the 
action – activates in the spectator the liminal state of ritual. The harmonics and rhythm of 
music conspire with other aesthetic components to create a ‗driving stimulus‘, initiating the 
neural spill-over or rebound effect of religious and aesthetic experience as described by 
D‘Aquili and others (Lex, 1979; Newberg and D‘Aquili, 2000); the mutually inhibitive neural 
systems, associated with cognition and affect respectively, are stimulated beyond a threshold 
and their functions ‗spill over‘; idea  and emotions are at once both ‗felt‘ and ‗thought‘. 
Victor Turner‘s ‗as-is‘ indicative state coexists with the ‗as-if‘ subjunctive state. ―It is almost 
as though the limbic system were itself endowed with higher intelligence, in a kind of 
carnivalesque reversal of the indicative system‖ (Turner, 1986:33) 
Within this aesthetic environment, which both mediates and frames the liminal experience, 
the audience members individually and collectively become part of the live, real-time, human 
social interaction that constitutes the dramatic action. Fragments of narrative are interwoven 
with poetic imagery, sustaining an ever-evolving re-imagined milieu: a landscape in which 
characters interrelate – each imbued with autonomous agency – as they negotiate a 















Lights down, listen and speak 
Ladies and gentlemen – your attention, please. Please take a moment to locate your 
cell phone and to ensure that it is completely switched off. In what we are about to be 
engaged, you must not, under any circumstances, become involved. You must not 
make judgments or take sides. You are just the pipe through which the information 
flows. You must not be seduced by passions nor overcome by emotions. They sneak 
up on you, catch you by surprise, and render you compromised. Personal sympathies 
and matters of the heart have no place here. That is your mandate. That is your code. 
You are a witness. That is all (Lessac et al., 2008:1). 
I was among the opening night crowd at Cape Town‘s Baxter Theatre one evening in 
February 2007 as these words of caution filled the darkened auditorium: the performance of 
Truth in Translation was about to begin. Audiences are accustomed to the routine reminder to 
deactivate their phones but, as it became immediately clear, this was a more portentous 
admonition: we were privy to a briefing being given to a group of translators that had been 
recruited to travel around the country with the TRC. Just as Ubu and REwind had done, Truth 
in Translation presents a kaleidoscopic version of the TRC hearings and the events it had 
been mandated to investigate. However, Truth in Translation goes further in examining the 
rift between language and experience, ―…at a moment of confession by a victim, words 
literally fail to articulate an experience‖ (Radithlalo, 2009:92).  The play sets out to explore 
the inadequacy of language in the face of ‗unspeakable‘ truths; it reveals language‘s inability 
to transmit the kind of knowledge which defies comprehension but for the simultaneous 
engagement of the cognitive and affective faculties. This notion is vividly depicted as the 
testimony of Mrs. Nombuyiselo Mhlawuli, is translated in the play: 
This inside me … fights my tongue … It is … unshareable. It destroys words. Before 
he was blown up, they cut off his hands … How do I speak this? – terrible … I want 
his hands back (Lessac et al., 2008:8). 
 
Auschwitz survivor Charlotte Delbo insists that language only scratches the surface of 
memory, ―… only sense memory, which preserves and tries to transmit the physical impact of 
the ordeal, enables us to approach the unthinkable [emphasis in original]‖ (Delbo, 1995: xiv). 
The theatre-makers endeavor to embody this paradox by weaving together, in performance, 
the individual narratives of a diverse group of TRC translators, a vital cog in the TRC 
machinery that sought to provide equal access to the eleven official language groupings in 
South Africa. 
The terms ‗translate‘ and ‗interpret‘ are often used interchangeably. However there is a 












are reminded that they are mere conduits for information, and should remain detached from 
the stories they are being called upon to help convey. The essential difference between the 
two tasks is summed up by a participant in a post-TRC workshop for interpreters: 
―…‗exactness of language‘ is important in translation, while ‗emotion and intention, not 
necessarily accuracy‘ is important in interpreting‖ (Anthonissen, 2008:171). Back in the play, 
and as the briefing comes to an end, the characters make it clear that they are expected to be 
translators rather than interpreters, to serve the record and not its embodiment: flippantly, and 
with some irony, they toss around the catch-phrase ―…do not become involved!‖ And so a 
central theme of the play is clearly flagged: the crucial role of emotion in human discourse. 
Director, Michael Lessac, states that he decided not to focus on any of the prominent figures 
associated with the commission, but rather on ―the young and nearly invisible interpreters‖ 
(Jaruzel, 2007), a choice which discards the single protagonist of the Aristotelian model, 
adopting instead the ensemble approach favoured by Brazillian director Augusto Boal 
(Homann, 2009). The principle had long been associated with South African struggle theatre 
and it serves Lessac‘s keen interest in ―… how we shape our identities as ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ … 
[giving] actors and audiences the space to investigate how we perceive ‗the other‘‖ 
(Bombard, 2011). The complement of translators is drawn from diverse racial and cultural 
backgrounds, each representing a particular ‗other‘ to the rest: a synecdochic amalgamation 
of South Africa‘s multi-textured society.  
Canadian sociologist Erving Goffman noted the capacity for spontaneous engagement in 
humans, the tendency to become emotionally absorbed rather than purely rationally 
engrossed in an activity: ―… the individual becomes an integral part of the situation, lodged 
in it and exposed to it, infusing himself into the encounter‖ (Ostrow, 1996:344). For an 
insight into the mechanisms at play though, I don the white coat once more, briefly to assume 
a clinical role: the biologist sees the on-stage interaction between the mix of ‗others‘ 
engaging audience attention and stimulating their neural networks of social cognition, 
including mirror-neurons, spindle cells, the amygdala and other brain regions ―… 
consistently recruited in understanding of social action - superior temporal sulcus and medial 
prefrontal cortex‖ (Todorov et al. 2006:80). Spontaneous social inferences occur below the 
level of awareness as individual audience members develop an affinity for those characters 












Lessac‘s interpreters rapidly shed their anonymity: within the first few minutes each emerges 
as a rounded character, exhibiting distinct human frailties and hinting at internal 
contradictions, personal secrets and emotional baggage. By way of example, Peter has 
already revealed himself to be something of a provocateur, but we are introduced to his 
tender side as he sings a ditty over the telephone for his young daughters. Alia, a coloured 
girl concerned for the health of her grandmother, exposes her knee-jerk prejudice by 
dismissing Peter as ―…this white guy who thinks he owns the place‖ (Lessac et al., 2008:4). 
As each of the characters reveals contradictory aspects to their personalities, individual 
audience members may begin to feel a realignment of their own empathic tendencies: 
simulations of the inner states of the ‗other‘ are assisted by mirror-neurons, making 
adjustments to the Theory of Mind and accommodating for new traits as they are exhibited. 
Webs of meaning  
The hearings get underway and through a laminate of language over language, personal 
narratives become interwoven with the sordid meta-narrativ  of a history that all must share. 
The translators channel intimate first-hand stories of senseless brutality, of loss, of anguish 
and ceaseless torment and they begin themselves to exhibit signs of emotional stress. The 
phenomenon of emotional contagion is made clear in a scene depicting testimony from the 
amnesty hearing of Victor Mthembu, in connection with the infamous Boipotong massacre of 
1992 - in which migrant Zulu-speaking hostel-dwellers slaughtered dozens of men, women 
and children on a rampage through the township (TRC, 1998d; Simpson, 2011). As the scene 
comes to a climax, Alia displays anger while translating for the cross-examining Advocate 
Daniel Berger, before confiding in her colleagues that she had lost control.  
 ALIA - MR BERGER (CONT'D): ... because, as you put it, ―a snake gives birth to 
 another snake‖? Mr Mthembu, are we talking about killing every child who isn‘t 
 Zulu?  
 [Gavel pounds. Transition into new seating arrangement for De Kock testimony.]   
 ALIA:  Fuck! (hurls chair into flightcase) I was so angry I totally lost it! 
 NOMAWETHU: Alia, he was the one who was angry. You interpreted.  
 ALIA:  No, that was my anger! And now I‘m going to be fired.  
 NOMAWETHU: We were all angry.  
 CLAIRE: You won‘t be fired. They don‘t even notice us. 
 JAKE: Hey. Do you know that everyone gets free massages except for us? (Lessac 













Vicarious traumatisation is a recognised condition brought on by prolonged and intense 
exposure to the trauma of others (De Ridder, 1997). Each of the characters begins to reflect a 
personalised combination of the variety of symptoms, which includes recurring nightmares 
and disturbed sleep, physical and emotional fatigue and somatic complaints like headaches 
and stomach pains. Significantly though, behaviour is affected: personal relationships suffer; 
there is fear and distrust of others, while irritability and increased levels of aggression are 
displayed. As the characters become more immersed in this simmering emotional climate, the 
relationships between them begin to fray and each one‘s innate prejudice and bias is brought 
to the fore:  the focus of empathy regularly swings from one character to another and the 
audience is encouraged to experience multiple shifting subjectivities. 
The spectators are given an opportunity not only to feel, but to contemplate the notion of 
empathy, the blurring of the distinction between ‘I’ and ‘you’, and the transitive nature of 
embodied knowledge. Lessac maintains that the practice of simultaneous translation is akin to 
the actor‘s process: ―For what are the translators if not actors … what happens when someone 
truly interprets is that you have to walk in their shoes, see through their eyes and that is basic 
acting‖ (Thamm, 2007). The second act of Truth in Translation begins with two of the 
translators on stage; young Jake is an aspiring actor and he coaches Peter in the fundamentals 
of his craft. 
 PETER: So, are you you, or are you somebody else? When you act? Or is somebody 
 else...  you?  
 JAKE: Alright, Peter, you are Hamlet, right? Your uncle has killed your father, and 
 now he‘s fucking your mother. (beat) How do you feel?  
 PETER: Fine.  
 JAKE:  Come on, man, not Peter, Hamlet. How does Hamlet feel?  
 PETER: Oh, right. Ah, I... Who‘s my mother fucking?  
 JAKE:  Your uncle.  
 PETER: What, for real...? Oh.   …  
 JAKE: Think of your kids. Fiona and...  
 PETER: Alice. … 
 JAKE: Alice and Fiona are kidnapped by a child molester...  
 PETER: Hey, shut up, man! That‘s sick! What‘s wrong with you?!  
 JAKE: There you go! See what just happened to you!  
 PETER: You don‘t go to my kids... Not my kids! What? What happened? (Lessac et 
 al., 2008:42-43). 
 
This scene introduces the re-enactment of the TRC amnesty hearing in which former victims 












1997). Interwoven with the Benzien testimony, Peter‘s acting lesson becomes a parallel role-
play game where he is the interrogator and Jake is a suspect with his shirt pulled over his 
head being strangled with a belt: an echo of the infamous wet-bag torture demonstration. As 
the testimony begins to reveal Benzien‘s technique of deliberately blurring the line between 
friend and foe – characterising his relationship with Ashley Forbes as one of friendship – it 
seems the ‗acting lesson‘ is now a children‘s game turned nasty: 
 [inter-woven text edited for clarity] 
 CLAIRE – BENZIEN: After that we went for a steak dinner. We drank many beers 
 together. Then we took a trip to the Eastern Cape. Where you had the most Kentucky 
 Fried chicken you had ever eaten. Remember? … Remember? …We drank 
 Stellenbosch wine. … Pinotage. … You saw snow for the first time. Remember the 
 family? They laughed, they took photos of you playing in the snow ... 
 ALIA – FORBES: Another time I was wrapped, naked and wet, in a carpet... You 
 stuck both your thumbs in my nose, until blood poured from my nostrils!  
 CLAIRE – BENZIEN: A harmless smack, a little nose bleed. … I brought you fresh 
 fruit every Sunday... 
 PETER: Gun running, you little kaffir shit. That‘s the charge.  
 JAKE: Don‘t... don‘t hurt me...  
 PETER: Not such a smart little shit now, huh?  
 JAKE: That‘s enough. Stop!  
 PETER: The truth! Tell daddy the truth...  
 JAKE: Stop... ahhh, stop... You‘re hurting me!  
 PETER: (mimicking him) ―You‘re hurting me. You‘re hurting me!‖  
 JAKE: Ahhhhhh!  
 PETER: Ahhhhhh! Alright! Wow. Woooah!... You were amazing. Next time I want 
 to... what I want to do, is switch it around...  
 JAKE: Come on, man, untie my hands. (There is a long pause as PETER just looks at 
 him). Come on, untie my hands. (Pause. JAKE looks around uneasily) Hey, untie my 
 hands. (Pause) What are you doing?  
 PETER: (After a few beats in which he stares at JAKE, and JAKE becomes very 
 nervous.) Acting. (Both laugh, Peter frees Jake) Next time, I want to be the victim. 
 (Lessac et al., 2008:46-48) 
     
The theatre-makers continue to juxtapose the grotesque and the mundane, inducing Brecht‘s 
verfremdungseffekt and ensuring the audience‘s critical faculties are not suspended despite 
the strong emotions being evoked. The action moves freely between a depiction of an 
objective ‗external‘ social reality and a subjective ‗internal‘ psychological reality, until the 
dividing line between these aspects of experience dissolves; ―for, as in physics so in the 
observation of ordinary life, the presence of an observer is itself part of the reality the 












Brecht himself, I have no doubt, would have endorsed the insertion of songs and commentary 
as the action progresses, as he would certainly have approved the use of comedy and 
clowning. In addition to providing convenient contextual signposts for the audience, the 
elusive nature of objectivity is underscored throughout by introducing a journalist character, 
Marcel; the audience experiences his frustration as he tries to construct suitably factual links 
for his television reports: 
 MARCEL: The hand... the hand in a jar. The hand in a jam jar. The hand in a 
 Consol jam jar... um... okay. The severed hand of Sicelo Mhlawuli... (tries  again) 
 ANC  activist Sicelo Mhlawuli... No, kak. (and again) The missing hand of 
 ANC activist  Sicelo Mhlawuli... (to himself) Fuck! (Lessac et al., 2008:10). 
It emerges that Marcel is carrying his share of personal pain which he dulls through self-
medication with alcohol. His emotionally numbed cynicism is frequently expressed in a dark 
humour which, according to TRC chronicler Max du Preez, was quite typical. ―The jokes 
became crueller and cruder. Mostly about torture, murder and suffering. Really tasteless stuff. 
It was our way of coping with week after week of emotionally draining hearings‖ (Du Preez, 
1997:9).  
But Marcel‘s cynicism is no mere expression of a negative world view seen through jaded 
and scornful eyes; in the play it is deployed rather in the manner of the court-jester or in the 
vein of the classical Stoic philosopher. Thus tilting at expectations and challenging the 
presumptions of social norms, Marcel sets out to expose the veracity of Diogenes‘ assertion: 
―Most men are so nearly mad that a finger‘s breadth would make the difference‖ (Dudley, 
1937:21). As they share a drink at the bar, Marcel frequently assumes a role in one or the 
other translator‘s private nightmare, encouraging them into a ritual of performing dreaded 
and repressed scenarios, to utter their fears, to embody their shame. Marcel becomes the 
Sergeant, alternately goading and ordering Peter, the army sniper, to shoot a defenceless child 
from a helicopter, coaxing a confession of cowardice from the cover of bluster; then he is a 
Vaudeville crier beseeching a reprisal of Thabo‘s ‗role‘ as the askari turncoat and apartheid 
hit-man Joe Mamasela, after the translator had become too involved in the assassin‘s 
testimony providing a glimpse into his own possible complicity; affecting the guise of a 
prosecutor, Marcel then cross-examines a witness while Gideon translates for his own father 
and in so doing confronts his twin sources of personal shame: his conservative Afrikaans 












As the translators speak the memories, they are forced to adopt multiple subjectivities as they 
vocally appropriate the varieties of truth through the sustained use of the personal pronoun 
‗I‘: each becomes the simultaneous embodiment of observer and participant, victim and 
perpetrator.  
 CLAIRE: You know what I hated  
 PETER: What? 
 CLAIRE: It was always I.  I did this…and I did that…I was raped…I slit his 
 throat…I, I, I … 
 NHLANHLA: That WAS the job! (Lessac et al., 2008:72-73). 
Claire‘s frustration at having to envision the reality and breathe into existence acts of 
brutality echoes that expressed by many real-life translators:  
 You had to identify with that person and say I did this or I did that. Some of the 
 incidents we knew to be true through media reports or families or comrades. But they 
 came there and completely denied it …You felt so angry you felt like punching them 
 in the face while they were speaking, especially as that lie had to come through me 
 through my voice (Ross, 2006). 
 
On the road 
According to its creators, Truth in Translation was devised to ―provide a thought-provoking, 
compelling theatrical experience of high artistic value … bridging social and cultural barriers 
to foster dialogue and active participation in a democratic society‖ (Colonnades Theatre Lab, 
2009:2). The extent to which it achieves its first objective is perhaps reflected in the 
overwhelmingly positive critical reviews the play has harvested wherever it has been 
performed. One of the few dissenting voice belongs to Cape Town theatre commentator 
Megan Choritz, who ack owledges she‘s likely to be seen as a ‗party-pooper‘, but that the 
standing ovation at the final curtain had surprised her (Choritz, 2007). However she raises 
points worthy of discussion, chief among which is that, as far as she is concerned, the play 
introduces nothing new.  
South African literary figure Zakes Mda points out that the TRC repertoire provides little 
novelty for those who had experienced apartheid first-hand. ―How can a writer surpass the 
Kafkaesque nightmares that unfolded in these hearings? But soon enough I remembered that 
for black people in South Africa there was nothing new in these stories‖ (Mda, 2009:124). I 
suggest that Mda‘s observation may likewise be true for a number of non-black South 
Africans who were connected to the anti-apartheid struggle and for whom the relentless 












Many plays of the struggle ouvre of the 1980s, were packaged for export rather than be 
doomed to a single season ‗preaching to the converted‘ at the Market Theatre. I maintain that 
Truth in Translation is no different: Lessac says the project was conceived specifically to 
export the lessons of the TRC to ―conflict and healing zones around the world … where 
people still might not be able to let go of thoughts of victimhood, entitlement, vengeance and 
denial‖ (Perry, 2007). 
I suspect that a source of further frustration for the reviewer can similarly be attributed to 
Lessac‘s stated aim of fostering inter-cultural dialogue on an international scale. ―We were 
fed bits and pieces of each of the interpreters – where they came from and their personal 
stories – but not enough to care about them. Perhaps focusing on one or two of them might 
have helped‖ (Choritz, 2007). The theatre-makers have clearly tried to provide points of entry 
for the widest possible audience by choosing to highlight diversity among the mix of 
characters. It is true that local audiences may be more familiar with the types represented on 
stage and so would perhaps feel a need for more specific character detail. However, the 
universal relevance embodied in the spread of characters has successfully engaged audiences 
in more than ten countries including Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Northern Ireland, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia: dozens of testimonials attest to the value of the encounter, 
―The performance initiated strong emotions, connected this group with people with similar 
experiences and strengthened them in understanding that they are not alone (Colonnades 
Theatre Lab, 2009:13). 
The tour of the Western Balkans in September and October of 2008 demonstrates the 
potential for theatre to foster dialogue and catalyse emotional and social healing in 
communities scarred by the trauma of civil war. Deployed as a piece of ‗applied theatre‘ 
(Ackroyd, 2000), the production formed the lynchpin of an intervention, coordinated together 
with dozens of local NGOs on the ground, involving talk-backs and workshops facilitated by 
the actors (Brownell, 2008). The opening performance was held on the banks of the river 
Neretva in the shadow of the 16
th
 century Ottoman bridge connecting two sides of the divided 
town of Mostar. In the outdoor setting the theatre presentation was imbued with ritualistic 
elements of carnival: ―Festival, ceremonial form and the transgression of social boundaries 
are animated with the strongest possible feeling of solidarity and community affiliation‖ 












ethnically-fuelled war of the 1990s, members of the various Balkan communities remain 
deeply suspicious of and hostile to ‗the other‘ in their midst. 
 … very little progress has been made to bring the ethnic groupings together. Most 
 schools are rigidly divided along ethnic lines, often with a high wall through the 
 middle of the property. In Mostar I witnessed Croat children being taught a 
 completely different history of their country than that taught to Muslim children at the 
 same school. (Du Preez, 2008:14) 
In a region where few will venture beyond their ethnic comfort-zones (Felleissen, 1997; 
Lippman, 2000), predominantly Catholic Croats watched from one side of the river, while the 
largely Muslim Bosniaks watched from the other bank; those without a direct view of the 
stage could follow the action on giant projections on the side of the bridge (Jaruzel, 2008). 
The iconic Stari Most had stood for 427 years before the bridge was destroyed by heavy 
shelling at the hight of the war in 1993; it was rebuilt between 2001 and 2003 and stands 
today as ―a symbol of both the divisions of the past and also of the process of post-war 
rebuilding‖ (Colonnades Theatre Lab, 2009:7). The physical environment scarred by history 
was thus co-opted to infuse the event with cultural specificity and so to invade the 
imagination of the audience (Schechner, 1968). 
The central theme of the fallibility of language in adequately conveying experience was given 
an added level of expression through the use of projected sur-titles, with the English text 
translated into the local dialects of the region (Jaruzel, 2008). In addition to ensuring the plot 
could be followed by all, the projections provided a neat commentary on how language can 
be equally deployed to unite or divide communities: in many instances the translations would 
be seen to be almost ide tical. ―Each dialect is marked only by a couple of words, and here 
and there slight changes in pronunciation‖ (Du Preez, 2008:14). This reality has not deterred 
nationalists on respective sides of the divide from rejecting the lingua-franca and insisting 
that Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian are vastly different languages. However, by 
acknowledging the specific sensitivities around language, the theatre-makers ensured that 
―audiences were reminded subliminally of the other culture and the other frame of reference, 
creating a unifying effect‖ (Colonnades Theatre Lab, 2009:7). 
The practice of ‗theatre pedagogy‘ seeks to use metaphor to make explicit the performance of  
identity in such charged environments, ―to put the ‗once removed‘ frame around these ‗data‘ 
but also to keep alive the immediacy of the discourse and the tensions and theatrical turns of 












Truth in Translation, Yvette Hardie, explains that ―the play is a non-threatening way to tell 
the truth and also to inoculate people with the values of tolerance and democracy, especially 
young people, so this doesn‘t ever happen again‖ (Jaruzel, 2007). Workshops were devised to 
support the theatre piece; through interactive exercises participants investigated notions of 
individual and group identity and examined how assumtions and prejudices influence their 
interactions with others. ―They were invited to see the many kinds of truth that co-exist 
within their community, and to empathise with points of views that were not necessarily their 
own‖ (Colonnades Theatre Lab, 2009:8). The local NGOs ensured that the workshops were 
attended by people from either side of the divide, many of whom hadn‘t interacted with ‗the 
demonised other‘ for close on two decades since hostilities had officially ended. Hardie 
observes that initially they had been reticent, ―… people sat divided; at the end of some 
workshops people started crossing the room to meet those from the other side. We saw 
human-to-human interactions‖ (Jaruzel, 2008). 
Augusto Boal‘s pedagogy is evident in the methodological approach to both the play and the 
interactive workshops. His dialectical methods were initially harnessed to inspire 
revolutionary political action (Boal, 1993). But although theatre can be used as a weapon 
against oppressors, the influential Brazilian visionary came to believe that theatre could 
equally be used to empower individuals to tackle internal oppressions that separate them from 
society. Theatre provides the means through which humanity is able to observe itself in the 
mirror of the imagination. ―Man can see himself in the act of seeing, in the act of acting, in 
the act of feeling, in the act of thinking. Feel himself feeling, think himself thinking‖ (Boal, 
1995:13)  
 People put it (the TRC) down, they say that ubuntu is a cliché. Well, to the rest of the 
 world it isn‘t. ‗I am because you are‘. That is a highly sophisticated perceptual 
 understanding  of how the brain works, of how the heart works. Is that not truly how 
 we form ourselves? Ubuntu is the bedrock of who we are‘ (Lessac, quoted in Thamm, 
 2007). 
I assert that the body of documentary and anecdotal evidence presented here is testimony to 
the vitality of the repertoire. It demonstrates the power of theatre to provide a shared 
emotional experience and, in so doing, to prime estranged members of fractured communities 
to discard their masks and to engage in active listening with one another: to acknowledge 












TRC, Lessac is resolute in his belief that the repertoire, as embodied in Truth in Translation, 
is able to provide the international community with a ‗moral touchstone‘. 
Conclusion 
In drawing my argument to a close, it is important to address certain inferences this study 
may provoke. Foremost among possible misapprehensions is that the totality of human 
experience can be reduced to a series of biological processes: this is not my contention. I 
have chosen to adopt an evolutionary approach and to consider the central questions from a 
neurophysiological perspective purely in order to cast a fresh light on old assumptions that 
may previously have hindered rather than fostered understanding. A scientist may 
legitimately conduct investigations within a vacuum in order to arrive at valid conclusions; it 
would be misguided though to presume that human experience can be contained within such 
a vacuum. While I have argued for the therapeutic value of theatre, particularly within 
damaged communities, I should emphasise the need for a holistic approach; theatre cannot be 
administered in the manner of a miracle-pill: it must acknowledge the interconnectedness of 
the physical and the metaphysical, the biological and the socio-political dimensions of 
experience. 
It is tempting to view Truth in Translation as just such an elixir: it was conceived with the 
express purpose of exporting the values of ubuntu to other countries across the globe where 
the legacy of conflict has left deep scars (Colonnades Theatre Lab, 2009). Although the play 
was rehearsed in South Africa with an entirely local cast, its first airing was far from home, in 
Rwanda. At the time that small East African country was emerging from a brutal genocide 
that happened to coincide with the birth of democracy in South Africa; in just a hundred days 
of 1994 as many as eight-hundred-thousand people were slaughtered, most of them minority 
ethnic Tutsis (Straus, 2004). Truth in Translation and its associated workshops were 
reportedly well received, despite the sensitive subject matter and the rawness of the wounds. 
―According to some of the organisers, the participating Rwandans had never been so open 
and frank in their conversations‖ (Du Preez, 2006). I suggest the favourable reception the 
play enjoyed was largely due to its presentation being at-one-remove from the lived reality of 
the audience. In the highly-charged environment, the performance could more fully inhabit a 
metaphoric dimension: there is no judgement, no finger-pointing. And that, I submit, is 












The Rwandese people were not unfamiliar with such forms of theatre before the touring 
troupe from South Africa arrived; on the contrary, as early as 1998 just four years after the 
genocide, a number of groups were already using performance as a tool for nation-building 
(Breed, 2008). Where ‗grassroots‘ theatre finds its most altruistic voice, Breed notes, it 
provides a space for survivors and perpetrators to fashion new relationships. But he points out 
that much of the theatre was being created under the auspices of the government to ‗perform 
nationhood‘ and promote its particular conception of unity, the motives not altogether 
benevolent. As Victor Turner reminds us, ―theatre should limit itself to presenting 
alternatives: it should not be a brainwashing technique‖ (1982:118). In staging nationalism, 
an attempt is made to evoke a pre-colonial ‗unified‘ past, whereas in truth there are two 
divergent narratives of that period: the Hutus‘ and the Tutsis‘ (Corey and Joireman, 2004). 
The updated mythology glorifies the reign of the Tutsi monarchy ―… [and the] theatre 
productions inadvertently emphasise and perform ethnic differences‖ (Breed, 2008: 34). 
There is a clear distinction, I assert, between re-imagining the future and glibly rewriting the 
past. 
In the realm of social ritual and in sharp contrast to the approach of the TRC, Rwanda opted 
to pursue a model of ‗retributive justice‘. The relative merits of the two methods of dealing 
with the past are beyond the scope of the present study, although Cape Town legal scholar 
Jeremy Sarkin sounds a warning that the choice of ―…how a society deals with its past has a 
major determining influence on whether that society will achieve long-term peace and 
stability‖ (2001:143). By opting for retributive justice, Rwanda has chosen to emphasise the 
desire for vengeance, which it is feared may contribute towards a risk of further cycles of 
ethnic violence in future (Corey and Joireman, 2004). But more importantly, I venture to 
suggest, the Rwandan authorities have chosen to manipulate the past rather than to re-imagine 
the future. The state-sanctioned criminal tribunals are a perversion of the traditional 
conciliatory ritual from which they take their name, the gacaca (Le Mon, 2002). This 
traditional arbitration device is a community-based informal process submitted to by parties 
in a civil dispute; its legitimacy predicated on the willing participation of the entire 
community. The setting up of gacaca courts can be seen as a betrayal of the cultural heritage 
which, I propose, courts the risk of sabotaging the mission at the outset. Furthermore, on the 












stretched to accommodate the estimated one-hundred and twenty-thousand accused who are 
due to stand trial (Straus, 2004). 
This overview should not be misconstrued as an attempted analysis of the Rwandan situation; 
it is intended to illustrate some of the pitfalls associated with the transitional justice and 
reconciliation. While I believe I have demonstrated the value of theatrical intervention in 
promoting and facilitating dialogue, I am compelled to stress that cultural forms are 
inherently politicised; cultural forms carry baggage that must be recognised for what it is and 
stripped away to whatever extent is practical. Truth in Translation is not immune to this 
hazard: it inevitably carries with it an embarrassment of riches, which attracts either more or 
less significance depending on the context into which it is being transplanted. It is for this 
reason that the younger Grotowski advocated a Poor Theatre; he desired a theatre stripped 
down to its bare essentials in order that the Truth be revealed (Grotowski, 1984).  
Artaud went even further to envision a theatre in which the body of the actor communicates 
directly with the nervous system of the audience (Ward, 1999); he had envisioned a theatre 
where the bodies of performers and spectators are stripped of their cultural carapace and their 
social masks while, in a metaphoric sense, they are flayed of their very skins. This would 
ensure that the confrontation with prevailing mythologies would be direct and the experience 
distinctly inter-subjective; in Turner‘s liminal realm of anti-structure class and culture, 
ethnicity, gender, and all manner of markers through which we are defined, cease to exist. A 
common humanity is acknowledged and the future is re-imagined. 
Stanislavsky, his contemporaries and their forebears each contributed to the insights we are 
fortunate to have the opportunity to develop in our own epoch; reflecting on and contributing 
to the current intellectual climate, just as they had done in theirs. Surely we owe it to 
successive generations to exploit the knowledge emerging from the neuroscience 
laboratories, some of which I venture to suggest, was unknowingly recognised by individuals 
such as Stanislavsky, Brecht, Artaud and Grotowski.  
It is thanks to those who have gone before that we are today able to question the wisdom of 
Descartes and to embrace the paradox that so perplexed Diderot. The earlier thinkers had 
scarcely dreamed of a quantum world where Schrödinger‘s cat would go missing, only to turn 
up both dead and alive. But today, thanks both to the speculative musings of artists and the 












emotions are a vital part of our subjective experience; that we must both think and feel if we 
are to truly engage with our world; that neural structures in our brain and viscera allow us to 
communicate directly with the nervous systems of others; and that we are able even to 
experience a sense of the Divine within our own bodies. 
Yet, there remains so much more to explore. 
Fortunately though, neuroscience - which began as a branch of biology dealing with the 
anatomy, physiology and biochemistry of nerves and nervous tissue - is increasingly being 
recognised as a truly interdisciplinary field of study (Choudhury and Slaby, 2011). The body 
of emerging knowledge is being seized upon and driven forward by scholars in such diverse 
spheres as chemistry, physics, mathematics, economics, computer science, engineering, 
linguistics, philosophy, psychology, and of course medicine with its allied disciplines. To this 
list I would selfishly argue for the inclusion of the dramatic arts, but it is important to 
acknowledge that the collective endeavour is for the ultimate benefit of humanity.    
Buddhist spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, and a number of scholars from other contemplative 
traditions are collaborating with teams of scientists conducting research into the neuroscience 
of altruism through Stanford University‘s Centre for Compassion and Altruism Research and 
Education (Haven, C. 2010). The links between emotion and the physical health of an 
individual have long been suspected, but researchers have recently confirmed links between 
―…chronic distressing emotions and lowered immune resistance‖ (Goleman, 2003:viii). 
Other recent research provides distressing evidence that the damaging effects of traumatic 
experience are transmitted to successive generations through epigenetic modifications 
(Yehuda, et al, 2009; Sarapas, et al, 2011). These findings have significant prognostic 
implications for communities being born and raised in regions of endemic conflict.  
However, ongoing research into neuroplasticity and neurogenesis provides hope by revealing 
how the brain is able to reorganise itself, to change and to adapt under the influence of 
particular types of experience, both negative and positive (Draganski and May, 2008). I 
speculate that even the lasting damage associated with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder may 
be addressed through the ineffable experiences theatre is able to offer.  
The Colonnades Theatre Laboratory that created Truth in Translation, has spawned the 












 … bring together world class artists from opposite sides of civil, religious and racial 
 conflict who, together, create theatrical productions that tour the world‘s conflict 
 zones  to advance the cause of reconciliation. (Global Arts Corps, 2011). 
Under their auspices an ensemble piece created with actors in Belfast is scheduled to open 
later in 2012; in Cambodia a circus production is planned to explore inter-familial 
relationships within a community that was never afforded a post-conflict reconciliation 
process; and Albanian, Serbian and Roma actors are planning a collaboration to explore 
shared myths.  
At the time of writing, local researchers have been granted ethical approval for a cross-
disciplinary study that seeks to map brain empathic responses to expressions of forgiveness 
and remorse in post-apartheid South Africa (Morris and Gophe. 2012). The research was 
initiated by Professor Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, a former commissioner on the TRC: ―We 
believe that the historical experience of being white or black during apartheid may have 
lasting intergenerational consequences in the way people respond to racially charged 
situations‖ (ibid:5). I look forward to the empirical data that may emerge from this research, 
and urge local theatre practitioners to incorporate the findings into the embodied repertoire. 
By means of performance I believe we might proceed feelingly, healing the wounds of the 
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